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REGO, Elba Cristina Lima. How Technological Catching up Matters Economic to 
Development Today. 166 p. Rio de Janeiro, 2014. PhD/Doctoral Dissertation (Public 
Policies, Strategy and Development Doctoral Program). Instituto de Economia, 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
 
The present dissertation, which approaches development as a catching up issue, 
analyzes the critical role of technological change and innovations for the developing 
countries willing to narrow or close their gap with the most advanced economies. In 
this study, catching up is defined as a process in which a developing country narrows  
its technological gap  in some key sectors, using  the leading countries as a model 
but also innovating, with significant increases in productivity, growth rates and 
income, which results in a narrowing of its economic gap.  The dissertation´s main 
arguments are that technological change and innovations have become not only a 
prerequisite to catch up in broad sense, but the very essence of catch up today, 
which increasingly relies on the ability of countries behind the technological frontiers 
to build up scientific and technological capabilities to absorb new technologies and 
innovate locally. The dissertation is organized in an introduction, three chapters and 
concluding remarks. The first and more conceptual chapter revisits theoretical and 
empirical contributions grounded in the catching-up approach. Although focusing on 
technological aspects, the chapter also calls attention to other critical elements to 
catch up, such as institutions, state intervention and finance. The second chapter 
discusses the catching-up experiences of Japan and East Asian, especially those of 
Korea and Taiwan. The third chapter analyses changing conditions in the 
international scenario associated with the emergence of the WTO and the 
resurgence of China as major international player, which put challenges but also 
open new opportunities behind the technological and economic frontier. 
 









REGO, Elba Cristina Lima. How Technological Catching up Matters to Economic 
Development Today. 166 p. Rio de Janeiro, 2014. Tese de Doutorado. (Doutorado 
em Ciências, em Políticas Públicas, Instituições e Desenvolvimento). Instituto de 
Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Brasil 
 
A presente tese, que aborda o desenvolvimento como uma questão de catching up, 
analisa o papel crítico das mudanças tecnológicas e das inovações para os países 
em desenvolvimento que desejam reduzir ou fechar o seu gap tecnológico e 
econômico com relação às economias mais avançadas. Neste estudo, catching up é 
definido como um processo no qual um país em desenvolvimento reduz o seu gap 
tecnológico em alguns setores chave, usando os países líderes como modelo e 
também inovando, com aumentos significativos de produtividade, taxas de 
crescimento e renda, que resultam em redução de seu gap econômico. Os principais 
argumentos da tese são de que a mudança tecnológica (i.e, a introdução de novas 
tecnologias) e a inovação tornaram-se não apenas um pré-requisito, mas a própria 
essência do catching up, que depende cada vez mais da capacidade dos países 
atrás das fronteiras tecnológica e econômica desenvolverem competências 
científicas e tecnológicas para adaptar e adotar novas tecnologias, e inovar 
localmente. A tese possui uma introdução, três capítulos e conclusão. O primeiro 
capítulo, revisita contribuições teóricas e empíricas fundamentadas na abordagem 
do catching up. Embora priorize os aspectos tecnológicos e a inovação, o capítulo 
também chama a atenção para outros elementos críticos para o catching up, como 
as instituições, a intervenção do Estado e o financiamento. O segundo capítulo 
analisa as experiências de catching up do Japão e do Leste Asiático, especialmente 
as da Coréia e de Taiwan. O terceiro capítulo examina as mudanças no cenário 
internacional associadas à emergência da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) 
e ao ressurgimento da China como grande player internacional, que colocam 
desafios, mas também sinalizam novas oportunidades para países atrás das 
fronteiras tecnológica e econômica que querem fazer o catching up. 
Palavras-chave:  catching up, catch up, technological change, innovation, economic 
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Why have some nations succeeded in attaining high levels of economic and 
human development while others, despite all development strategies already 
adopted, still continue very far from the socio-economic frontier? What explains the 
differences among countries and regions in terms of wealth, productivity and 
welfare? What are the key elements for developing economies to succeed in 
catching-up with the more advanced economies today?  
Since the early days of economics as a separate field of study, a huge amount 
of literature has addressed these questions, explaining the origin of nation’s wealth 
and how progress can be attained. Over time, different approaches have proposed 
many interpretations and prescribed a plenty of policies for countries to succeed, 
often conflicting with one another. In fact, socio-economic progress is a 
multidimensional issue, contingent upon a myriad of changing factors, such as capital 
accumulation, knowledge, technology, institutions, culture, politics, behavior, values 
and conditions in the international arena. Thus it comes as no surprise that 
economists and other experts have different ideas about what development is about 
and how it can be achieved.  
According to Irma Adelman (1998)1, shifts in theories about underdevelopment 
and policy prescriptions to attain economic progress are dependent on many 
elements, such as learning; changes in ideology, international environment and 
domestic institutions; emergence of constraints and new aspirations; technological 
breakthroughs and how the culture of Economics evolves. The greater availability 
and better quality of data on development and growth make it possible to check the 
validity of some propositions with a certain degree of accuracy, as well as the 
formulation of new approaches with a higher degree of adherence to the reality. The 
emergence of new ideologies usually implies the reformulation of old theories and 
policy prescriptions in accordance with the values of the elite in power. Technological 
breakthroughs and institutional innovations solve old problems and put new 
challenges; close old roads and give birth to new opportunities. Structural socio-
                                            
1 Adelman, Irma (2001) – Fallacies in Development Theory and Their Implications for Policy. In G.M. 
Meier and J.E. Stiglitz (editors), Frontiers of Development Economics, World Bank and Oxford 






economic shifts associated to the development process itself demand new 
institutions, change the nature of constraints that a country has to face and forge new 
social aspirations. Yet the principles that structure the rhetoric of Economics also 
affect how the determinants of change are integrated into theories and models 
(Adelman, 1998). 
Despite all interpretations, recommendations and changes along the way, 
most countries are still doing badly in terms of progress and well-being.  The 
prosperity gap between nations is widening2 and even the more advanced ones have 
to strive harder not to get worse off. In addition, drastic changes in political, 
technological, financial, regulatory and competition conditions in the international 
scenario have rendered some development strategies, which worked quite well in the 
past, ineffective or prohibited; thus, new development instruments are necessary. 
These new circumstances helps to explain the renewed interest in development 
studies and why questions concerning how socio-economic progress can be 
accomplished, how countries significantly behind the technological and economic 
frontier can catch up, and even what the critical factors are today for countries that 
are behind the technological and economic catch up with the more advanced 
economies remain crucial and should be addressed more than ever.  
Just as it was in the past, there is still neither an easy nor a general answer to 
these questions that fits all countries. The current developing and least developed 
nations are very heterogeneous in terms of population, size, economic and social 
structure, geography and capabilities. Many of them pursued development strategies 
after World War II, but they were unable to sustain a consistent growth trajectory that 
enabled them to narrow their economic gap with advanced countries, or at least to 
reduce poverty and inequalities substantially. Some countries have already reached 
a diversified and complex economic structure while many others have a limited 
division of labor and are specialized in activities with diminishing returns (Reinert, 
2005).  
                                            
2 According to Landes (1998), in about 250 years, the difference in income per capita between richest 






Nelson et al. (2005)3 point out that any attempt to answer the questions above 
-  “how can countries that are significantly behind the technological and economic 
frontier catch up?” and “what are nowadays the critical factors to catch up?" - 
involves studying the past, analyzing the present and looking into the future. Looking 
backward is as crucial as looking forward (Winters and Yusuf, 2007), which means 
not only seeing what those that succeeded in reaching the socio-economic frontiers 
did, but also learning from the mistakes of countries that did not succeed or only did 
so partially. Analyzing the present involves taking into account the changing 
conditions in the international economic arena and looking at what countries that 
seem to be on their way to catching-up, such as China, are doing. Looking into the 
future includes prospecting trends and examining emergent elements.   
That said, the objective of this study, which approaches development as a 
catching-up issue associated with technological change and innovation, is to 
examine the critical elements for developing economies to narrow their gap with the 
more advanced economies by addressing the following inquiries: 
1) How can we revisit the catching-up approach in light of the knowledge 
economy and the experiences of countries that have succeeded in narrowing 
their gap with the more advanced economies in the last decades?  
2) What seem to be the critical factors for catching-up today and what is the role 
of knowledge and technological catching-up in attaining a higher level of 
development? 
3) What can countries behind the economic and technological frontier still learn 
from the experience of economies that succeeded in forging ahead (especially 
Asian economies) or are on their way to do so (case of China), through the 





                                            
3 NELSON, R. at al (2005) – A Program of Study of the Process Involved in Technological and 









This thesis comprises the present introduction, three chapters and a conclusion.  
1) The first chapter revisits theoretical and empirical contributions grounded in 
the catching-up approach, focusing on technological aspects, but also to other 
critical elements to catch up  
2) The second chapter discusses the catching-up experiences of Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan (East Asia) through the lens of the review done in the first chapter 
and other empirical studies. 
3) The third chapter analyses changing conditions in the international scenario 
associated with the emergence of the WTO and the resurgence of China as 
major international player. Emphasis is given to the rules protecting intellectual 
property rights and to some aspects of China’s ongoing catch-up that have 
challenged established consensus about development and catching-up, as 










I - DEVELOPMENT AS A CATCHING UP ISSUE  
 
The main goal of this first and conceptual chapter is to review some theoretical 
and empirical contributions of the tradition that approaches development as a 
catching up issue, associated with technological change and innovations. Since the 
late 1990s, this tradition has been reinvigorated by studies emphasizing that 
countries behind the technological and economic frontier need to develop inner 
capabilities to innovate in order to catch up with the more advanced economies and 
occasionally forge ahead.  
The chapter starts by overviewing influential propositions and policy 
prescriptions of classical development economics and market-friendly theories on 
development, with the purpose of making a clear difference between the catching-up 
approach and other perspectives about growth and development. This overview will 
be useful to the discussion on concrete experiences of catching-up held in the 
second chapter. Afterwards, Gerschenkron’s and Abramovitz’s contributions are 
discussed, as well as new-Schumpeterian studies, examining concepts such as 
functional substitutes (Gerschenkron, 19624), social capabilities and technological 
congruence (Abramovitz, 19865, 19896 and 19947; Abramovitz and David, 1995), 
windows of opportunity (originally by Perez and Soete, 19888), technological 
capabilities and national innovation systems (originally by Freeman, 1974; diffused 
by Lundvall, 1992 Nelson, 19939, and then by many others). The selected studies 
combine both theory and historical evidence, raising useful elements to the 
understanding of the catching-up processes in different contexts. 
                                            
4 Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962) – Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Harvard 
University Press. 
5 Abramovitz, Moses (1986). Catching-Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind. Journal of Economic 
History, vol. 46, no2, p.385-406. 
6 Abramovitz, Moses (1989) – Thinking About Growth. In Thinking About Growth and other Chapters 
on Economic Growth and Welfare.  Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
7 Abramovitz, Moses (1994) - The Origins of the PostwarPost-war Catch-up and Convergence Boom; 
In J. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen and N. von Tunzelmann (editors), The Dynamics of Trade, Technology 
and Growth. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
8Perez, C. and Soete, L. (1988), ‘Catching up in technology: entry barriers and windows of 
opportunity’, in G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R.R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete (eds), Technical 
Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter, pp. 458-479. 
9 NELSON, R. (ed.) (1993), National Innovation Systems. A Comparative Analysis, Oxford University 






1.1. The Classical Development Economics  
 
Prosperity was the main concern of Economics until the late 19th century, 
when Marginalist/Neoclassical theories focusing on resource allocation gained 
popularity. Neoclassical growth theories emerged in the early 20th century, proposing 
single equations to explain the growth performance of all countries. The exogenous 
neoclassical growth models (e.g. Solow’s model), associated with these theories, 
predicted that growth rates and income per capita would converge among countries, 
since the tendency of diminishing returns on capital and the consequential fall in the 
rate of return on investment would lead investors to move from advanced to 
backward countries. In other words, the exogenous neoclassical growth models 
forecasted that “under otherwise similar circumstances, investment in poor countries 
(that is, those with little capital) would be more profitable than in the richer ones, and 
so the former would enjoy higher investment and faster economic growth than the 
latter” (UNIDO, 200510, p. 9). Besides the hypothesis of diminishing returns, this 
result relied on two other assumptions: the exogenous character of technological 
change and the equal access to the same set of technological knowledge by all 
countries (UNIDO, 2005).   
Economic prosperity came back to the stage during the Great Depression in 
the 1930s, but it was only after the Keynesian revolution and World War II that 
development in a broader sense really appeared as an attractive and separated field 
of Economics. This resurgence occurred thanks to the socio-economic challenges 
faced by many countries and the resulting priority conferred to economic progress by 
their governments. On the one hand, Europe and Japan faced the challenge of 
reconstructing what was destroyed by the war, which demanded a huge coordination 
of decisions and it was something that could not be expected from markets. On the 
other hand, governments in the newly-independent nations that emerged after the 
post-1945 decolonization of Asia and Africa, and also in the already independent 
Latin American countries, were called upon to modernize their traditional (and 
primarily agricultural) societies through industrialization and urbanization, both 
                                            
10 UNIDO (2005) - Industrial Development Report 2005, Capability building for catching-up: Historical, 







considered pre-conditions for increasing productivity and income per capita (Fine, 
200611). In the post-war period, former colonies were on their own, facing great 
challenges and in need of policy advice on development.   
As a new branch of economics, Development Economics had many 
background influences, such as the Keynesian revolution, the Soviet planning 
experience, national economic policies during the Great Depression, planning 
practice during the wartime and the Marshall Plan for recovery of Western Europe 
and Japan after the war (Meier and Dudley, 198412). Meier and Dudley (1984) point 
out that the Keynesian revolution had a strong influence on development economics, 
for raising alternative arguments to orthodox economics and conferring a larger role 
to the public sector. In doing so, Keynesianism paved the way for unconventional 
approaches to economic problems and provided a case for discretionary national 
economic actions to promote capital accumulation and industrialization through 
planning (Meier and Dudley, 1984).  Unlike the neoclassical approach, the so-called 
“Classical” Development Economics acknowledged that both underdevelopment and 
development had multiple causations and tried to understand the peculiarities of 
backward or underdeveloped countries13 in Asia, Latin America and Africa, as well as 
to understand under which conditions economic growth could be generated. 
According to Meier (2001)14, the first generation of development economists 
“was visionary and dedicated to grand theories and general strategies.”15 They 
attempted to shed light on the understanding of the differences among countries in 
terms of growth rates and economic development, as well as to investigate ways 
through which underdeveloped countries could overcome poverty. Initially, the 
                                            
11 Fine, Ben (2005) – New Growth Theory: More Problem than Solution. In K.S., Jomo and Fine Ben 
(2005) – The New Development Economics After the Washington Consensus. Tulika Books, pp. 68-
86. 
12 Meier, Gerald M. and Seers, Dudley (Ed.) (1984) Pioneers in Development, Washington, World 
Bank, volume 1. 
13 The peripheral economies (to use the Raúl Prebisch’s terminology) were called "rude and 
barbarous" in the 18th century; backward in the 19th century; underdeveloped in the prewar period; 
laggard, less developed countries, developing economies or poor countries after WW II (Meier & 
Dudley, 1984). Since the 1990s, some of them have been labeled emergent economies. 
14 Meier, Gerald (2001) – The old Generation of Development Economists and the New. In Gerald 
Meier and Joseph Stiglitz (editors), Frontiers of Development Economics, pp. 13-50. World Bank and 
Oxford University Press. 
15 Among the pioneers of the classical development theory in the late 1940s and 1950s were Eugene 







pioneers of economic development used to focus on growth and identify economic 
development with industrialization, meaning the introduction of manufacturing 
industries in agricultural economies. Later, their concerns about development were 
expanded beyond economic growth and productivity, to encompass equity, income 
distribution and other social issues. However, the basis of development remained - 
as at the beginning of economics - the generation of economic wealth, considered a 
synonym for progress and precondition to life improvement.  
Most pioneers saw capital accumulation as the crux of economic progress (in 
Maurice Dobb´s terminology) and massive state planning as the key tool to surpass 
deficiencies of market mechanisms in reallocation of production factors in the course 
of industrialization processes through import substitution strategies.16 For them, the 
role of the state should be to promote rapid development by coordinating and 
supporting private investments, as well as by investing directly in infrastructure and 
heavy industries.17 This way, the state would contribute to the achievement of 
national objectives in terms of per capita income growth and the improvement of the 
population’s living standards. Many development economists supported mercantilist 
trade policies, advocating the protection of infant industries in initial phases of import 
substitution industrialization, in association with selective export promotion (Adelman, 
1999). 
Despite the consensus, classical development economics was far from being 
a homogeneous body. In fact, it was marked by strong debates and controversies 
about “balanced growth versus unbalanced growth, industrialization versus 
agriculture, import substitution versus export promotion, planning versus reliance on 
the market price system” (Meier and Dudley, 1984, p. 22). Some development 
economists did not consider comprehensive planning indispensable, neither foreign 
aid nor huge investments in physical capital. Others paid more attention to 
                                            
16 Often development economists were enthusiastic about planning experiences in the Soviet Union 
during the 1930s and in the reconstruction process of Europe under auspices of the Marshall Plan, as 
well as with the constitution of welfare states in many European countries. 
17 For Arthur W. Lewis (1954), for instance, the structural problems of underdeveloped economies 
could not be overcome without strong state coordination, which assured a balanced growth of various 
sectors, a sine qua non condition to the economy as whole grow. Lewis was, along with Theodore 






economies of scale and circular causation, whereas others, like Lewis (1954), 
focused on dualism (Krugman, 199518). 
In a work published in 1954, Arthur Lewis discussed the idea of a dual 
economy in a poor country by using a theoretical explanatory model to describe 
intrinsic problems of underdevelopment and explain patterns of growth in countries in 
general. Hirschman (1968)19, conversely, believed that development could happen 
without dualism, but argued that industrialization should be forcefully sequential. In 
Hirschman´s view, the big technological gap with advanced countries would make 
industrialization of late-latecomers a ‘tightly’ staged process of import substitution, 
beginning with the manufacturing of final consumer goods to domestic markets and 
then moving on to intermediate goods and equipment through backward linkage 
effects (Hirschman, 1968). For Hirschman (1968), it would be possible to go into 
export specialization in manufactured goods only after import substitution has 
advanced to some degree.  
There were also disagreements among development theorists over the nature 
of policies needed to take a country out of a low-level income or poverty trap and to 
enhance conditions for growth. Some authors, such as Rosenstein Rodan (1953)20, 
emphasized the role of a coordinated and broad investment program. Hirschman 
considered that the best policy to get out the poverty trap was initially to foster a few 
key sectors with strong backward and forward linkages, which would push other 
industries through the “doorway” of profitability. Afterwards the country should invest 
in other sectors to correct possible disequilibria caused by investments in the target 





                                            
18 Krugman, Paul (1995) - The Fall and Rise of Development Economics. In: Paul Krugman, 
Development, Geography, and Economic Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 1-29. 
19 Hirschman, Albert (1958) - The Strategy of Economic Development, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press). 
20 Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul (1943) - Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern 






1.1.2 United Nations and the Latin American perspec tive on development   
 
The United Nations bodies and regional commissions played an important role 
in the understanding of underdevelopment and design of development policies. In 
1951, at least two reports written by groups of experts under the United Nations 
sponsorship directly addressed the particularities of developing countries and 
examined which obstacles had to be overcome and which factors had to be provided 
to promote development (Meier and Dudley, 1984).21 In these reports and other 
United Nations papers, it was argued that underdeveloped countries should set up 
planning and coordinating bodies to correct market deficiencies and build 
development programs. This explains why development programs, national planning 
bodies, and industrial development institutions soon flourished throughout the world. 
The most well-known of the UN Commissions was the Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA), established in 1948 and based in Santiago, Chile. The 
ECLA produced a large body of studies on Latin American economies, planning, 
development policies and economic integration (Meier and Dudley, 1984). The 
Commission, which gathered some of the best Latin-American development experts, 
provided new interpretations of underdevelopment, practical tools to project sectoral 
domestic demand and import capacity, estimates for savings and capital-output 
ratios, and investment criteria and input-output analyses for Latin American 
economies (Meier and Dudley, 1984).  
In some manner, ECLA’s economists answered the calls of development 
economists from advanced countries like Gunnar Myrdal, who instigated the new 
generation of economists in backward countries to create a body of thought more 
realistic and relevant for the problems of their countries and abandon the 
prescriptions of mainstream economics (Meier and Dudley, 1984).  In Myrdal’s 
words:  
                                            
21 The report Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries (United 
Nations, 1951a) emphasized the necessity of focusing on physical capital accumulation and called 
attention to the existence of labor surplus in underdeveloped countries. The report Measures for 
International Economic Stability (United Nations, 1951b) proposed the adoption of specific 
international actions for reducing the vulnerability of underdeveloped economies to fluctuations in 
trade volumes and prices of primary products, stimulating flows of international capital and enhancing 
sound development programs. The gap between available resources and requirements in terms of 






In this epoch of the Great Awakening, it would be pathetic if the 
young economists in the underdeveloped countries got caught in the 
predilections of the economic thinking in the advanced countries, 
which are hampering the scholars there in their efforts to be rational 
but would be almost deadening to the intellectual strivings of those in 
the underdeveloped countries. I would, instead, wish them to have 
the courage to throw away large structures of meaningless, 
irrelevant, and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrines and 
theoretical approaches and to start their thinking afresh from a study 
of their own needs and problems. (Myrdal,1957, p. 103-104, apud 
Meier and Dudley, 1984, p. 20 ) 
 
ECLA’s development experts contended that the peculiarities of 
underdeveloped Latin American countries demanded a new theoretical framework to 
support their industrialization through import substitution. Given the structural and 
peripheral insertion of those countries in the world system as exporters of primary 
goods, their industrialization would follow different stages and produce different 
results.  
Departing from the critique of classical comparative advantage theory, the 
Prebisch’s hypothesis (also called Prebisch-Singer hypothesis) stated that there was 
a tendency for the terms of trade between the producers of primary and 
manufactured goods to deteriorate over time, which could be explained by the 
existence of structural differences between labor markets in the center and in the 
periphery of capitalism, as well as by the lower elasticity of demand for primary 
goods. Thus, the specialization in primary goods would imply a transfer of income 
from poor agricultural and mining economies to industrial countries (Bresser Pereira, 
200022) and structural external imbalances in the latter. To break this trend, it was 
imperative to increase productivity and foster economic growth by spurring 
industrialization in the Latin American countries through import substitution policies. 
Generally speaking, state activism should play a critical role in the planning process, 
enhancing a more efficient allocation of resources than that provided by markets, 
promoting capital accumulation, protecting infant industries and investing directly 
through public companies.  
                                            
22 Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos (2000) – After Structuralism, a Development Alternative for Latin 






This hypothesis of a deterioration tendency in the terms of trade was much 
criticized, but, according to Bresser Pereira, “the ‘best’ outcome that orthodox 
economists were able to pull off against Prebisch’s thesis was that the terms of trade 
among developed and developing countries would have been constant in the long 
run” (Bresser Pereira, 2000, p. 5).  
One of the most prominent ECLA economists was Celso Furtado, who made 
an important contribution to the design of the development strategy adopted in Brazil 
during the 1950s and 1960s. He saw development as a process of industrial 
modernization and construction of a wage-based economy. Contrary to what had 
happened in advanced economies, in which changes in the productive forces and 
consumption patterns were articulated and moved in the same direction, Furtado 
stated that there was an uneven assimilation of advanced technologies in 
underdeveloped countries, which absorbed innovation in consumption patterns 
without the adoption of more efficient productive processes (Furtado, 197323). 
In Furtado’s view, development would involve changing the economic 
structure (by reducing external dependence and internal heterogeneity) and 
increasing the social homogeneity. In this sense, development could be understood 
as a process through which all members of society would progressively satisfy their 
needs for shelter, food and access to clean water, sanitation, health care, education 
and cultural goods (Furtado, 1992). According to Bielschowsky (199824), Celso 
Furtado was among the ECLA intellectuals who most looked at understanding the 
historical context of the Latin American countries.   
Over time ECLA thought evolved and became more sophisticated, taking into 
account the new historical circumstances, while keeping the idea that economic 
growth and the diffusion of technical progress would assume different characteristics 
from those of developed countries (Bielschowsky, 1998). Contrary to the critics of 
ECLA, Bielschowsky (1998) commented that the Commission placed an importance 
on promoting exports – and not only import substitution – since its very beginning 
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and mainly from the 1960s onwards. Indeed, the institution played an important role 
in two initiatives in this regard.25 
Despite the Commission also stressing the importance of export promotion, its 
image is predominately associated with the prescription of planning and the 
protection of infant industries within the context of import substitution policies. ECLA 
economists certainly gave an immeasurable contribution to the understanding of the 
Latin American peculiarities; the design of development policies more appropriate for 
local reality; and technical support, planning and project building. The Commission, 
however, was not able to help Latin American countries to move forward and 
outward, and thereby take earlier advantage of the new IT technologies and 
industries, with production, distribution and competition patterns quite different from 
those of the mature industries. Many countries remained trapped in import-
substitution policies and closed in their own domestic markets, adopting protective 
measures without setting compliance requirements or phasing out schemes to boost 
emerging industries. Asian economies, as we will see later, took a different route, 
targeting both emerging technologies and foreign markets early. They also invested 
massively in education.    
 
1.2 Development as a natural result of market-frien dly policies  
 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the thesis of the classical development 
economics started to lose prestige both in the academic arena and on the political 
front. In fact, with the end of the post-war economic boom26, the unsatisfactory 
results of many countries that pursued development strategies and macroeconomic 
imbalances across advanced countries contributed to radically shift the previous 
state-friendly picture. Doubts about the ability of strong states to promote growth 
                                            
25 The Commission took part in the creation of the Latin America Association of Free Trade (ALALC, 
in the Spanish and Portuguese acronym), which aimed to diversify exports of Latin America countries 
through intra-regional trade. It was believed that the Latin America common market would provide 
gains of scale, facilitating the import substitutive process (Bielschowsky, 1998).  The other initiative, 
which produced more immediate fruits and had Prebisch as the protagonist, was the creation of United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to promote the integration of developing 
countries into the world economy.  
26 Post-war economic boom ends in the early 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, 






through planning and coordination in underdeveloped countries became stronger 
with the growing evidence of deficiencies in industrial programming and planning in a 
broad sense (Meier, 2001).  
According to Wade (2003)27, three types of critiques were made regarding 
state activism: a) import substituting industrialization policies during 1950s and 1960s 
produced inefficient industries, demanding constant subsidies, without reaching 
international competitiveness; b) government pervasiveness created considerable 
‘rent-seeking’, diverting economic agent efforts from productive activities to lobbying 
for getting more government subsidies and protection; and c) some of the most 
successful latecomer countries attained a remarkable industrial performance by 
adopting outward-oriented models, pushed by market incentives and a strong private 
sector. In sum, state activism supported rent-seeking and distorted markets; 
provoked a wasteful use of resources; kept industries inefficient and non-competitive; 
and encouraged corruption.  
For the supporters of market-oriented reforms, state activism had generated 
more extensive and detrimental distortions than the market failures that government 
interventions intended to correct. Accordingly, the remedy to correct market 
distortions caused by such interventions was to withdraw the state from the 
economy. In the neoclassical perspective, governments should restrict their activities 
to a) preserving the macroeconomic stability; b) providing physical infrastructure; c) 
supplying public goods, such as education, basic research, defense and national 
security, law, and environmental protection; d) correcting price distortions related to 
market failures; e) and improving income redistribution (Wade, 2003).  
One of the main arguments regarding state intervention was that governments 
should basically remove distortions in the market of factors of production to get prices 
right and an appropriate allocation of resources across sectors; encourage the 
adoption of suitable technologies; and foster capital accumulation. The emphasis of 
mainstream economics on hypothetical economic equilibria and optimization 
succeeded once more in dominating the economic arena. It was the so-called new-
liberal counterrevolution of the late 1970s and 1980s, which gave birth to a new 
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generation of development economists, postulating new methodologies, 
interpretations and policy prescriptions.  
Instead of broad theories and visionary models, they preferred to investigate 
the microeconomic aspects of the development process and target specific policies. 
According to the new ideology, labeled the Washington Consensus28, nothing more 
than reducing the state economic role and strictly applying the basic principles of 
standard economic analyses would be necessary to induce growth. Macroeconomic 
conditions and market incentives by themselves would improve the efficiency of the 
economy. Hence, in order to grow, it would be enough to get prices, property rights, 
institutions, competitiveness, and governance right. All these “right things” were to be 
achieved through privatization, fiscal discipline, market–determined interest and 
exchange rates, trade liberalization and deregulation.29   
This perspective became more influential in the 1980s, when development lost 
popularity in the most renowned Economics schools, where it was treated as a 
secondary issue. Many departments of Economics in important universities in the 
United States and Great Britain stopped offering courses in Development Economics, 
arguing that it would suffice to train students in core disciplines such as 
microeconomics, macroeconomics and econometrics. As Chang (2003)30 notes, 
actually for some mainstream economists, development economics should not exist 
as a specific branch, separated from the ‘Economics-as-a-universal-science’ and with 
its own assumptions and methodologies. The same universal theoretical principles 
and policies would fit all countries, no matter their level of development.31  
Development quickly came to be viewed as the result of sound 
macroeconomic policies and free markets. Indeed, the so-called Washington 
                                            
28 The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1989, originally in reference to 
the policy prescriptions recommended by Washington-based institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank 
and the U.S. Treasury Department, to the Latin American countries that faced debt crises in the 
1980s. Later on the term acquired a more general use, being employed, under protest of its creator, to 
designate a broad set of policies believed to be neo-liberals or market fundamentalist. 
29 Recently more emphasis has been given to ‘right institutions’ for the well-functioning of markets. 
According to Fagerberg and Srholec (2005), this more ‘institutionalist’ perspective is also called a 
‘market-friendly’ approach and its main contestant has been the knowledge-based perspective, which 
emphasizes the crucial role of a country’s capacity to use and create knowledge to succeed in 
catching up.   
30Chang, Ha-Joon (Editor) (2003) - Rethinking Development Economics. London, Anthen Press. 
31 Heterodox theoretical and empirical studies continued to be done, but at the margin of the 






Consensus not only brought to the forefront new economic prescriptions but also a 
new understanding about development itself, which was supposed to be achieved 
(exclusively) through market mechanisms and negligible state intervention.  
In industrialized countries, the emergence of the new prescriptions coincided 
with a period of slowdown and turbulence – recession, trade restrictions, interest rate 
hikes, currency devaluations, and unemployment. In the early 1980s, this scenario 
contributed to trigger a huge debt crisis in Latin American countries, which provoked 
serious balance of payment constraints and other macroeconomic problems. In 
consequence, these countries had to shift their priorities from development toward 
the achievement of external balance (Adelman, 1999), ending in a very long and 
costly recession and/or stagnation.  
The administrations of Ronald Reagan (USA) and Margaret Thatcher (UK) 
strengthened the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both 
institutions defined the terms of the “market versus state” debate, supporting the 
former (Fine, 200632). With the debt crisis of 1982, the IMF made its concessional 
loans contingent upon the adoption of liberalization programs, which became broader 
and stricter in the 1990s. In practice, both institutions endorsed the applicability of 
universal policy prescriptions to all countries, without giving the necessary attention 
to their particularities (Adelman, 1999). Once the pendulum moved toward free trade, 
deregulation and the minimal state, development policies were put aside or 
neglected.  
Although many critiques have correctly pointed out absences, failures, 
excesses and the negative side effects of the absolute economic powers conferred to 
states in the post-war period, moving the pendulum radically towards market 
fundamentalism left almost no room for governance and institutions. It produced 
some costly results in terms of economic performance, industrial development and 
social indicators.33 These consequences were experienced by many countries that 
rapidly and indiscriminately liberated their domestic markets, strictly pursuing the 
                                            
32 Fine, Ben (2006) – New Growth Theory: More Problem than Solution. In K.S., Jomo and Fine Ben 
(2006) – The New Development Economics after the Washington Consensus. Tulika Books, p. 68-86. 
33 The 1980s were considered a lost decade to Latin American countries. According to ECLAC, during 
the 80s, GDP grew only 1.3 per cent on average in Latin America; the income per capita fell 0.8 per 
cent. The PIB per capita grew only 1.1 percent in average between 1990 and 1999. Poverty and 
indigence levels increased from 40.5 percent in 1980 to 48.3 percent in 1990, and in 2000 was still 






prescriptions of mainstream economics or combining them with homemade polices. 
Furthermore, some countries (like Argentina) dismantled institutions that supported 
their development, which resulted in a decline of productive investments. The 
market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, however, were usually judged by 
the extension of liberalization, deregulation and privatization achieved rather than by 
their effects on firms, industries, production, the economy as a whole and the social 
indicators. Eventually, poor economic performance and deterioration of social 
indicators throughout the developing world generated a crisis of legitimacy for their 
major sponsors (like the World Bank and the IMF), and also disseminated pessimism 
with regard to human emancipation through economic progress.  
 
1.3 Resurgence of development in the 1990s   
 
In the 1990s, development resurged and progressively broader perspectives 
about the subject began to regain prestige both in the academy and on the political 
front, due to the poor performance of the countries that strictly followed the 
prescriptions of the so-called Washington Consensus; the growing concerns about 
climate change and environmental depletion; the great visibility of some development 
thinkers (such as Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz); and the impressive performance 
of Asian economies using different policies. The initial interest in theoretical models 
that produced self-sustaining and endogenous technological progress gave way to 
studies that tried to examine concrete experiences of economic growth and 
determinants of economic performance (Rodrik, 200334). The notion of sustainable 
development also started to gain popularity.35  
                                            
34 Rodrik, Dani (2003) – Introduction – What do we learn from countries narratives? In Rodrik, Dani 
(editor) (2003) – In the Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economics Growth. Princeton 
University Press. 
35 The term sustainable development was first used in 1983 in the framework of the United Nations 
World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, then 
the Prime Minister of Norway. The concept of sustainable development was widely publicized and 
became known during the UN Conference on Environment and Development (so-called Eco-92 or 
Rio-92) in 1992, when were signed the Agenda 21 and numerous agreements on biodiversity, climate, 
forests, desertification, access and use of natural resources in level global. Over time more 
dimensions were added to the definition of sustainability, such as social sustainability, political 
sustainability, financial sustainability, cultural sustainability, and so on. As Herman Daly (2006) 






Since the emergence of new development approaches and the re-invigoration 
of old ones, more emphasis has been given to technological change, institutions, 
governance and environmental issues. One of the approaches that got revisited in 
the 1990s was a 1960s tradition of thinking of economic development as a matter of 
catching up associated with technological change and institution building. This 
tradition is examined in the next section. More emphasis will be given to 
technological aspects. 
 
1.4 Development as a catching up issue  
 
The notion of development as a catching up issue is not new and the term was 
often used as a synonym of convergence, just as the first generation of neoclassical 
growth models had done. These models focused on capital accumulation and 
predicted the convergence of growth performance and income per capita among 
countries. The neoclassical growth models also sustained that the growth rates of 
backward countries would tend to decline as their convergence towards the more 
advanced countries proceeded.   
This section discusses alternative approaches to catch up, starting with a 
conceptual discussion and then examining in more detail selected contributions of 
the above mentioned tradition of thinking of development as a catching-up issue 
associated with innovation and technological change.  Although Torstein Veblen 
(1915)36 had already approached the matter, the inauguration of this tradition is 
usually credited to the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron, who stated in 
the 1960s that catching up is far from being an automatic result of capital 
accumulation. Since Gerschenkron’s original contribution, efforts have been made to 
identify the critical factors to catch up, analyze the economic determinants of 
technological change and understand its role in economic development, with different 
emphasis and concepts of catching up in mind.37 
                                                                                                                                        
part of the definition or else be implicitly condemned to oblivion". The problem is, as Daly (2006) also 
noted, that "any definition that excludes nothing is a worthless definition". 
36 Thorstein Veblen (1915) - Imperial Germany and the industrial revolution. New York: Macmillan. 
37 One of lacks of the literature on catching-up is the absence in many studies of clear definitions 







1.4.1 What catching up is about 
  
In Gerschenkron´s perspective, catching up is understood as a process of 
narrowing the economic gap between backward and advanced countries through 
rapid industrialization and structural economic changes, encompassing technological 
modernization, institutional innovations and shifts in management and labor force 
behaviors. Abramovitz, who studied macroeconomic aspects of catching-up 
processes, contended what he called the general (neoclassical) hypothesis on 
catching up and developed the concepts of social capabilities and technological 
congruence. According to that hypothesis, “rates of productivity growth across 
countries in any period would be an inverse function of their initial level of 
productivity, and national levels of productivity would converge towards the leader’s” 
(Abramovitz, 1986). The author argued that such convergence is not something 
automatic and that a country´s potential for catching up is related to its technological 
congruence and social capability, emphasizing that the realization of such potential is 
contingent upon many factors. Similarly to neoclassical models, however, Abramovitz 
seemed to treat convergence and catching up as the same thing.   
Contrarily, in Fagerberg and Godinho’s view, catching up and convergence 
should be considered distinct issues, although they partially overlap. For them, 
‘“catch-up’ relates to the ability of a single country to narrow the gap in productivity 
and income per capita vis-à-vis a leader country”; while ‘convergence’ “refers to a 
trend towards a reduction of overall differences in productivity and income in the 
world as a whole.” (Fagerberg and Godinho, 200338, p. 6). 
Neo-Schumpeterian perspectives and evolutionary theories of technology 
change define catching up as the process through which developing counties narrow 
their technological gap (and then the economic gap) with the more advanced 
economies, emphasizing the key role of innovation. They have added important 
elements to the understanding of catching up processes, the identification of its 
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determinants and the formulation of development polices, as part of an effort to build 
a theory of technological change. 
In this study catching up is understood in a narrow and in a broad sense. In a 
narrow sense, it refers to a process in which a developing country narrows its 
technological gap with the leading countries in some key sectors (technological catch 
up), using the leaders as a model, and also innovating; in a broad sense, it refers to a 
process in which a developing country narrows its gap in productivity and income 
with leading countries (economic catch up), via a technological catch up.  
As Odaginri, Goto, Sunami and Nelson (2011, p. 2)39 note, both meanings of 
catching up are interconnected, since economic catch up requires a technological 
catch up, especially today when many industrial sectors have become technology-
intensive. Whether in a narrow or in a broad perspective, catching up processes 
always have a sectoral dimension and rely on structural changes in key sectors, with 
impacts on the rest of economy.   
Although economic development involves intentional efforts by backward 
countries to catch up with the more advanced economies that serve, to some extent, 
as a model, each country must find its own way of doing things, according to local 
circumstances, as Gerschenkron (1962), Malerba and Nelson (2011)40, among 
others, had stressed. In other words, economic development entails innovation, 
meaning both the introduction of practices and products already in use in other 
countries and the introduction of practices and products developed locally – a 
process which requires intensive learning and many kinds of capabilities, such as 
technological, organizational and managerial capabilities.    
While recognizing that the catching up process is a complex and 
multidimensional phenomenon, in which knowledge and the use of new technologies 
per se are insufficient to achieve progress, this study gives more emphasis on the 
technological and innovative dimension of catching up. In retrospect, it is important to 
point out the crucial role that technological change has played in successful catching 
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Hiroyuki; Goto, Akira; Atsushi Sunami and Nelson, R. (2011) (editors) - Intellectual Property Rights, 
Development, and Catch Up: An International Comparative Study. Oxford University Press. 
40 Malerba, Franco and Nelson, Richard (2011) - Learning and catching up in different sectoral 






up experiences since the 19th century, despite most growth and development 
theories giving, until recently, more emphasis to capital accumulation and 
considering technical progress an exogenous variable 41 (UNIDO, 2005; Odaginri, 
Goto, Sunami and Nelson (2011) 
 
1.4.2 The Gerschenkronian approach 
 
The first version of Gerschenkron’s proposition on the catching up of backward 
countries appeared in an article entitled ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective’, which was prepared for a Conference in Chicago in 1951 and published 
later in the Journal Economic Development and Cultural Change (Fishlow, 200342). In 
this article, and afterwards in his book of the same title (published in 1962 and 
reedited in 1966), Gerschenkron discussed the catching up of continental European 
countries with Britain through rapid industrialization in the late half of the 19th century, 
especially focusing on the German and Russian cases.  
Gerschenkron treated development and industrialization as synonyms and 
considered them a catching-up issue, associated with the introduction of modern 
techniques and institutional innovations. He disagreed with interpretations that 
advocated for the uniqueness of development paths and that gave more emphasis 
on the differences among countries than the common elements of catching up 
experiences (Shin, 1996), showing how late industrialization may vary. His main 
proposition is that the development of backward countries tends to be fundamentally 
different from that of advanced countries, both with respect to the speed of the 
process and the productive and organizational structures of new industries.   
Gerschenkron also disagreed with those that overemphasized the 
prerequisites to catch up, and he pointed out that missing requirements may emerge 
in response to specific needs and demands as the development process progresses 
                                            
41 The neoclassical theory of growth and the classical theory of development, for instance, even 
though differing in many assumptions, associated differences in growth rate to capital accumulation 
and differences in income and productivity to accumulated capital per worker.   
42 Fishlow, Albert - "Review of Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 







-- although he stated that there was no guarantee that the appropriate institutions or 
other required conditions would necessarily or automatically appear when needed. 
For him, the level of backwardness of a country affects its development strategy, but 
does not indicate its success or failure in catching up. If a country has natural 
resources and had already removed certain institutional obstacles (such as slavery in 
Russia), the opportunities associated with industrialization are proportional to its 
degree of backwardness (Zonenschein, 200643).  
Gerschenkron noted that some elements that were crucial in Britain’s 
industrialization were lacking when industrial development started in backward 
continental European countries in the 19th century. Based on these catching up 
experiences, his theory contends that the existence of a more advanced economy 
(Britain at that time) enables countries that are behind to start their industrialization 
processes by using the more advanced country as a source of technical assistance, 
skilled labor and capital goods (Gerschenkron, 1962).  
In his book, Gerschenkron remarks that the catching up of backward countries 
involves both imitation and innovation, requiring a lot of effort. Although the 
development of latecomers usually starts by employing the technological and 
institutional backlog developed by leading countries, “in every instance of 
industrialization, imitation of the evolution in advanced countries appears in 
combination with different, indigenously determined elements” (Gerschenkron, 1962, 
p. 26). Innovation, in his view, refers to the creation of original institutional 
arrangements, which works as functional substitutes for structures and institutions of 
the more advanced countries (Shin, 199644). In the catching up processes of 
continental Europe in the 19th century, the creation of new and original institutions - 
adapted to the local conditions, the degree of backwardness and the technological 
trend - played a role as crucial as borrowed technologies and imitation of England’s 
practices. In many cases, the new institutions were created during the catching up 
process, and not prior to its beginning. Thus, Gerschenkron preferred to call attention 
to the variety of responses to challenges placed by the development process, instead 
of focusing on pre-conditions for catching up.  
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In the 19th century, the most important institutional innovations, according to 
Gerschenkron, were related to the financing of industrialization. The industrial 
investment banks were one of the new instruments created by countries such as 
France, Germany and Italy to finance long-run investments in large-scale industrial 
plants and infrastructure (construction of railroad, ports, drill mines, and 
improvements in the cities). They appeared in the 1840s-1850s in France and 
Belgium to finance railroad building and quickly extending their support to other 
manufacturing industries (Shin, 1996). However, it was in Germany that banks 
played a crucial role in the industrialization, as compared to England’s 
industrialization (financed by what Karl Marx called primitive accumulation), in which 
the banking system was not so important. In fact, Germany was the paragon of the 
universal bank, which combined long- and short-run activities, in close connection 
with industrial enterprises. The German banks acted as entrepreneurs, identifying 
technological trends and new business opportunities. 
Gerschenkron stressed that industrialization (or catching up in a broader 
sense) is a difficult, arduous and expensive process, but that obstacles are important 
elements of success, since small challenges do not create any response, as Arnold 
Toynbee (a British Historian) argued. Or, in other words, a nation needs to be 
challenged both internally and externally to advance.  Nonetheless, Gerschenkron 
noted that it was only when the process started at a large scale that the tension 
between pre-industrialization conditions and expected benefits became strong 
enough for European countries to overcome the obstacles and liberate the necessary 
forces for industrial progress. The author also remarked that, as industrialization may 
generate certain undesirable non-economic effects, a great delay in industrial 
development may create sufficient time for the emergence and intensification of 
social tensions, which can hamper the process. Challenges and obstacles make the 
presence of an original development ideology fundamental, which becomes more 
important the more backward the country is.45 In Gerschenkron´s words: 
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1950s-early 1960s is a very good example of the importance of such ideology. The ideology of 
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self-esteem and self-confidence of people, stimulating the creativity in different arenas. One of most 






To break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward 
country, to ignite the imaginations of men, and to place their 
energies in the service of economic development, a stronger 
medicine is needed than the promise of better allocation of 
resources or even of the lower price of bread. Under such 
conditions even the businessman, even the classical daringan 
innovating entrepreneur, needs a more powerful stimulus than 
the prospect of high profits. What is needed to remove the 
mountains of routine and prejudice is faith – faith, in words of 
Saint-Simon, that the golden age lays not behind but ahead of 
mankind…In a backward country the great and sudden 
industrialization effort calls for a New Deal in emotions. 
(Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 24-25). 
 
Unlike the common view about the abundance of labor in backward countries, 
Gerschenkron contended that the supply of the required work force to catch up is 
scarce, since new technologies demand skills that workers from traditional activities 
do not have. Gerschenkron’s argument is more valid today than ever, since the so-
called knowledge economy is very demanding in terms of skills and capabilities, 
which in most cases is rare in the work force of backward countries. Gerschenkron 
also underscored the importance of targeting the most modern technologies due to 
their dynamic backward and forward effects on the economy as whole.  
Some authors argue that he did put excessive emphasis on capital goods 
industries and large-scale industrial plants, arguing that many backward countries 
could not do the same thing. Hirschman, for instance, points out that, in the 19th 
century, latecomers were able to base their catching up on the introduction of large-
scale capital good industries because they were already engaged in the production of 
equipment and therefore did not face a big technological gap. It would have enabled 
them to embark on the ‘newly emerging dynamic industrial sector’ (Hirschman, 
1968).  
For Hirschman, latecomers with a much bigger technological gap (or a higher 
degree of backwardness) should follow a tightly sequential industrialization process, 
starting with manufacturing final consumer goods, and then moving on to 
intermediate goods and machinery. His point was that there would be a threshold to 
follow the Gerschenkron pattern. Countries with a large technological delay could not 
“jump” directly into the production of capital goods. Their industrialization should be 






industrializations in the experience of Latin American countries, traditionally exporters 
of agricultural products to advanced economies. The author seems to be right about 
the accumulation of certain capabilities to undertake a more ambitious catching up 
strategy, but some qualifications are needed, as we will soon see.  
Other authors are less comfortable with Gerschenkron’s emphasis on large 
industrial plants, contending that it was not something feasible for late- latecomers 
due to the required scale of markets. This argument seems also to be valid to some 
extent. Generally speaking, in the 19th century the threshold to start industrialization 
processes by targeting capital goods industries was likely not only related to the 
existence of technological capabilities – to use a neo-Schumpeterian concept – in  
the production of equipment, but also to the markets’ sizes and the endowment of 
raw materials.  
But what is Gerschenkron’s main argument? Is it about targeting new and the 
most dynamic technologies, focusing on capital goods industries, or prioritizing large-
scale plants?  
It appears that Gerschenkron emphasized the importance of targeting 
industries based on modern technologies and talked about focusing on large-scale 
capital goods industries because in the late 19th century breakthrough technologies 
emerged in the machinery sector and were associated with large plants. His 
insistence on the capital goods sector was contingent upon the historic context that 
he observed at the time. This view is in line with Fargerberg and Godinho’s 
interpretation. They believed that Gerschenkron considered it crucial for European 
latecomers to target the more progressive and dynamic industries because of their 
high potential returns and strong modernization pressures on the rest of the economy 
(Fargerberg and Godinho, 2003). In fact, Gerschenkron (1962) said literally: “it was 
largely by application of the most modern and efficient techniques that backward 
countries could hope to achieve success, particularly if their industrialization 
proceeded in the face of competition from the advanced country” (Gerschenkron, 
1962, p. 9)   
Many important technological trajectories that emerged over the 20th century 
were based on large-scale plants. However, it is worth noting that throughout most of 






enabled some backward countries with big markets or export-oriented to focus on 
some segments of large-scale heavy industries from the very beginning of their 
import substitution industrialization processes. Brazil, for instance, before starting its 
sequential import substitution strategy in the 1950s, as recommended by 
development economists, invested in steel and other heavy industries. The country 
pursued an industrialization strategy based on final durable consumer goods and, in 
the 1970s, re-directed its efforts to the development of capital goods industries. The 
former Soviet Union, China and India, which were also very distant from the 
technological frontier, also developed heavy industries in the post-war period. Korea, 
again a very backward country, quickly targeted capital industries very early.     
Gerschenkron’s insights are still valid today if we take the essence of his 
arguments instead of reading them literally or from a narrow historical perspective. 
He paid attention to elements for succeeding in catching up that have acquired even 
greater importance in the last few decades, such as institutional innovations and the 
introduction of modern technologies; although he neither explicitly spoke about the 
importance of endogenous technological innovations nor the need for building 
technological capabilities, as do the neo-Schumpeterians.  
 
1.4.3 Technological congruence and social capabilit ies by Abramovitz 
 
Abramowitz’s ideas about catching-up processes were first developed in the 
paper Catching-up, Forging Ahead and Falling Behind (1986)46 and his starting point 
was the catching-up experience of Western European economies with United States 
after World War II. Abramovitz contested what he called the simple version of the 
catching up or convergence hypothesis, which predicts that the bigger the 
technological and productivity gap between the leader and follower, the larger the 
potential of the latter for fast growth in productivity. He stated that the simple version 
of the catching up hypothesis needed qualifications. Backward countries can 
potentially grow faster than the more advanced ones only if they have technological 
congruence and social capabilities sufficiently developed to successfully exploit 
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technologies already in use in leading countries (Abramovitz, 1986, 198947 and 
199448). 
The concept of technological congruence refers to the compliance level of 
available natural resources, supply factors, technical capabilities, market scales and 
consumer demands in the laggard country “to those required by the technologies and 
organizational arrangements that have emerged in the leading country or countries” 
(Abramovitz and David, 199549). In the short run, limitations in technological 
congruence may render it extremely difficult for laggard countries to adapt to and 
adopt the current practice of the leaders. These difficulties, however, are not constant 
and can be reduced over time, during the catching up process.   
The concept of social capability refers to:  
“[the]countries levels of general education and technological 
competence, the commercial, industrial and financial institutions 
that bear on their abilities to finance and operate modern, large 
scale business, and the political and social characteristics that 
influence the risks, the incentives and the personal rewards of 
economic activity” (Abramovitz, 1994, p. 25).  
The concept also includes long-term policies, social attitudes towards wealth 
and growth, incentives and opportunities. Abramovitz remarked that institutional and 
human capital elements of social capability could only be developed slowly. Over 
time, there is a two-way interaction between the social capabilities demanded by 
technological best practices and the development of such capabilities.  
Abramovitz emphasized that some elements of a country’s social capabilities, 
such as the level of education and existing institutional arrangements, restrain its 
choice of technology, but that such constraints may decline when the country learns 
to change and improve its institutional arrangements. Concerning institutions, he also 
stressed the importance of government’s stability and effectiveness; managerial and 
                                            
47 Abramovitz, Moses (1989).  Thinking About Growth. In Thinking About Growth and other Chapters 
on Economic Growth and Welfare.  Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
48 Abramovitz, Moses (1994). The Origins of the Post-war Catch-up and Convergence Boom; In J. 
Fagerberg, B. Verspagen and N. von Tunzelmann (editors), The Dynamics of Trade, Technology and 
Growth. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
49 Abramovitz, Moses and David, Paul (1995) - Convergence and Deferred Catch-up Productivity 
Leadership and the Waning of American Exceptionalism. Draft prepared for publication as Chapter 1 
in Growth and Development: The Economics of the 21st Century, edited by Ralph Landau, Timothy 






organizational experience with large-scale enterprise; and the presence of financial 
institutions and markets to mobilize capital for individual firms.  
If it is true that technological congruence and social capabilities determine a 
country’s potential for catching up, as noted by Abramovitz, its ability to realize that 
potential in a certain period of time is driven by factors associated with the 
international environment and how the country responds to challenges set forth by 
the catching up process. The first group of realization factors comprises elements 
that affect the access to knowledge and the ability of laggard countries to learn 
about, appraise and acquire the more advanced methods used in leading countries, 
as well as the necessary devices and rights to use that knowledge for commercial 
purposes (Abramovitz, 1986, Abramovitz and David, 1995).  
Externally, access to knowledge depends upon the channels of knowledge 
diffusion, such as vehicles of international technology communication, knowledge 
facilities, licenses, multinational companies, international trade and direct 
investments. Internally, to use “borrowed” technologies, local firms need technical 
competence to recognize, evaluate and adapt it to their own conditions and needs, 
as well as legal, managerial and marketing skills (Abramovitz, 1994). In general, a 
country’s ability to adapt and exploit borrowed technologies depends not only on the 
availability of the required skills and technical capabilities to deal with new 
technologies, but also on the ability of workers to learn new jobs and routines and 
respond to new opportunities in different places (Abramovitz, 1994).  
The second set of factors includes conditions that either enhance or obstruct 
structural changes in the composition of the output and the mobility of resources 
(distribution of workforce and geographical location of industries and population), 
since aggregated productivity growth tends to change industrial and occupational 
structures in the long run. The third set of factors refers to macroeconomic and 
monetary conditions, which impact the effective demand, the capital cost, investment 
expenditures, return on investments and risks associated with them. These 
conditions are necessary, but not sufficient per se to enhance capital accumulation 
and the expansion of demand.  
According to Abramovitz (1986), catching up tends to be a self-limiting 






Improvements in social capabilities during the process of catching up may enable 
followers to keep going fast and forge ahead of the leader. Abramovitz and David 
(1995) use the concepts of technological congruence and social capabilities to 
explain differences in terms of economic performance among countries, as well as to 
explain why Europe, an old center of technological progress, was able to catch up 
with the United States (which forged ahead in the second half of the 19th century after 
catching up with England) only after World War II. According to them, it was the 
congruence between the US socio-economic characteristics and the path of the 
technological progress that enabled the country to attain and maintain productivity 
leadership until the post war. In other words, the United States had better social 
capabilities and technological congruence than European countries, whose 
deficiencies in technological congruence and social capability prevented them from 
fully exploiting large-scale technologies. In contrast to the United States, most 
European countries had difficulties in adapting their capabilities (in terms of 
education, institutional and organizational arrangements, for instance) to the 
requirements of modern large-scale technologies, explaining their delay in catching 
up with the leader. To different degrees, those countries had deficiencies with regard 
to levels of general and technical education. 50 
Abramovitz stressed that the higher the social capabilities of followers, the 
higher is their ability to compete in new markets and displace old established 
industries of the leader countries, whose survival depends upon subsidies and 
protectionist measures (Abramovitz, 1986). Competitive pressures may be an 
incentive for research and innovation as well as an excuse for protection. He added 
that countries that succeed in their catching up processes quite often challenge the 
older leaders at the technological frontier. In fact, as the technological gap falls, the 
direction of knowledge transfer may change in some domains, and the old laggard 
countries may become leaders in particular branches and sources of new knowledge 
                                            
50 According to Fagerberg and Srholec (2005), Europe, especially Germany, led science-based 
industries until the interwar period in the 20th century, but during the World War II, the United States 
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schools, with whom such industries were closely connected. This movement toward Science and R&D 
was reinforced during the World War II and the Cold War, thanks to the substantial public investments 
in defense.  In the post war period, the European countries were able to narrow their productivity gap 
with the United States by adopting (in many cases through imitation) technologies already employed 
over there because they increased their technological congruence and improved their social 






to the countries that they had followed before (Abramovitz, 1986). In this case, the 
country not only reaches the current frontier (catching up), but forges ahead, 
surpassing previous leaders.  
Unlike Gerschenkron, who does not adhere to the theses of general 
preconditions to catch up and who shows that many requirements are created in the 
process of development itself, Abramovitz seems to see social capabilities and 
technical congruence as something that should be almost totally present or 
developed before the catching up process starts. Although the two concepts are very 
interesting, they are vast and complex, encompassing practically all elements that 
influence growth. Therefore, to say that a country did not succeed in catching up 
because it missed the necessary social capabilities and technological congruence 
sounds like a vague (or ad hoc) rationalization, made only after results are known. 
Yet, successful and concrete experiences in catching up have shown a great variety 
in terms of the initial level of backwardness and paths taken. In many cases, the 
necessary conditions were built in the process itself. However, it is true that more 
competences are required in advance in order to catch up today and that  perhaps  
broad concepts, such as social capabilities, can serve as better proxy of such 
requirements in many circumstances than concepts looking at specific capabilities.  
 
1.4.4 Catching up in neo-Schumpeterian perspectives   
 
Evolutionary/Neo-Schumpeterian approaches, which are focused on 
technology and technological change, tend to see catching up as a process of 
narrowing the technological gap in some key sectors, initially through technology 
transfer and then through innovation. Many scholars associated with these 
approaches have added important elements to the understanding of catching up 
processes, the identification of its determinants and the formulation of development 
polices, as part of an effort to build a theory of technological change. The concepts of 
natural trajectories of technical change (Nelson and Winter, 197751), technological 
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paradigms and technological trajectories (Dosi, 198252), techno-economic paradigms 
(Freeman and Perez, 198853), windows of opportunities (Perez and Soete, 1988) and 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 199054) were developed in order to 
understand the role of technological change in catching up processes. Motivated by 
Schumpeter’s emphasis on the generation and diffusion of innovation, and more 
concerned with technological change processes, neo-Schumpeterians also forged 
the concept of technological capabilities and national innovation systems (NIS), 
which affect the intensity and the direction of the learning process. Both concepts will 
be discussed later on in this chapter.  
In the evolutionary and Neo-Schumpeterian views, economic catching up 
requires a technological catching up and its crucial element is technological learning, 
which goes beyond mastering productive techniques to include ways of organizing, 
coordinating and managing activities -- representing a kind of learning that is more 
difficult to develop, even though it represents an essential part of the catching up 
processes (Malerba and Nelson, 201155; Nelson et al, 2005). For this reason, 
Evolutionary/Neo-Schumpeterians approaches have accurately studied technology 
issues and how the emergence of new technologies influences the latecomers’ 
possibilities of technological catching up. The introduction of new technologies is 
seen in this perspective as a costly and risky process, which demands endogenous 
technology investments, skills and complex capabilities to absorb and adopt what 
comes from more advanced countries.  
Moreover, an effective catching up process cannot be reached simply by 
accessing foreign knowledge and using imported technologies. In fact, capability 
building is necessary to participate in the generation and improvement of 
technologies, which means being able to act as imitators as much as innovators of 
new products or processes (Perez and Soete, 1988). Another aspect is that the 
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conditions for catching-up have become more restrictive over time, demanding more 
technological capabilities and innovative efforts of countries struggling to reduce the 
technological gap with more advanced countries. Actually, in the 1980s and 1990s 
the accumulation of technological capabilities and specialization in services became 
more relevant for catching up than capital accumulation and a sufficient 
manufacturing base, factors that counted more in the past, according to Fagerberg 
and Verspagen (2002). These authors note that these changes in the conditions for 
catching up “may be a reflection of the radical technological change in the last 
decades, with ICT based solutions substituting earlier mechanical and 
electromechanical ones, and the derived change in the demand for skills and 
infrastructure” (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002, p. 17).  
According to Perez and Soete (1988), a deeper understanding of the 
technological issues that sustain the process of development is necessary, which 
means taking into account the ways that technologies evolve and diffuse, as well as 
the conditions in which a process of effective technological catching up can happen. 
They criticize the approaches that try to understand technological change as a more 
or less continuous and cumulative unidirectional process, which, in practice, is to see 
development as “a race along a fixed track, where the catching up will be merely a 
question of relative speed” (Perez and Soete, 1988, p. 460). Of course, speed is an 
important aspect, but Perez and Soete note that there are many examples of 
successful overtaking based on running in a new direction. Actually, technological 
change is “a disruptive process with changes in direction and deep structural 
transformations” (Perez and Soete, 1988, p. 460), as Gerschenkron (1966) had 
already called attention to.   
Evolutionary/Neo-Schumpeterian scholars have shown that technology cannot 
be straightforwardly transferred from leading to backward countries through capital 
goods. In fact, developing countries absorb neither passively nor easily foreign 
technologies through importation and imitation, since technology, defined as 
knowledge56, can only be partially codified and transmitted. As Nelson (Nelson et al, 
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1997) states, technological advancement is not a fortuitous process: it depends upon 
both supply side factors, such as the mechanisms of diffusion from leading to 
backward countries (like international trade, foreign direct investment, technical 
know-how and technology transfer), and demand side factors, such as the absorptive 
and adaptive capacity of recipient countries. It is a risky and costly process that 
involves deliberation, learning and adaptation, both for forerunners and latecomers. 
Technological knowledge is only partially codified in blueprints and other documents. 
What is sold is codified knowledge (Amsden, 2001), and it is not enough to master 
imported technologies. Much of the necessary knowledge to use and adapt new 
technologies is tacit and requires permanent learning and skillful entrepreneurship, 
which demands that firms learn to do things they did not do before (Nelson et al, 
1997; Amsden, 2001).    
Recognizing the dependence on previous knowledge to use imported 
technologies, Neo-Schumpeterians developed the concept of absorptive capacity, 
defined as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, 
assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The 
concept refers also to the ability to create new knowledge and acknowledge that the 
competences to assimilate existing knowledge and create new knowledge are 
connected.57  
The requirements to catch up in terms of knowledge and technological 
infrastructure go beyond the capabilities of individual firms. Actually, the ability of 
developing country firms to access and use available sources of codified knowledge 
relies not only on their own competences, but also on collective skills and 
capabilities. For this reason, neo-Schumpeterian researchers have put emphasis on 
the concepts of technological capability (starting with Rosemberg, 1982), national 
systems of innovation-NSI (starting with Freeman,1982), and Bengt-Ake Lundvall 
(1992), Nelson (1993); and sectoral systems of innovation (Malebra, 1999).  
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1.4.4.1 Technological capabilities and National Inn ovation Systems  
 
Technological capabilities comprise the ability to develop new goods, services 
and production processes (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2005). The accumulation of 
technological capabilities makes the process of assimilation and improvement of 
imported technologies easier, in the same way that the accumulation of social 
capabilities does in the Abramovitz’s perspective.  
The concept of NIS was originally proposed by Christopher Freeman, and 
diffused by Richard Nelson and Bengt-AkeLundvall in the early 1990s, and has been 
enriched over time by the contributions of authors like Pattel and Pavitt, Metcalfe and 
others. In essence, the NIS refers to the network of people and institutions involved, 
in some way, in the importation, production, modification, diffusion and absorption of 
new knowledge and technologies at the national level. The main argument here is 
that a country’s innovation and technological performance rely on the complex 
interaction among actors in the system that is comprised of researchers, firms, 
universities, government research institutions and others. Their interaction - 
producing, distributing and applying different types of knowledge - can assume the 
form of joint research, personnel exchanges, cross-patenting and purchase of 
equipment, among many others (OECD, 199758).    
The NIS approach focuses on flows of knowledge (instead of the 
measurement of knowledge investments) and reflects the growing attention devoted 
to its economic role, as do the use of systemic methodologies to study technology 
development (OECD, 1997). Actually, innovation results from the complex 
relationships among an increasing number of institutions with different kinds of 
expertise in the process of knowledge production and diffusion. The success of 
companies and national economies as a whole relies on their ability in gathering and 
applying knowledge from these institutions.  
Knowledge can flow through many channels in a NIS, such as interactions 
among companies, universities and public research institutions; diffusion of 
                                            






knowledge and technology to firms; and the movement of personnel. Knowledge 
flows are structured differently among countries and also vary in weight for different 
actors, institutions and interactions with the production system. Macroeconomic and 
specific policies can facilitate or block the flow of knowledge.  
One of the most important interactions is that among companies, which may 
involve R&D collaborations and strategic technical alliances. Another significant 
connection is between the public and private research sectors – public research 
institutes and public universities on one side and private companies and universities 
on the other. Government-supported research provides basic knowledge to industry, 
serves “as an overall repository of scientific and technical knowledge in specific 
fields” and also makes new methods, tools and skills available (OECD, 1997). The 
role of the public research sector as a source of knowledge for industry varies across 
NIS. The correction of systemic failures may involve the improvement of interactions 
between actors and institutions to facilitate the production, diffusion and absorption of 
knowledge at a national level. 
The NIS approach emphasizes the importance of enhancing joint research 
activities and other technical collaborations among companies and public sector 
institutions; promoting innovation networking; developing innovative clusters; and 
designing more efficient flows, interactions and partnerships within the system. The 
purpose is to increase the ability of companies to acquire knowledge and technology, 
to absorb and adapt the techniques to their needs, and also to develop their 
innovative capabilities and performance.  
The NIS influences the innovative performance of firms and thus the country´s 
innovative and technological performance. As the technological path a country takes 
is influenced by the connections that characterize the NIS, a better understanding of 
how it works helps policy makers identify leverage points, recognize systemic failures 
and better design technology and innovation policies to boost innovative activities 
and competitiveness of industry and the economy as a whole (OCDE, 1997). 
UNIDO (2005) notes that the main constraint in implementing catching-up 
policies today is the national capability to manage the simultaneous development of 
domestic knowledge, business innovation and policy/governance of the national 






and the demand side, as well through the formulation of the adequate framework and 
incentives, including subsidies for innovative activities in a broader sense, which are 
not prevented by the WTO rules, as will be explained later.     
Lundvall (2005)59 warns that the concept of NIS “has been both used and 
abused”, and that although policy makers sometimes discussed it, NIS is neglected 
in practice. A broader discussion about the complexities involved in NIS (as well in 
sectoral systems of innovation), although of much relevance, goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  
 
1.4.4.2 Knowledge, technological capabilities and e ducation                                                                                                                              
 
Knowledge has become more complex in terms of previous knowledge and 
skills, and investments in emergent or more promising technologies have become 
more costly or financially unaffordable by most developing countries. A set of skills 
and a physical and social infrastructure are required to search, identify, evaluate 
alternative sources, assimilate and adapt imported knowledge and technologies, and 
then innovate locally (UNIDO, 2005). The effectiveness of an organization in 
mastering the inflow of codified knowledge and become an innovator depends on the 
existing tacit knowledge and collective competences in science and technology, in 
the organization and in the NIS (UNIDO, 2005).  
As the stock of codified knowledge grows, its use requires an expressive 
increase in a number of capabilities and tacit knowledge. The complexity of the 
necessary capabilities varies across sectors. Some sectors (such as 
pharmaceuticals) rely more on scientific knowledge. In other sectors (such as iron 
and steel), the use of new knowledge and technologies demands much more than 
access to technical blueprints (UNIDO, 2005).   
Building indigenous capabilities in science and technology depends on trained 
scientists and engineers; it also demands more R&D activities by local firms, 
especially if taking into account the constraints placed by by international trade and 
IPR rules to access codified knowledge. R&D activities demand an appropriate 
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institutional context that is related to the formulation and implementation of pro-
innovation policies in developing countries, which makes necessary an 
understanding of the function of competition and industrial policies in the innovation 
process. According to Nelson et al (2005), the importance of the scientific 
underpinnings of technology and the constraints to access codified knowledge, as 
placed by international trade and IPR, reinforce the role of research in universities 
and public laboratories as part of the institutional structure needed for successful 
catch-up. Local universities and public laboratories may have an important function in 
training scientists and engineers, mastering and tailoring the technologies and 
organizational forms of advanced countries for local needs, and conducting research. 
As Fargerberg and Godinho (2003) state, the key role of education for 
development cannot be stressed enough, since,  
“compared to the situation three or four decades ago, the 
progressive technologies have become less ’congruent’ with the 
economic conditions (and, particularly, skill-based and R&D 
infrastructure) that prevail in many developing countries. (...) today 
only countries that have invested massively in the formation of skills 
and R&D infrastructure seem to be able to catch-up (while those that 
haven’t fall further behind).”  (Fargerberg and Godinho, 2003, p. 42) 
 
Mazzoleni and Nelson (2006)60 address in more detail the role of research in 
domestic universities and public laboratories in the catching up processes, which 
according to them, is more important today than it was in the 20th century. They 
stress that practices that need to be mastered involve both “physical technologies” 
(embodied in physical hardware and materials) and what Nelson and Sampat 
(2001)61 call “social” technologies, or technologies embodied in organizations, laws, 
public policies, customs, norms and so on. The effective operation of many physical 
technologies demands the implementation of several social technologies.  
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A study conducted by Fagerberg and Srholec (2005)62, which provides very 
useful insight on development issues, confirms the centrality of knowledge for 
success in catching up today. The authors evaluate the real importance of a set of 
capabilities considered critical for catching up in the literature through an empirical 
model that takes into account data for 29 different variables from 135 countries 
between 1990 and 2002. These factors are knowledge, openness to 
technology/knowledge from abroad, development of the financial system, quality of 
governance and degree of democracy.63 They found a strong statistical relationship 
between the level and evolution of GDP per capita, and the level and evolution of 
knowledge. Countries that succeeded in catching up have invested strongly in the 
creation of knowledge capabilities, as measured by indicators like skilled labor force 
(highly-educated workers), R&D activities, scientific publications, and ISO 
certifications, as well as information and communication technologies (ICT) 
infrastructure.  
But Fagerberg and Srholec (2005) also found that knowledge needs to be 
supported by an adequate financial system and good governance. In fact, it is the 
efficient management of these three dimensions of development that makes the 
difference in catching up. The potential for low-income economies to grow faster than 
the rich ones exists, but it is counteracted by better financial conditions, better 
governance and faster increase of knowledge in the more affluent countries. For this 
reason the variation in GDP per capita between rich and poor economies is growing 
rather than declining (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2005).   
The increasing recognition of the necessity for a domestic knowledge system 
to decode and use codified information, however, contrasts with the recent reduction 
in science and technology (S&T) efforts in competence building in developing 
countries (UNIDO, 2005).64 Moreover, there is a tendency to concentrate efforts on 
basic science because it is cheaper than investing in applied S&T development. This 
trend explains why some Latin America countries make a higher contribution to the 
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world’s basic science “compared to their local R&D effort, without significant 
spillovers to innovative activity”65 (UNIDO, 2005).    
Indeed, recent research has shown that successful catching up experiences 
since the emergence of science-based industries – such as chemical and electric 
equipment – in the 19th century have been associated with the expansion of higher 
education, especially in science and engineering (UNIDO, 2005).66 Overtime, the role 
of universities and public research in catching up evolved: besides supplying a well-
educated and trained workforce, these institutions do basic research, and provide 
assistance to domestic firms and other technology services.  
However, only investing in the preparation of engineers and scientists or R&D 
labs (supply side) is not enough. There is no innovation or economic transformation 
without an increase in the demand for knowledge by the private sector since the 
locus of innovation is the firm, whose role it is to transform creative ideas into 
innovative products and processes, submit innovations to market test and diffuse 
them. Ultimately, it is the market that creates incentives for firms to demand the 
resources for innovation or not.  Actually, matching the supply and demand sides of 
innovation resources requires firms feel the need to innovate and that both private 
and public sectors work together from the early stages of IS building. (UNIDO, 
2005).67     
An effective relationship between university and industry often relies on the 
degree of responsiveness of the educational curricula and activities to the 
emergence of new technology fields or sectors (UNIDO, 2005). This usually involves 
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building effective networks between academic institutions, technical and vocational 
training, research institutes, technical associations and industry. Increases in 
quantity, however, are not a guarantee of competence building, since a growing 
supply of engineers and scientists alone is insufficient to enhance the development of 
technological capabilities if their skills are not demanded. Creating an effective 
technological infrastructure, especially during the early phase of industrial 
development, involves setting complementary policies and institutions that are 
necessary to enhance the interaction between industry and academia, and also the 
skill formation through in-firm training or training programs contracted from vocational 
schools (UNIDO, 2005). 
In sum, access to knowledge does not mean technological progress, which 
depends on mastering and applying new knowledge, as well as creating new 
knowledge. In general, there is no certainty if any commercially useful result will be 
produced. There is also the danger of knowledge obsolescence and loss of markets 
to competitors. Previous success cases and the perception of technological 
opportunities help to build a competitive environment that encourages firms to make 
technological investment to enlarge or protect their markets. But, as the real 
opportunities are not known in advance, in a less competitive environment firms may 
prefer to get more of existing products and technologies. In such situations, only new 
competitors can motivate them to search for improvement and explore new 
possibilities of technological advancement (Abramovitz, 1986). 
  
1.4.4.3 Windows of opportunity to catch up 
 
An influential contribution to the caching up approach associated with the neo-
Schumpeterian perspective was proposed by Perez and Soete (1988) in the late 
1980s, in the paper Catching up in Technology: entry barrier and windows of 
opportunity, in which the interaction between technological path and the potential for 
catching up, given the costs of entry for latecomers during technological transitions, 
is discussed.   
Perez and Soete (1988) offer an analytical scheme based on the cost of entry 






cycle of a technology system, exploring under what conditions catching up is more 
likely. The product life cycle describes the development of a product from innovation 
to its introduction in the market, and unto its extinction, as postulated by Vernon in 
196668.  Technology systems are understood as elements of techno-economic 
paradigms, according to Freeman and Perez´s taxonomy69. Within a techno-
economic paradigm, technologies change incrementally. As technologies mature and 
the production techniques become more standardized, a window of opportunity is 
open to less developed countries, due to their comparative advantages in terms of 
lower labor costs. But, for Perez and Soete, it does not represent a real opportunity 
to catch up for latecomers because mature technologies are less dynamic, and “this 
choice implies clear risk of getting ‘fixed’ in a low wage, low growth, development 
pattern. (Perez, 1988, p. 459)”  
According to the authors, real windows of opportunity for latecomers appear 
during the birth of new techno-economic paradigms, generating and diffusing new 
types of knowledge, skills and experience, and also creating a favorable environment 
for easy entry. Techno-economic paradigm shifts affect technology systems that 
evolved and matured under the previous paradigm. It implies that countries and firms 
that have accumulated advantages in the old system face high costs to get rid of past 
experiences and externalities (associated to mature technologies), and acquire new 
ones. Newcomers with the relevant new knowledge and skills “are lighter and faster” 
because they do not carry the onus of capital stocks and institutions of the previous 
paradigm. For these reasons, Perez and Soete (1988) contend that periods of 
paradigm shift have historically enabled some countries to catch up and even forge 
ahead of previous leaders: such was the case with the United States, which caught 
up with England in the second industrial revolution; and with East-Asian countries 
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that caught up with the United States (at least in some sectors) at the beginning of 
the information technology revolution. 
In the Perez and Soete’s view, conditions are more favorable for lagging 
countries to catch up during paradigm shifts for two sets of reasons:  
a) Everybody is learning – designers, plant engineers, management, workers, 
distributors and consumers. Much of the required knowledge is public and available 
at universities. Many of the required skills are created in practice. It is only with the 
evolution of the system that the new knowledge and skills tend to become 
increasingly private.  
b) A temporary window of opportunity is open “with low thresholds of entry 
where it matters most” for those with a reasonable level of productive capacity, 
locational advantages and enough supply of skilled human resources in new 
technologies.  
Perez and Soete state that catching up involves being in a position to take 
advantage of temporary windows of opportunity created by technological transitions. 
Developing countries that are able to take advantage of this kind of opportunity have 
probably attained this position through decades of efforts, with some success at 
mastering mature technologies. Although early entry into new technological systems 
is crucial, it is not a sufficient ingredient for a successful process of catching up. 
Problems will emerge if the endogenous generation of knowledge and skills is not 
enough to remain in business with the evolution of the system. In fact, being able to 
take advantage of new opportunities and favorable conditions require the ability to 
recognize them, the competence and creativity to formulate an adequate strategy, 
and the social and political conditions to “carry it ahead”. The socio-institutional 
framework at the international level is also important. Moreover, the self-sustainability 
of the growth process demands constant technological effort, a growing flow of 
investments and the creation of synergies. 
As discussed in the section on Gerschenkron’s contribution, some authors are 
quite skeptical about whether today there is a real window of opportunity in the first 
phase of new technology. Hikino and Amsden (1994) argue that, conversely to Perez 
and Soete’s view, the technological gap between advanced and developing countries 






protected by the new intellectual property rights (IPR) system and other mechanisms 
of appropriation that make access to such technologies more expensive. And yet, 
knowledge itself has become more complex in terms of previous knowledge and 
skills, as well as in investments in emergent or more promising technologies that are 
costly or financially unaffordable by most developing countries. 
The arguments about the current difficulty to access and master new 
technologies are valid, but we need to be cautious about criticisms that 
overemphasize the constraints posed by technological entry barriers if we want to 
avoid a certain technological determinism that leaves no room for latecomers to 
catch up with leaders. To say that there is a window of opportunity does not mean 
that every laggard country can pass through it. As Perez and Soete point out, a 
country needs to have the conditions to take advantage of the situation or, put in 
other words, it needs to possess certain technological capabilities to adapt and 
adopt, and then become an innovator later on.  
Studies on specific technologies conducted by neo-Schumpeterians have 
shown the presence of niche markets for laggard countries even when high entry 
barriers are present (Shin, 1996). Moreover, leaders have historically not succeeded 
over time in their intents to prevent or control technology transfer. They can make it 
more difficult, but not stop it. Yet difficulties associated with technological trends and 
entry barriers may be overcome by the creation of original institutions, as 
emphasized by Gerschenkron, even though it is not an easy task.  
Another critique of Perez and Soete’s analysis is that they seem to consider 
the institutional system dependent on the technological system, while one observes 
that institutions can change and be adapted in response to new technological 
constraints and demands. Institutions may also be created in advance to take 
advantage of new technological opportunities or to prospect technological trends 
(Shin, 1998). In fact, in the process of catching up, the technological path and 
technological barriers are as important as the strategy adopted by latecomers to face 
technological and other constraints. And, as we saw in Gerschenkron’s analysis, the 
creation of original institutional arrangements may allow a country to overcome its 







1.5. Institutions, state and finance 
 
The dissemination of science-based and information technologies, the 
consequent growing importance of knowledge for a country’s performance and 
competitiveness, and the more restricted international IPR rules create challenges 
that go beyond the competences of firms and markets, especially in developing 
countries. In these countries, the creation of capabilities in science and technology 
demands, more than in advanced nations, proactive states, adequate financial 
instruments and proper institutional arrangements, aspects that will be addressed in 
this section.   
 
1.5.1 Institutions  
 
Institutions are considered essential for development by much of the literature 
on growth, and the catching up approach is not an exception. In a narrow sense, 
institutions refer to rules and norms.  In a broader sense, they also involve 
organizations and other collaborative activities (Fargerberg and Srholec, 2005). 
According to Hodgson (2014), “Institutions are the long-lasting systems of 
established and rooted social rules that structure social interaction.” Chang and 
Evans (2005)70, see institutions “as devices which enable the achievement of goals 
requiring supra-individual coordination and, which are constitutive of the interests and 
worldviews of economic actors”.71   
But, what are the required institutional arrangements for both growth and 
catching up?  
As Gerschenkron had stressed, successful catching-up experiences have 
been associated not only with the adoption by laggard countries of existing practices 
in leading countries, but also with innovation, particularly institutional innovations. 
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Even though Gerschenkron had given more emphasis to the role of institutions in 
allocation of scarce financial resources in late industrialization processes, his 
analysis had also shown the importance of non-market coordinating mechanisms in 
the mobilization of other scarce resources to support the new business, such as 
skilled labor, knowledge, and managerial capacity. Taking Gerschenkron’s 
proposition in a broader perspective, one can say that an important role of institutions 
in catching up processes is to mobilize and provide scarce resources in general, 
such as capital, technical and managerial competences and knowledge.  
Institutional learning may reduce the time necessary to build the appropriate 
institutions, but learning does not simply mean replication of institutions used or in 
use in more advanced economies (Shin, 1996). In fact, institutional learning is about 
creating institutions that perform similar functions to those performed by 
entrepreneurs and institutions in advanced countries, while tailored according to the 
country’s degree of backwardness, technology features and the challenges put by 
the international scenario. Although laggard countries can take advantage of the 
successful institutional experiences of leading countries, institutions must be, to 
some extent, embedded in the country’s socio-economic structure to work properly 
and effectively (Evans, 2005).  
Actually, development can be attained with different institutional 
arrangements, both economic and political. There is no institutional arrangement that 
matches all countries or stages of development, as Gerschenkron (1966), Adelman 
(1998), Shin (1998) and Niosi (2002), among others, have pointed out and empirical 
studies have shown. Moreover, as Gerschenkron also remarked, appropriate 
institutions do not necessarily need to be created in advance; they may be designed 
in the course of the catching up process. However, institutions need to be adapted as 
the development evolves in order to support the economic demands, thereby 
transforming the initial growth impulse into sustained economic growth (Adelman, 
1998). Some institutions are good for stimulating economic growth but inappropriate 
for its continuation. As they become dysfunctional in generating economic 
development, institutions and policies have to shift selectively – e.g., institutions 
engaged in import substitution promotion probably are not good for fostering 
international competitiveness and export. Generally, success in diversification 






Furthermore, some types of institutions fit very well at a given moment in a 
particular environment, but may not be efficient or effective for all or forever (Niosi, 
2002). Over time they may become a burden if they remain locked onto 
characteristics that did well in the past but are inappropriate for the new historical 
circumstances. Institutional arrangements for a middle-income country can be much 
more demanding than for a low income one.  There are situations in which 
inefficiencies reinforce each other and are very hard to correct. Countries that 
succeeded in catching up developed institutions equipped to promote capability 
building and technological change. Today, increasing requirements in terms of 
knowledge and technological capabilities make such institutions more important than 
ever. The introduction of new institutional arrangements and regulations in the 
international scenario also demands the creation of institutions or the restructuration 
of existing ones to deal with so many obligations, patterns requirements and new 
challenges. 
Creating good institutions, however, it is not enough. They need to work in a 
systemic way, entailing the mobilization of resources and the diffusion of knowledge 
and innovations throughout the economy. Analyzing the emergence of the biotech 
industry in the US, Coriat, Orsi and Weinstein (2002) showed how the diffusion of 
new technologies and the constitution of new industries might be an outcome of 
institutional changes, such as rules on IPR and new financial arrangements. In their 
words, “institutional changes introduced in different domains and at different levels of 
the American NSI (namely in IP regime and in the financing of innovation) matched 
ones with the others, in such way that finally opened for the agents new 
opportunities” (Coriat, Orsi and Weinstein, 2002, p. 27).  
According to the authors, these new institutional “complementarities” resulted 
from decisions made by public authorities and agencies in charge of regulations, due 
to emergent property of the innovation system in which the actors interacted. 
Changes in IPR rules allowed the patent of basic research outcome publicly funded 
and of living forms, and although very controversial, created new markets; financial 








1.5.2 State  
 
The state matters for catching-up and its role naturally evolves as 
development proceeds and also as the conditions in the environment to catch up 
change. Over time and worldwide, states have created markets or substituted 
inadequate ones, and played an active role in physical capital accumulation, human 
capital formation and technological change, with diverse degrees of success. 
Historically, the state’s first economic role was to unify regions and markets, build up 
political and socio-economic institutions, set rules and regulations, provide basic 
infrastructure, facilitate transactions, remove barriers to the mobility of labor, and 
pursue economic progress.  
Governments had active participations in the industrial revolution in Britain 
(18th century) and in the industrialization of the United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain in the 19th and 20th, by fostering private investments 
or investing directly, protecting inefficient infant industries, providing financial funds, 
setting rules of the game, improving education, expanding the infrastructure or 
creating markets.  The state was also important in the development of small 
economies in Europe, such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Switzerland – countries that exhibit high living standards and equitable income 
distribution today.  
After the World War II, the governmental economic activism was accepted 
throughout the world for the sake of development and equity, and supported, in 
different degrees, by most economic theories. Active states were widely justified in 
the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and similarly in the industrialization 
of Latin American and Asian countries, many of them newly independent and very 
behind the economic and technological frontiers. There was a certain consensus that 
some economic and social goals could not be attained exclusively through market 
mechanisms. 
The public sector was the main agent of industrialization in Asia and Latin 
America, with different degrees of success. In some countries, the state assumed 
functions performed by private entrepreneurs and institutions in the more developed 






substitutes. Advised and supported by the United Nations Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), Latin American governments set planning and coordinating bodies 
to correct market deficiencies and design development strategies based on import 
substitution policies. Moreover, they directly assumed investments in heavy 
industries and infrastructure, and also protected infant industries through overall 
guidance, tariffs and credit facilities.  
It was in Asia, however, as will be seen in the second chapter, where the so-
called developmental state emerged and promoted the rapid industrialization of many 
economies through planning and active industrial policies, in combination with market 
mechanisms. In Japan, the state coordinated and supported strategic investment in 
the domestic and foreign markets, providing financial resources, protection to local 
companies and other incentives. In the East Asian economies, governments followed 
the Japanese example, targeting emerging technologies, guiding and supporting 
private investments, providing physical and legal infrastructure, and fostering the 
development of social and technological capabilities through high investments in 
education.  
Since the 1990s, from the intense debate confronting state and markets, it has 
emerged distinct proposals and concrete experiences of relationship between both. 
In the academic front, although extremisms remain, more balanced views have 
rejected the false dichotomy that opposes states and market mechanisms. 
Emphases have been given to the state activism in specific domains such as 
investments in human capital and infrastructure, acquisition of technology, regulatory 
and competition policies, institution building, capability improvement and governance, 
beyond the preservation of the macroeconomic stability.   
In the knowledge-driven economy, states have been called upon to assume 
new functions, besides adopting “sound” macroeconomic and horizontal policies 
(education, tax incentives, financing), creating the necessary infrastructure, investing 
in basic research and setting rules and regulations, as Mariana Mazucatto (2011)72 
states in the so-called pamphlet The Entrepreneurial State. The author argues that to 
foster economic growth-enhancing innovations, a “far more proactive role is required” 
from states than the Keynesian demand management. In her view, it is necessary a 
                                            






target, leading and entrepreneurial state in Schumpeterian sense, able to take risks, 
set a vision for strategic change, create new technological opportunities, make the 
necessary investments, foster a decentralized network to enhance risky research and 
facilitate the dynamic process of its development and commercialization.  
Mazzucato emphasizes the key role that the state has historically played in 
leading innovation in many industries and fostering economic growth in different 
situations, especially in the United States. Differently from what mainstream 
economics says, she adds, most risks in innovative activities in the US have been 
taken by the public sector instead of private companies or venture capital funds. In 
the US, the government has enhanced innovation from the early stages of research 
up to commercialization of its results, taking risks that the private capital do not want 
to take or cannot afford for surpassing in its horizon of decisions. Supported by many 
studies by Peter Block and others, Mazzucato shows that an expressive number of 
key innovations imputed to the dynamism of markets – such as personal computers 
and the internet - are indeed the result of public sector choices that created new 
products and associated markets.  
By investing in the most uncertain and riskiest areas, states have enhanced 
technological change and been the source of innovation and engine of growth in 
advanced economies and economies in their way to catch up. Over time, these 
states have actively created new markets and corrected “network failures”, instead of 
simply fix market failures. In Mazzucato’s words:  
“…the role of the government, in the most successful economies, has 
gone way beyond creating the right infrastructure and setting the 
rules. It is a leading agent in achieving the type of innovative 
breakthroughs that allow companies, and economies, to grow, not 
just by creating the ‘conditions’ that enable innovation. Rather the 
state can proactively create strategy around a new high growth area 
before the potential is understood by the business community (from 
the internet to nanotechnology), funding the most uncertain phase of 
the research that the private sector is too risk-averse to engage with, 
seeking and commissioning further developments, and often even 
overseeing the commercialisation process. In this sense it has played 
an important entrepreneurial role.” (Mazzucato, 2011, p. 18-19) 
If in developed countries states had and continue to have a crucial role in 
leading industrial development, in developing countries they are called upon to be an 






to enhance technological progress and innovations, looking beyond the private sector 
horizon. In this regard, it is crucial its actuation to strengthen the interactions in the 
national knowledge system, in order to foster the flow of knowledge across the 
economy and innovative activities, through universities, research institutions, public 
banks and regulatory agency. Yet, states also play a role in enhancing the 
competition in the economy to compel the private sector to invest in innovation and 
technological improvement. Without the active participation of the private sector in 




As it is well known, financing is a key element for catching up. In Britain, the 
Industrial Revolution in the 18th century was financed by the so-called primitive 
accumulation. In the industrialization of late-coming countries in the 19th century, the 
required financial resources to finance their catching up with Britain came from 
investment banks in Germany and in other European countries and from self-
financing (and capital markets, later) in the United States. In countries with a higher 
degree of backwardness, such as Russia in the 19th century, the state played a more 
crucial role in financing industrial development. In Japan and East Asia, as will be 
seen in the second chapter, this function was carried out by the government and 
business groups, which performed the role of the capital markets in the advanced 
economies. In the industrialization of Latin American countries, international markets, 
foreign direct investment and public institutions provided the funding for modernizing 
their traditional agricultural economies.   
The importance today of many financial instruments that were created in the 
past cannot be underestimated, but the new science base and IT technologies 
demand new and original financial arrangements. Some countries have been more 
successful than others in designing non-conventional financial instruments, such as 
venture capital funds, while others that have tried to “borrow” institutions developed 
in leading nations have failed or succeeded only partially. This seems to confirm that 
financial arrangements, like other institutional instruments, need to be embedded in 






Even apparently successful instruments have limitations in financing new 
sectors. Venture capital funds, for instance, tend to support projects with returns 
forecasted to three to five years, which is not enough to allow innovation in emerging 
sectors such as biotechnologies and green technologies, according to Mazzucato 
(2011). The author states that this short-term bias is overtime detrimental to long 
scientific exploration and emergent business. Moreover they tend to overemphasize 
patents, producing patents of little values that are not conductive to the increment of 
innovations.   
Innovation-driven technologies reinforce the importance of public institutions, 
such as development banks, in supporting investments in more promising and risky 
new businesses (such as biotechnology and green technologies), which otherwise 
would not take place. However, providing funds to innovation is useless if the private 
sector is not compelled by competition to innovate. Brazil, for instance, has created 
many kinds of financial instruments to foster innovation, but investments by private 
companies in innovative activities are still kept low and funds unused.73   
Besides having an active role in financing basic research, innovations, and 
emerging sectors, governments in developing countries still need to be involved with 
the financial support of investments in infrastructure and some mature sectors and 
technologies. The reason is the scarcity of long-term financial resources in the 
domestic banking system and international markets. On the one hand, long-term 
financial institutions are underdeveloped or inexistent in most developing countries. 
On the other hand, the current international financial scenario is characterized by 
scarce long-term funds to finance investments and infrastructure (a problem 
especially for the poorest countries), as well as by a high instability due to the 
predominance of short-term capital flows and consequent volatility of capital markets. 
Even solid economies can be affected by financial turbulence and speculative waves, 
or regional financial crisis, as in the 1990s (speculative waves against European and 
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East Asian currencies) or global crisis, as in 2008 (a broader financial crisis caused 
by the US subprime).  
Moreover, international financial markets may put more restrictions on than 
give options to backward countries for reducing the maneuver of policy makers in the 
management of macroeconomic policies. 
The 2008 financial crisis reinforced the importance of national and regional 
development institutions for developing countries, to finance infrastructure and other 
investments, and also to act as a countercyclical instrument in times of financial 
turbulence. Developing countries have already realized the need of strengthening or 
building up development banks and are taking many concrete initiatives in this 
regard, both individually and as a group. Here we will give some illustrative 
examples. At the national level, one observes that countries from Latina America, 
Africa and even from Asia have shown great interest in knowing how the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES), one of the world´s largest public development 
institutions, works and in some cases demanded its cooperation to create or 
restructure national development banks. At the regional level, efforts have been done 
to make more effective existing regional development institutions, like CAF74, or to 
create new ones, like Banco del Sur75 and the BRICS Development Bank76. Other 
initiative worth mentioning was the creation of the International Development 
                                            
74 Created in 1970 as a small sub-regional institution by the then five members of the Andean Pact 
(now Andean Community), CAF was restructured in the last two decades and became a regional 
development bank sponsored by 18 countries of Latin America, The Caribbean, and Europe, as well 
as 14 private bank. It provides credit lines, non-reimbursable resources, and technical and financial 
support in structuring of projects of public and private sectors of Latin America. With headquarters in 
Caracas, Venezuela, CAF has representative offices in Buenos Aires, La Paz, Brasilia, Bogota, Quito, 
Madrid, Mexico D.F, Panama City, Asuncion, Lima, Montevideo and Port of Spain. 
75 Regional Financial Institution newly created by members of the Union of South America Nations – 
UNASUR - to finance infrastructure and social projects in the region. It is expected that the bank starts 
its operation in 2015, with a capital of USD 7 billion, subscribed by Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
76 The BRICS Development Bank is the multilateral development bank newly created by the BRICS 
states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as an alternative to the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. With headquarters in Shanghai, China, and USD 50 billion as initial 
capital, the bank will finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects (like the World 
Bank). In addition, a Contingent Reserve Arrangement, with USD 100 billion as initial capital, will 
provide assistance to members in financial difficulty (like the IMF). In the new institution, all members 
will have the same voting power, unlike the World Bank and the IMF, in which the quota assigned to 
members determines their voting power. Devised to reflect the countries relative size in the global 
economy as measured by GDP, these quotas have not been changed for many years in order to 






Financial Club - IDFC, a network of national and sub-regional development banks 
from developing and developed countries.77  
These initiatives are supposed to help their sponsors to address the major 
obstacles to finance development today and reflect their dissatisfaction with an 
international financial environment dominated by multilateral financial institutions 
controlled by the US and short-term private capital markets  
 
1.6. Concluding remarks 
 
For a long time, economists considered capital accumulation as the main 
explanatory factor for the differences in terms of growth and productivity performance 
among countries.78 Early neoclassical analysis of technology saw technological 
change as an exogenous variable to the economy and result of advances in sciences 
and techniques, without economic motives or incentives. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
endogenous character of the technological change progressively began to be 
recognized and many theoretical approaches and models looked for identifying its 
economic determinants and role in economic development. In these models, new 
technologies were supposed to flow easily from leaders to backwards. While 
countries in the technological frontier faced high risks and costs to develop new 
technologies, backward countries were regarded uniquely as passive importers of 
technologies embodied in equipment and machinery, without practically any role in 
the technology generation. It was supposed that firms in laggard countries could 
learn how to use imported technology by reading the technical information contained 
in blueprint material and employ new equipment as efficiently as firms in the 
countries in which they were developed, incurring only costs of purchasing new 
products and technologies.  
                                            
77 Created in 2010, under the sponsorship of the German KfW, the IDFC joins 20 financial 
development institutions from all regions and also intends to strengthen the influence of their through 
cooperation and sharing of best practice experiences in strategic issues of mutual interest, such as 
climate finance, infrastructure finance, social development, poverty reduction, green banking and 
innovation finance. 
78 Schumpeter emphasised the importance of generation and diffusion of technology to the economic 
development in the first half of the twentieth century, but his ideas were not very influential among 







In this first intent of bringing technology inside, local conditions – such as 
capabilities, institutions and infrastructure –  seemed to have little importance to the 
absorption of new techniques. Even the more sophisticated endogenous growth 
models that took into account the role of trade and technology to the development of 
backward countries used to keep the assumption about their passive role, regarding 
them merely as importers and imitators of technologies developed in advanced 
countries.   
Technological progress was also object of attention of classical development 
economics in the 1950s and 1960s. Most classical development theorists believed 
that technologies developed in more advanced countries could be absorbed by 
backward countries through capital accumulation. Although emphasizing the 
difficulties in the diffusion of technical progress from advanced to developing 
countries, development theorists from Latin America (mainly those based on ECLA) 
did not accurately study the process of technology transfer or how the emergence of 
new technologies influenced the latecomers’ possibilities of technological catching 
up.  
Also in 1960s, but following a different path, the economic historian Alexander 
Gerschenkron inaugurated a new tradition of thinking of development as a catching 
up process associated with technological change and (institutional) innovations, 
which came to be known as the catching up approach. Gerschenkron showed that 
the catching up of backward countries – meaning the reduction of the economic gap 
with leading countries through rapid industrial modernization - involves both imitation 
and innovation, and requires a lot of efforts. Innovation, in his view, consists in the 
creation of original institutional arrangements, which he sees as functional substitutes 
for the structures and institutions of the more advanced countries. In general, instead 
of focusing on the preconditions for catching up, Gerschenkron preferred to call 
attention to the variety of responses to challenges put by the development process. 
He also stressed the importance of targeting the most modern technologies due to 
their dynamic backward and forward effects to the economy as whole.   
Since the Gerschenkron’s contribution, efforts have been made to identify the 
economic determinants of technological change and understanding its role in 






developed the concepts of social capabilities and technological congruence. He also 
emphasized that access to knowledge does not mean technological progress, which 
depends on mastering and applying new knowledge, and on creating new 
knowledge. In their quest to understand technological change and how technologies 
evolve, Neo-Schumpeterians forged the concepts of natural trajectories of technical 
change, technological paradigms and technological trajectories, techno-economic 
paradigms, windows of opportunities, technological capabilities and national 
innovation systems.  
Generally, one of the basic premises of the catching up approach rooted in the 
Schumpeter´s perspective is that in order to narrow the technological and economic 
gap with the more advanced nations, a country needs not only accessing and 
mastering imported knowledge and technologies, but also needs to develop an inner 
ability to innovate technologically and institutionally. It relies on supply side factors, 
such as mechanisms of diffusion from leading to backward countries (like 
international trade, foreign direct investment, technical know-how and technology 
transfer) - and equally on demand side factors, such as the absorptive and adaptive 
capacity. In fact, technological advance is far of being a fortuitous process. It is a 
risky process that involves deliberation, learning and adaptation, both for forerunners 
and latecomers. The perception of development or catching up as a natural 
consequence of capital flows from developed countries to backward countries was 
never confirmed by empirical evidence.  
Technological knowledge is only partially codified in blueprints and other 
documents. Much of the necessary knowledge to use and adapt the new 
technologies is tacit and requires permanent learning and skillful entrepreneurship. It 
demands that firms learn to do things that they were not able to do before, supported 
by the innovation system they are connected with. Theoretical and empirical studies 
have shown that catching-up increasingly relies on the ability of countries behind the 
technological frontiers to adopt and adapt imported technologies, and to develop new 
technologies that depend upon the acquisition of technological capabilities, 
technological infrastructure and an efficient NIS.  
The increasing importance of knowledge to catch up is confirmed by empirical 






century. They show that the critical role of knowledge to development is not 
something new, although only more recently this had been recognized by a larger 
spectrum of growth and development theories.  Knowledge, however, needs to be 
supported by proper financial conditions and good governance. In this scenario, 







II - THE SUN RISES79 AND TIGERS CATCH UP: JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 
CATCHING UP 
 
Europe and the United States concentrated most of the world’s industrial 
activity until the end of the 1950s. The impressive economic performances of Japan 
in the 1960s, East Asian countries from 1970s onwards, and more recently of China 
and India have contributed to shift dramatically this scenario, questioning established 
development theories and providing new development models for developing  
countries.  
Asian economies comprise a broad range of ethnic groups, cultures, religions, 
languages and sizes, with different resource endowments. There are large and 
populous countries such as India and China, and small city-states such as 
Singapore. Some of them export oil and natural gas (like Indonesia and Malaysia) 
and other are extremely dependent on imports of oil and other natural resources. 
Asian countries differ also politically – many of them have or had strong authoritarian 
regimes, while others (like India) have consolidated democratic regimes. This 
diversity, and also differences in terms of initial conditions, explains why the 
economic development of Asia has varied greatly among countries since the World 
War II, despite many elements in common.  
The departure point of the so-called Asian Miracle was the catching up of 
Japan, which experienced sustained and unprecedented growth rates in the first 
post-war decades. Other Asian economies, departing from higher degrees of 
backwardness, attempted to pursue the Japanese route by following different 
strategies and some of them also experienced remarkable results in terms of socio-
economic development. The first ones were South Korea, Singapore, Hong-Kong 
and Taiwan (East Asia), followed by Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia (Southeast 
Asia), and more recently by China and India (South Asia), and Vietnam (Southeast 
Asia).  
In this chapter, we examine the main features of catching up experiences of 
Japan and East Asian economies, focusing especially on the Korean and Taiwanese 
                                            
79 Japan is often called the “Land of the Rising Sun” because the words for Japan in the Japanese 






cases, the most successful catching-up experience in the second half of the 20th 
century. We do so in the light of the theoretical contributions overviewed in the first 
chapter and of other empirically-based studies. We believe that empirical and 
theoretical perspectives cannot encompass all the complexity of the reality if taken 
separately. Together, however, they may help us to better understand why few 
countries have succeeded in reaching socioeconomic progress whereas the majority 
still continues to struggle in moving ahead.  
 
2.1 Japan’s catch up   
 
The starting point of the Japanese catch up was the so-called Meiji-
Restoration (1868-1912), under which Japan adopted many European and American 
customs and institutions, as well as their technologies. The explicit purpose of the 
regime was to strengthen the country’s economy (by catching-up with advanced 
Western economies) and the military power of the state, which at that time was 
challenged by Western empires. The slogan of the day was “a rich society and a 
strong army” (Fukoku-Kyohei), a goal to be achieved through industrial development 
(Shokusan-Kogyo). Therefore, similarly to what happened in Russia in the 19th 
century, the engine of the Japanese industrialization was a military concern (Shin, 
1996).  
The public sector played a vital role in the process of modernization and 
industrialization of Japan, particularly in its initial phase. Among other things, the 
government modernized the legal system, the physical infrastructure and the 
educational system; it expanded and improved transport networks, promoted land 
and financial sector reforms, initiated new businesses in industries considered 
strategically important and sent students and educators to be trained in the United 
States and Europe. In fact, acquiring knowledge and creating a higher education 
system were seen as crucial to catch up with advanced western economies. Japan 
made a huge effort to develop a system of higher education between 1870 and 1920, 
taken as model institutions from Germany, UK and the USA, and succeeded in 
catching up with these countries regarding students’ enrolment by the 1920s. 






mathematics, engineering, applied sciences, technology and foreign languages - and 
a large number of foreign professors and researchers were invited to work there. 
According to the UNIDO report (2005), the transfer of students and scholars 
enhanced the development of a national academic system, which attained a standard 
equivalent to those of most advanced European economies within 50 years. 
Influenced by German and British experiences, the Japanese government also 
set complementary policies and public research institutions to support research 
activities carried out by the private sector, both in agriculture and industry. This 
support tended to increase as the access to imported technologies started to be 
restricted by foreign companies (UNIDO, 2005).    
Gradually private initiatives and the cooperation between public and private 
actors grew in importance, especially with the emergence of the family-owned 
business groups, known as zaibatsus. Until the World War I, these groupings were 
engaged predominantly with food processing and textiles, the dominant industries of 
the time in Japan. During the war, heavy industries emerged as leading sectors and 
the Japanese economy experienced a rapid transformation (Fargerberg and 
Godinho, 2003). It is worth noting that during the wartime period Japan was already a 
developed society with regard to many socio-economic indicators, such as income 
per capita and education. According to Sen (2003), the levels of these two indicators 
were higher than the world average on the eve of the Japanese catching up. 
Generally speaking, Japan was technologically behind, but was not a socially 
backward country (Abramovitz, 1986).  
The power structure of the Japanese society changed deeply with the defeat 
of Japan in the World War II.  The dismantlement of two out of the three contending 
powers in society – the military and the zaibatsus – gave room for the emergence of 
new business groups called keiretsus, as well as for the re-empowerment of the 
bureaucracy, which resumed the leadership of Japan’s catching up with the more 
advanced West countries. Prohibited from having an army, the Japanese state 
channeled all national resources and efforts to enhance the nation’s economic 
development. Shin (1996) remarks that due to restrictions imposed by the war 
winners, economic development became the only alternative for the Japanese state 






developmental state in the country. The concept of developmental state was first 
proposed by Johnson in 1982 in a study about Japan, in which he described the 
combination of state planning with market mechanisms. The term was adopted by 
other authors, such as Alice Amsden in studies on Korea and Robert Wade in studies 
on Taiwan. Peter Evans and Ha-Joon Chang contributed to generalize the concept 
(Bastian, 2008)  
 The exact role of such developmental state in the Japan’s economic growth 
after the war is controversial. Mainstream economists have argued that the 
government only pre-paved the way for private investments. However, even though 
(given the moderate backwardness of Japan) the private sector had been more risk-
taking after the war than during the Meiji Restoration, evidence seems to show that 
the state activism was crucial and, according to Fagerberg and Godinho (2003, p.16), 
“contributed significantly to gear the attention of private business to catch-up with the 
West”.  
The government supported the catching up of the private sector by providing 
overall guidance; selective tariff protection and credit facilities; selecting firms for 
controlled imports and exploitation of foreign technologies; arranging the necessary 
industrial combinations to the proper scale of operations; reducing the risky 
investments in innovation; and, in general, by coordinating research projects. The 
coordination of such projects also aimed to save resources by avoiding redundant 
research and mitigating global risks of heading into wrong directions via the division 
of specializations (Shin, 1996).  
To foster Japan’s industrial development, the Japanese government built an 
original institutional framework adapted to local conditions, the country’s degree of 
backwardness and the path for technological progress. This institutional framework 
worked as a functional substitute, in Gerschenkron’s perspective, of existing 
institutional arrangements in forerunner countries (Shin, 1996). Whereas the 
investment bank was one of the main functional substitutes (or innovative 
arrangements) for the catching up processes of continental Europe during the 19th 
century, the Ministry for Trade and Industry (MITI) played this role in the Japanese 
catching up after the WW II whereby it supported private industrial investments 






coordinating state agent in the economic arena, initially directed its attention to iron, 
steel, aluminum, automobile, and shipbuilding industries. 
 Rather than simply assist the development of labor-intensive mature 
industries to supply the domestic market, the MITI decided to promote also the most 
dynamic and high technology industries, such as oil-refining, machinery and 
electronics, in which “income is high, technological progress is rapid, and labor 
productivity rises fast” and make them competitive in the world economy (OECD 
1972, apud Wade, 2003, p. 25). Even when the MITI supported already established 
industries, such as iron and steel, it stimulated the adoption and/or development of 
new technologies, instead of fostering the absorption of mature technologies. Initially 
the MITI resisted supporting the ambitious plans of the iron and steel private sectors 
since it did not consider them exporting industries, but later changed its position and 
included the building of an integrated production system for both industries in the list 
of priorities with the steel export boom in 1955.  
According to Shin (1996), the most distinctive characteristic of the Japan’s 
catching up in the iron and steel industries was their very early insertion in the global 
production and markets, when compared to what happened in the United States, 
where the development of such industries was enhanced by and directed to the 
immense and rapidly growing domestic market. In effect, the backward and forward 
linkages of the Japanese industry with global markets were what made possible the 
concentration of a huge iron and steel production capacity in Japan.  
Contrarily to the US and European countries, according to Shin (1996, p. 96), 
“Japan imported raw materials from all over the world, established plants big enough 
to exploit economies of scale on the global level and exported its products to the 
world markets.” Until the Japanese catching up, all the major world steel producers 
had based their production on domestic raw materials, including the exporting 
countries. Japanese companies had to engage in exporting to pay for imported raw 
materials and used the increased production capacity in order to take advantage of 
economies of scale. These economies played a key role in the enhancement of the 
Japanese international competitiveness.  
In Shin’s view, the institutional pattern of Japanese catching-up in the iron and 






In fact, by the end of the war, Japan had already heavy industries and possessed 
experienced managers and engineers, well-trained workers, and technological and 
organizational capabilities to exploit the new technologies of the time. The country 
constraints were derived from the scarcity of financial resources and restrictions 
imposed by international circumstances. The funds necessary for investment were 
provided at great extent by the keiretsu system and the state, which facilitated the 
‘over borrowing’ of Japanese companies. However, unlike what occurred in 
Germany, where investment banks provided finance and controlled the industry, in 
Japan the coordination mechanism operated within the keiretsu system, without any 
private effective inter-keiretsu coordination. The support that Japan received from the 
US in the context of the Cold War was important. 
Shin (1996) also remarks the strong competition for market shares and new 
markets among the keiretsus, as well as the MITI’s efforts to mitigate overcapacity 
problems in the 1950s, by controlling their investments and sales. Due to keiretsus’ 
resistance to government regulation, the MITI changed its strategy and stimulated 
cartelization and mergers in order to get the same results.     
The development trajectory of the electronics sectors, which successfully 
caught up with the U.S. industries in the late 1970s, was quite different from that of 
the iron and steel industries, and especially from that of the semiconductor industry. 
Export markets gave the overall direction of the semiconductor sector development, 
although the beginning of the process had been more domestic-market based, in 
comparison with the experience of East Asian countries. While the iron and steel 
sectors were already mature and established industries, the semiconductor was an 
emergent industry, characterized by rapid process and product innovations, and a 
greater linkage impact over the economy as whole.   
In Japan, the keiretsu groups involved in semiconductors were vertically-
integrated electronic manufacturers, with backward and forward linkages with 
consumer electronics, computer, and other IT products. It was the electronics 
industry itself that provided a stable demand for the semiconductors’ production and 
made them profitable (Shin, 1996). The vertically integrated electronics companies 
had access to low cost capital and other government benefits. After succeeding in 






semiconductors, Japanese corporations started moving to more complex products 
and technologies. A similar strategy would be adopted by Korea later on. 
Japan was able to pursue a very ambitious catching up strategy from the very 
beginning of the semiconductor and computer industries in the post wartime because 
the country had already accumulated technological and organizational capabilities 
(Shin, 1996), or social capabilities in the Abramovitz’s terminology. Its success can 
be attributed both to the risk-taking behavior of firms and also to the state activism, 
which supported Japanese companies until they became competitive in the domestic 
market and internationally. The starting-point of the state’s participation in Japanese 
IT technologies varied across the electronics industry. In some cases, such as in the 
semiconductors, private companies initiated their own catching up; in others, such as 
in the computer industry, the state intervention was important from the beginning.  
The state support to the electronic industry was particularly important from the 
1970s onwards, even though the government identified the electronic sector as 
strategic since the late 1960s. The government policy first focused on import-
substitution and then on export promotion – a path of development that, in Shin’s 
view, was not available to Korea, which had to adopt export promotion and import-
substitution policies simultaneously (Shin, 1996).  
The Japanese government played a crucial role by reducing uncertainties and 
enhancing investments. Its support involved the control of technology transfer and 
the U.S. companies’ direct investments, research project coordination, protective 
measures and credit facilities. Japan’s protectionism restrained the US firms’ access 
to license their technologies to the Japanese market. 
  
2.1.1 Remarks on the Japan’s catch- up  
 
Amartya Sen (2000) contends that the Japanese economic development was 
enhanced by the human resource development associated with social opportunities, 
particularly in basic education. In effect, the pervasive and efficient Japanese 
educational system endued the industrial system with high-quality human resources 






The Japan’s development has been interpreted as a Schumpeterian process 
of creative destruction. In fact, an important element in the Japanese catch-up was 
the very rapid and orderly process of structural change through which old industries 
were replaced by technologically more progressive ones, with growing product 
differentiation and continuous improvements associated with learning. Since the 
beginning of the postwar period, Japan set the goal of establishing a broad-ranging 
industrial structure and developing a diversified manufacturing system, updated 
technologically, although Takeuchi, Shimada and Itami (1997) contend that the focus 
on latest technologies of the time was in part fortuitous. Whether a process partially 
fortuitous or completely intended, the fact is that Japan knew how to take advantage 
of the favorable economic and geo-political circumstances after World War II, 
characterized by the Cold War, as well as of the technological trends of the time, in 
order to catch up.  
Grabowski (1999) also argues that the rapid technical change in Japan was 
more an outcome of the incorporation of innovations into the economic activity 
through a process of learning by doing than the result of deliberate investments in 
research and development, as had been previously seen in England. In this process, 
Japanese conglomerates combined the exploitation of economies of scale and the 
development of flexible plants, in which products are tailored according to the end-
users’ needs. In fact, the very rapid catching-up of Japan towards Western 
productivity levels involved important organizational innovations (e.g. the introduction 
of the “just in time system”) that resulted in improvements in productivity and 
efficiency. These innovations, diffused with a lag to the established leader (the U.S.) 
and other countries, totally transformed many industries at the world level. In other 
words, Japanese firms not only reached the technological frontier (caught up), but 
also forged ahead, defining a new frontier in some sectors.  
Initially, most of the Japanese growth was inward-oriented, with domestic 
demand pushed by increasing incomes. Once Japanese firms acquired 
competitiveness in the domestic market (highly protected), they started to exploit 
foreign markets, targeting the demand for high tech products in the most advanced 
countries.  The domestic market, however, remained protected to enable local firms 
to improve their technological capabilities – the U.S. companies had access to the 






investments were considered strategic by the state. Although firstly inward-oriented, 
Japan knew very early to take advantage of the insertion in global markets.    
As a whole, the Japan’s catching up process was largely self-financed, even 
though the US financial support in the context of the cold war (through the Marshal 
Plan, for instance) had been fundamental in the beginning of the Japanese economic 
recovery. Part of capital needs for the keiretsu investments was supplied by the 
state, which had a direct participation not only in the process of technological 
development and investment coordination, but also in financing Japan’s catching up.  
In fact, the Japan Development Bank (JDB) was one of the major financial 
instruments of the government’s industrial policy, coordinating cooperative loans to 
target industries and affecting the allocation of credit by private banks to the industrial 
sector (Fargerberg and Godinho, 2003). Moreover, the Ministry of Finance controlled 
the level and the structure of the banks’ interest rates, as well as influenced their 
decisions on credit allocation, which made the Japanese financial system very 
effective in collecting savings and transfer them to industrial conglomerates. The 
easy money provided by the banking system, in association with the keiretsu system 
and integrated manufacturers, enabled the private companies to maintain high and 
stable investment rates.  
Steel and shipbuilding industries were the first to reach the productivity 
frontier; the next ones were the automobile and electronics (Fargerberg and 
Godinho, 2003). Regarding electronics industries, the Japanese catch up was more 
significant in the capital-intensive segment of semiconductor industry. Most Japanese 
semiconductor producers took advantage of the horizontal keiretsu grouping, 
benefiting from their keiretsu banks. The major players were integrated electronics 
manufactures, with business also in consumer electronics, computer and 
telecommunication. Some of them became independent vertical keiretsus, articulated 
through backward and forward linkages. This close integration allowed them to 
“exploit the synergy between the sectors better than their US counterparts”, whose 
vertical integration was prohibited by the US antitrust law (Shin, 1996, p. 121). One of 
the synergies was the systemic user-producer relation. The main incentive to 
improve the Japanese semiconductor technology came from the computer sector, 






for new products and allowed them to get more rapid returns on their investments. 
The integrated industries had a priority access to low-cost capital, tax incentives and 
other benefits granted to other divisions of the group. 
In synthesis, Japan’s catching up involved both imitation and innovation. The 
developmental state played a key role by offering general guidance and selective 
protection and by mitigating risks associated with investments in innovation and 
investments in general. This work was done by MITI, the main institutional innovation 
of the Japanese catching up. The MITI supported the import substitution in the 
mature industries, as well as enhanced the export drive of the emergent IT industries, 
allowing them to take advantage of global production and marketing networks. Both 
import substitution and export promotion policies generate dynamic effects on 
economy as whole, producing an equitable development path through which most 
part of population could improve their standard of living. As the result, Japanese 
industries were able to catch up with their more advanced counterparts abroad and 
eventually to forge ahead, defining a new technological frontier. 
After successfully catching up in many sectors, Japanese corporations 
adopted aggressive strategies to become more globalized and competitive. They 
rapidly expanded their investments overseas, looking to reduce production costs and 
increase market shares due to the limited scale of domestic markets. These 
investments tended to be clustered geographically in some regions – initially in the 
East Asia, and later in the Southeast Asia, regions with lower labor costs. The 
tendency to delocalization became stronger throughout the 1990s with the high yen. 
When the Japanese economy entered into a stage of maturity, and the high 
rates of growth vanished, increase exports to maintain production became an 
obsession for the Japanese corporations.  In the context of the strong yen, the 
Japanese industry started to search tirelessly to raise productivity, improve quality 
and cut costs to preserve their international competitiveness. The success of this 
strategy - translated into huge trade surplus - generated many trade frictions with the 
main Japanese commercial partners, especially the US. The persistent low 
dynamism of domestic demand, the losses associates with the financial bubbles of 






high trade surplus made it clear there was the need for structural reforms in 
companies and changes in their predominant competition practices. 
The emergence of East Asian countries and more recently of China as 
important competitors in the international markets clearly showed more the limits of 
the strategy of cutting cost and enhancing product differentiation to maintain market 
shares and keep pace with the leader. It also made it evident that the needed 
reforms went beyond the universe of firms. Apparently the educational system and 
many institutions which were very functional during the Japanese catch-up need to 
change once again change in order for the Japanese economy to better face the 
challenges associated with its level of maturity, the emergence of new and big 
players and other changing conditions in the international arena.80   
 
  
2.2 Catching up experiences of East Asian countries  
 
The historically unprecedented economic performance of East Asian countries 
over the past 50 years transformed them from backward into modern and competitive 
economies, able to produce high technology products and successfully compete with 
Europe, United States and Japan in many industrial fields.  
The first East Asian economies that tried to follow the Japanese path were 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, which became known as the “four 
Asian tigers”, or also as the “four little dragons”. They looked at the Japanese 
example, but took their own way for catching up and also succeeded in achieving a 
rapid and equitable growth. Similarly to Japan, their catching up processes were 
marked by high rates of investments in human and physical capital, fast-growing 
productivity in agriculture and the birth rate decline (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). 
Differences in terms of strategies relied on specificities of each economy, their level 
of backwardness, changes in the international environment and the emergence of 
new technological paths (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2003). 
                                            
80 The discussion of the challenges Japan have faced after reaching the economic and technological 






A number of different theories have tried to explain the so-called East Asian 
Miracle, which surpassed that of Japan. As in the Japanese case, there is a 
controversy about the critical factors to the East Asian successful catching up 
processes, particularly regarding the role of the state and market mechanisms.  
In the next sections, the critical elements of the so-called East Asian Miracle 
will be examined, in light of the Korean and Taiwanese catching up experiences, 
focusing on the technological aspects. In order to highlight the specificities of East 
Asian catching up experiences, they are compared with those of Southeast Asia and 
Latin America economies.     
 
2.2.1 Korea and Taiwan’s roads to catch up   
 
Korea and Taiwan81 were very far from the economic and technological 
frontier when they started their development process in the 1960s.  Korea, for 
instance, had an income per capita of about USD 880, smaller than those of many 
sub-Saharan African countries (Grabowski, 1999). Both economies succeeded in 
narrowing their socio-economic gap with more advanced ones, adopting different 
combination of policies. Most of their output and productivity increment is attributed to 
the accumulation of physical and human capital. Investments in human capital 
allowed a more effective use of the imported technology embodied in the machinery 
and equipment. Korea and Taiwan depended heavily on foreign finance: Korea, in 
the form of lending; Taiwan, in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Differences between both economies in terms of catching-up strategies and 
product specialization can be explained by their historical background and specific 
conditions in the eve of the spurt of industrialization (Grabowski, 1999; Shin, 1996). 
                                            
81 South Korea and Taiwan were controlled by Japan until the end of World War II. South Korea 
remained under the Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945; and Taiwan, from 1895 to 1945. South Korea is 
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Given their historical and economic peculiarities, while Korea’s government 
enhanced concentration and the development of large groups - the chaebols - public 
policies in Taiwan encouraged the dissemination of relatively small firms, which 
carried out most of the investments. The island concentrated its efforts in the 
production of components, which were more labor-intensive, taking advantage of the 
flexibility of its small firms. Such strategy raised the investment rates from about 10 
percent of GDP in the 1950s to over than 30 percent in the late 1970s. The 
Taiwanese government support comprised tax holiday, financing and other 
incentives. One of the key elements of the Taiwan catching-up was the promotion of 
entrepreneurship, due to its impacts on the innovative activity, a result of the close 
association between public research labs and start-ups.   
In Korea, the military regime elected industrial development as a strategic 
endeavor for economic, political and geopolitical reasons, in order to: a) solve the 
country chronic balance of payments constraints; b) legitimize the non-democratic 
regime; and c) make Korea a military power with certain independence from foreign 
resources and technologies, as well as from the US military influence (Shin, 1996). 
Conversely to Taiwan, and as Japan had done, the country concentrated its efforts 
on large domestic conglomerates and embarked in an industrialization process 
based on the development of heavy and chemical industries – industries that 
demand high investment in facilities - and also on the mass production of final 
consumer goods.  
The chaebols were the Korean counterpart of the Japanese keiretsu. They 
appeared in the early 1950s, but only became prominent in the 1970s with the Heavy 
and Chemical Industry (HCI) plan, the state’s program to foster the development of 
chemical and heavy industries through import substitution measures. Initially the 
chaebols were not strong enough to launch by themselves large-scale investments, 
being dependent on the state capital mobilization. In fact, given the degree of the 
backwardness of Korea, it was the state that guided the chaebols’ investments – 
initially, in heavy and chemical industries, and then in electronics in the 1980s.  
In the case of heavy industries, particularly of iron and steel, the catching up 
strategy followed by Korea was very similar to that of Japan, although it had 






large-scale investments required, the government created the state enterprise 
POSCO in the late 1960s, which, with the establishment of a chemical complex, was 
the starting-point of Korea’s ambitious industrialization program of the 1970s. 
POSCO was conceived as a key instrument of the export promotion´s framework, 
and its role was to provide inputs to other industries at lower prices than foreign 
suppliers did and export directly at least thirty per cent of its production. The funds for 
its initial investments could not be obtained in international markets neither in 
multilateral institutions as the World Bank, which refused to support the project. 
Then, the Korean government started the company by negotiating loans with Japan 
Export-Import Bank and changing the usage of an important portion of reparations 
paid by the Japanese government, which involved concessions to Japan (Shin, 
1996).  
Whereas Japan embarked in a broader catching up strategy in many 
segments of the electronics industry, Korea, a country with a higher level of 
backwardness, started its process by assembling simpler labor-intensive consumer 
electronics, moving progressively to more technologically complex processes and 
products as the industrial development proceeded. At the beginning, the state 
strategy was based both on import substitution policies, which reserved the domestic 
market for local producers, and export promotion. Although some segments of the 
electronics industry had strong linkage with the domestic demand, others were 
developed exclusively to export.  
Initially the Korean electronics industry was characterized by a dual structure: 
a segment linked to the domestic demand, and other ‘enclave’ segments directed to 
export (Shin, 1996). The latter were associated to foreign direct investments and 
networks of international specialization, without a strong connection with the 
domestic market. One of the more prominent examples of fostering an ‘enclave’ 
segment was the development of the semiconductor industry from the mid-1960s. 
Until the beginning of the 1980s, Korea was basically an assembly site for 
multinational electronics companies, and Shin argues that its weak forward linkages 
with industries like computer and telecommunications explain the high degree of 
export orientation of semiconductors. Moreover, the internal market was insufficient 






The Korean catching up in the semiconductor industry was the result of high 
investments in R&D (from the 1980s), carried out by the chaebols with the state’s 
support. In fact, rather than wait for comparative advantages to emerge naturally, the 
Korean government created them by concentrating resources in a few groups, 
adopting an import substitution strategy and directing incentives to export 
(Grabowski, 1999). One key means of acquiring advanced technologies by Korean 
companies was the establishment of outposts at Silicon Valley by taking over small 
US firms.  
The chaebols concentrated their investments in a narrow segment of the 
semiconductor sector, i.e., the development through learning by doing of competitive 
memories, the DRAMs. First, they invested mostly in facilities and only later in R&D. 
The specialization was possible because the characteristics of the electronics 
industry, such as the possibility of fragmenting production in different sites with gains 
in economic efficiency.  
According to Grabowski (1999), governments of Korea and Taiwan did not 
always adopt detailed development plans. Instead, they often acted pragmatically, 
going with “what worked and dropping what did not. Thus there was a dialectical 
interaction process between policy makers and society, more so in Taiwan than in 
Korea.” Adelman (1999) and Grabowski (1999) point out that both governments 
exhibited high levels of autonomy regarding small groups’ interests and were strongly 
committed to development. Generally speaking, they implemented a two-way policy, 
protecting infant industries in the domestic market and promoting their 
competitiveness by exposing them to competition in international markets with the 
support of export marketing institutions. Adelman stresses that they both “combined 
selective protection in successively higher industries with selective liberalization in 
earlier industrial specialties” (Adelman, 1999, p. 120). The selected industries were 
supported through quotas, tariffs, and subsidies. Financial resources were provided 
to them at below market interest rates, since the government controlled the banking 
system via ownership or having significant influence (Grabowski, 1999).  
The public sector was the actor that organized and enhanced the well-
functioning of the markets by building the physical and institutional infrastructure, 






technology and promoting stability, investment and competition (Stiglitz and Charlton, 
2005). For Adelman (1999), possible market distortions associated with state 
interventions were limited by the subordination of subsidies to the export 
performance of their beneficiaries.  
The two economies and other East Asian countries took advantage of the 
import demand from OECD countries, and also of shifts in the technology cycles and 
competition strategies of large multinational companies. The segmentation of 
production of electronics, often spatially separated to gain efficiency and save costs, 
and different requirements in terms of capital and skills across each segment led 
these companies to search for lower wages. East Asia economies had the merit of 
perceiving the windows of opportunity opened by the global production networks 
associated with the emergence of information technologies and globalization. 
Both economies invested heavily in education, and the increase in the supply 
of university graduates was so impressive that it temporarily surpassed their capacity 
to create job opportunities for them in the academic system and industry, especially 
in science and engineering. Many of them emigrated in search of job opportunities or 
to continue their education abroad. The government tried to restrain the brain drain, 
but without much success at the beginning. In Korea, the universities became more 
undergraduate teaching-oriented than research-oriented, and the university system 
was not able to develop a university system with strong balance between teaching 
and research, as other countries did (UNIDO, 2005). Overtime, job opportunities 
were created, stopping the brain drain.     
 
2.2.2 Critical factors to the East Asia success  
 
Many studies conducted by individual academics and institutions (such as the 
World Bank) have tried to explain the success of East Asian economies in catching 
up, stressing the role of market friendly policies, state activism (or developmental 
state), export-oriented strategies, high investments in education and concentrated 
investments in the most dynamic technologies. Other explanations impute the East 
Asian success to their cultural heritage, particularly Confucian tradition and other 






Naya and Meyer, 1989, p. 16). There are also those that remark the importance of 
the US support due to the cold war and the presence of many fortuitous 
circumstances in the world economy, such as the large foreign aid and growing 
openness of markets to manufactured goods. As in the case of Japan´s catching up 
after the defeat in the World War II, the U.S. aid in the context of the Cold War also 
contributed to strengthen the states in Korea and Taiwan and to the success of their 
policy in promoting socio-economic development.   
Certainly all these elements matter and none of them alone explain the East 
Asian success, although some of them had been more determinant than others. In 
this section, we will initially sum up the main arguments on state activism, market 
friendly policies and export-oriented strategies. Then, the Korean and Taiwanese 
experiences will be analyzed from the perspective of the catching up approach, 
emphasizing technological aspects.   
 
2.2.2.1 Market friendly policies versus state activ ism 
 
The market-friendly policy approach and similar theories regarding the 
success of East Asian countries expound that efficient resource allocation was the 
principal force for growth, and that such efficiency resulted from freely functioning 
markets, “including closer integration of domestic product markets into international 
markets” (Wade, 2003 p. 29). Therefore, the East Asian economies are examples of 
the benefits associated with “get the prices right”, in which “right” means domestic 
prices aligned with international prices. (Wade, 2003).  
One of the main studies that basically attributed the remarkable East Asia 
performance to the adoption of market-friendly policies was published by the World 
Bank in 1993, entitled “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy”. 
The origin of this study was the dissatisfaction of Japan’s government with the Bank’s 
emphasis on the use of free market policies in backward countries willing to grow, 
despite all the evidence to the contrary from the East Asian experience (Amsden, 
1994). Eventually the Bank agreed to conduct broad research on East Asian growth, 







The study noted that there is no single East Asian model, since East Asian 
economies combined policies differently, which the report classified into two broad 
groups: fundamentals and selective interventions. The first group included 
macroeconomic stability, high investments in human capital, solid financial systems, 
reduced price distortions and openness to foreign technologies. Selective 
interventions were comprised of financial repression, credit facilities, selective 
industrial incentives and export promotion trade policies, among others. It is also 
recognized that in most economies governments intervened to promote the 
development of selected industries systematically and through innumerous means, 
subsidizing credit, protecting domestic import substitutes and establishing export 
targets. They encouraged private investments through a broad range of instruments, 
including low relative prices for capital goods, subsidized interest rates, which 
provided limited risks for private investors who could seek tax rebates and special 
tariffs and exchange rate policies to keep the price of capital goods low.  
Governments also created a wide range of financial institutions, among them 
investment banks to provide long term financing, as well as stimulated the 
development of bond and capital markets. The banking system was strengthened 
and made more accessible to a broad scope of savers, raising the level of financial 
savings. Additionally, education policies prioritized universal primary and secondary 
schooling, which enhanced rapid increases in labor force skills.   
Although recognizing that government interventions through industrial, 
financial and trade policies played an important role in the East Asian catching up, 
mainly in the Northeastern economies, the World Bank report found it difficult to 
establish a statistical correlation between growth and specific interventions, under the 
argument that other economies followed the same polices without much success. 
Based on analytical and empirical judgments, the report affirms that states fostered 
growth in a higher and more equal way than otherwise would have occurred only 
when three prerequisites were matched: a) clear performance criteria for selective 
intervention and monitoring performance; b) strict cost control of intervention, 
preserving macroeconomic stability; and c) low price distortions. In other words, the 
report stated that government intervention fostered development only when rigorous 
criteria in terms of performance were required and monitored by government and 






criteria were fundamental to the achievement of two important objectives: 
macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth. In this analysis, performance of 
some economies that had not matched these criteria might have been even better if 
local government had “intervened less or not at all” (World Bank Report, 2003). 
The document added that government interventions only made the difference 
by producing higher and more distributed growth in just a few economies. The report 
suggests that the institutional context is as crucial to the success or failure of a policy 
as the policy itself. This would help to understand why similar policies produce 
different results in different economies. In the NIEs of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand), government interventions would have been less pervasive 
and important to the economic performance than the sound macroeconomic policies. 
Then, the Report concluded that the experiences of Southeast economies are more 
relevant to other developing countries than that of Northeast Asia, which had an 
impressive performance in a very different international environment. 
In sum, the main conclusion of the World Bank´s report is that the common 
element in the trajectory of high performing Asian economies was the adoption of a 
set of similar market-friendly policies that fostered high accumulation of physical and 
human capital, as well as better allocation of resources by encouraging saving and 
investment rates, expenditures in education, and exports. Although acknowledging 
that government interventions played a role in the most successful economies, the 
report concludes that the effect of the state intervention was residual. According to 
the World Bank, East Asia achieved high growth mostly by getting the basics right 
through sound macroeconomic policies, which provided the essential framework for 
private investment, whose high rates exceeded an average of 20 percent of GDP for 
the period 1960-1990. Therefore, the key factor to success was the government 
focus on macroeconomic stability, basic education, sound financial systems, and 
secure property rights.  
In contrast with the World Bank’s view, supporters of the developmental state 
approach explain most of the East-Asian performance on the basis of state activism. 
Amsden, for instance, attributes the East Asian Miracle to micro-institutions based on 
a broad state intervention, which enhanced competitiveness by subsidizing learning, 






notes that in all successful countries private investments were supported by the state 
in many ways, such as the provision of infrastructure, promotion of technology 
transfer, financing, tax rebates, public procurement and so on.  
In Amsden’s view, much of the East Asian government expenditures on 
private production run apart from the general government budget and parliamentary 
political process, and were under the exclusive control of the bureaucracy (Amsden, 
199782). Although the magnitude and composition of off-budget revenues and 
expenditures have varied across East Asian latecomers, generally, public spending 
contributed at a large extent to the fixed capital formation.  
Amsden contends that focus on the fundamentals supposes that economic 
growth is a straightforward process, conversely to what new growth theories and 
models suggest, in which economic growth is explained by multiple causes (Amsden, 
1994). In her perspective, the Bank’s mistake was to dissociate the macro basis from 
their micro foundations, or supporting institutions. In fact, the high saving rates in 
East Asia were fostered by the state, which owned all banks both in Korea and 
Taiwan. In the same way, exports were enhanced by favorable exchange regimes 
and extensive substitution policies (“tariffs and quotas on competing imports”) and 
sophisticated export incentive systems. Consequently, “one cannot separate high 
investment rates from financial repression, or high export growth from import 
substitution or deliberate export promotion” (Amsden, 199483, p. 628).  
In fact, the World Bank did not give a real space to heterodox interpretations 
(named revisionists), leaving out most contentious issues and prioritizing evidences 
more in line with the market-friendly approach. Instead, the report presented 
predominately data and analyses that support the free market-friendly policy view, 
keeping away works that show correlations contradicting its main thesis.  
The conclusion that East Asia economies succeeded by getting prices right 
with minimal states derives from a narrow definition of market that overstates 
exchange and neglects production. This neglect, in Amsden’s view, obscures the real 
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government involvement in the economy in East Asia and that states supported the 
social construction of competitive assets (resources, skills and organizations) to 
overcome knowledge-based barriers by manipulating key prices (such as exchange 
rates, interest rates and wages) and by deliberately getting some prices “wrong” 
rather than try getting prices right by fostering perfect markets (Amsden, 1994).  
According to Wade (2003), some evidence indicates that intentional 
“distortion” of some prices may support growth by changing the signals to which 
decentralized market agents respond, influencing their behavior. In the case of Korea 
and Taiwan, public policies relatively lowered the cost of investment goods, fostering 
accumulation, industrialization and technological development. Yet, the reduction of 
the technological gap with leader countries and of competitiveness in international 
markets have implied “a deliberate creation of ‘distortions’ in the form of firm-specific 
skills, knowledge-based monopolies and other types of entry barriers” (Amsden, 
1997, p. 479).  
Emphasizing the role of the developmental state in the Asian success does 
not mean dismissing the vital importance of the entrepreneurs. In fact, the state 
enhanced the development of a strong private sector, even in countries in which 
state companies invested directly in productive activities. As the World Bank report 
recognizes, one aspect that made difference in the most successful East Asian 
economies was the subordination of government interventions to rigorous 
performance requirements by the private firms.    
Wade (2003) adds new elements to the developmental state interpretation and 
sets three levels of explanation to the economic performance of East Asia, being the 
primary causes a combination of: a) high levels of productive investment embodying 
newer technologies; b) more investments in key industries than would have 
happened without the government activism; c) exposure of many industries to 
competition in foreign markets. The second level of explanation is that to reach these 
results governments used a set of economic polices - including incentives, controls 
and instruments to spread risk – to govern the market process of resource allocation. 
These policies were carried out by specific organizations of the state and the private 






The author states that governments guided markets by a) redistributing 
agricultural land in the early post-war period; b) managing the financial system and 
subordinating private financial capital to industrial capital; c) preserving the 
macroeconomic stability, focusing especially on the exchange rates, interest rates 
and the general level of prices; d) regulating foreign competition in the domestic 
market and setting priorities to scarce foreign currencies; e) promoting exports; f) 
enhancing technology transfer from multinational companies and building a national 
technology system; g) supporting selected industries through sectoral polices. 
(Wade, 2003) 
Wade makes a distinction between sectoral policies that lead markets and 
those that follow markets. In the first case, the government influences the choice of 
products to be produced and technologies to be adopted by the use of public 
resources and other policy tools. In the absence of interest by private sector or of 
private firms themselves, the government may put its strategy in action through 
public enterprises. Sectoral policies follow the markets when the government accepts 
proposals of private firms in terms of new products and technologies, assisting them 
to reach their endeavors. Wade qualifies the leading and following policies by their 
degree of additionality. When government supports firms to do what they would have 
done anyway, according to the author there is a “small followership”. When the 
support is significant enough to affect the margin of investments, there is a “big 
followership”. So Wade uses the term ”big leadership” to “refer to government 
initiatives on a large scale enough to make a real difference to investment and 
production patterns in an industry, and ‘small leadership’ to refer to government 
initiatives which on their own carry too few resources or too little influence to make a 
difference” (Wade, 2003, p. 28). According to Wade, what made the difference were 




2.2.2.2 Import substitution versus export orientati on: a comparison with the 







Another stream of interpretation assigns the success East Asian economies to 
the adoption of export-oriented strategies, which encouraged domestic producers to 
export rather than sell their products on the domestic market. This stream was quite 
popular in the 1990s, when it became very common to compare Latin American and 
East Asian experiences, contending that the latter succeeded in catching up because 
they adopted (1970s and 1980s) export-oriented strategies and market-friendly 
macroeconomic policies earlier, while the former pursued import substitution paths 
based on the protection of infant industries for long time.   
Although very appealing for its simplicity, this interpretation tells only part of 
the story. As Amsden (1993) points out, this explanation sees the world in terms of 
export-led growth versus import substitution and considers that exporting does not 
demand a previous period of import substitution. It supposes that domestic 
production just starts when the country has comparative advantage, and that this 
stage can be reached without subsidies or protection in the context of import 
substitution polices. It implies, according to Amsden (1994), seeing import 
substitution as an isolated event, instead of a process whose length is not easy to 
capture using only aggregate measures.  
Unlike the views that emphasize exclusively the export-oriented aspect of the 
East-Asian industrialization processes, the fact is that often import substitution 
policies precede export-orientated strategies. In Korea, for instance, the development 
of heavy and chemical industry was initially oriented to the domestic market and 
greatly based on protective measures and concession of subsidies to infant 
industries. The extension and length of the protection varied according to the sector 
involved, being higher in strategic industries. 
The early export orientation of the electronics industries seems to be more an 
exception than the rule if we consider the whole process, and it was at great extent 
connected to the productive and competitive strategies of international leading firms. 
Aiming to reduce costs and becoming more competitive, electronics firms located in 
advanced countries outsourced the assembly of final goods and/or the production of 
components to subcontractors in countries with lower wages. Governments of East 
Asian economies, and later on also of Southeast Asian countries, took advantage of 






early in global production and marketing networks of electronics industries. Overtime, 
some of them moved from the simple assembly of products to the production of 
components and/or specific goods, initially by copying and eventually developing 
their own products and technologies.    
East Asian nations performed better in the 1980s than Latin American’s 
probably because they focused on both import substitution and exports, conversely 
to what the latter initially tended to do. Moreover, differently from what happened in 
most Latin American countries, the strong states of Korea, Taiwan and other East-
Asian countries made their support to the private sector contingent upon a system of 
rewards and punishments according to the achievement of established goals 
(Grabowski, 1999; Amsden, 1997). In other words, governments in East Asia 
predominantly allocated subsidies and indirect support in a disciplinary way, 
subjecting import substitution industries to many requirements, including export 
performance, productivity increment, quality improvements, investments in human 
capital development and R&D expenditures. If the targets were not made for a good 
reason, the privileges were usually removed. The extent and success of such 
discipline varied across economies. Indeed, there were no great disparities among 
the former and the latter in terms of type of policies and subsidies conceded to 
promote rapid industrialization.  
Amsden (1994) sustains that the composition of manufactured goods for 
export supports the thesis about the connection between export-led growth and 
import substitution in East Asia, arguing that the sectors that performed better were 
those that received more government incentives. In all countries that succeeded in 
export activities in East Asia, the state played a key role in the organization of 
production and trade expansion. Even in Thailand, the country with less government 
intervention (although considerable) in East Asia, the export-led industries was 
granted with significant government support. Thus, conversely to the views that see 
export as a natural and automatic result of the presence of comparative advantages, 
the Asian experiences show that steady efforts are required to compete effectively in 
world markets, which involves learning new competences, marketing, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, for which the assistance of specialized export institutions and 






The export-led orientation became stronger in East Asia in 1980s, after the 
second oil shock and the beginning of the debt crisis that engorged many developing 
countries. This re-orientation enabled the region to resume growth and boosted 
manufactured exports. The conversion of import substitution industries in exporters 
relieved pressure on the balance of payments and stimulated the raise of investment 
rates in the economy as a whole, and reduced the dependence of East Asian 
countries on foreign borrowing.  
As it is known, Latin-American countries were traditional suppliers of primary 
products to more advanced economies, which provided the needed foreign 
currencies to finance part of their imports of manufacturing goods, despite of the 
tendency of deterioration of the terms of trade envisaged by ECLA.  Moreover, large 
countries like Brazil, Argentine and Mexico, had also big markets and abundant 
natural resources that enabled them to base their industrialization in the expansion of 
their domestic markets. East Asian countries, in contrast, had neither primary 
products to export and generate foreign currencies nor domestic markets large 
enough to sustain a process of inward-oriented industrialization. They also spurted 
their industrialization by adopting import substitution polices to promote mature 
industries, as the Latin America countries did, but soon had to take a step toward 
international markets to continue moving ahead. In doing so, they transformed a 
contingency in an opportunity. 
Korea and Taiwan, for instance, had to search foreign markets to get strong 
international currencies to finance the continuation of their development process. 
They knew how to take advantage of the emerging electronic industries and 
technologies by adopting export-oriented strategies. Such strategies enhanced 
productivity gains in the economy as a whole, and enabled some countries to 
become innovators in specific segments of the electronics industry. These countries 
exploited opportunities in international markets, but also expanded domestic markets. 
The Southeast Asian countries pursued another pathway, by which they specialized 
in the production of goods for export, predominantly assembled, to the detriment of 
the development of the domestic economy and the production of intermediate goods 






The integration of East Asian countries into the world economy was crucial to 
their long-term growth and it was possible because they combined direct government 
intervention and reliance on private entrepreneurship. The government adopted 
sound macroeconomic policies to, contrary to the orthodoxy, get fundamental prices 
“wrong” according to strategic goals. Government agencies established a closer 
relationship with the private sector, guiding and assisting through planning, 
coordination and a myriad of support mechanisms – financial, technological and 
managerial. The process was complex and the path to success involved difficulties 
and failures.  
In sum, in most cases in East Asia, the outward orientation was preceded 
and/or accompanied by import substituting strategies. East Asian countries were also 
affected by the 1980’s crisis, but they learned to take advantage of the changing 
conditions in the international trade arena, while initiating programs to liberalize 
imports, investments regulations and financial markets.   
 
Box  2.1 - Import substitution policies in Latin Am erica 
Latin American economies adopted development strategies 
based on import substitution policies, but the protection and 
subsidization of local industries were usually provided without the 
imposition of any discipline on the capital. In contrast to the Asian 
economies that succeeded in catching up, the Latin American 
economies kept their industrialization processes inward-oriented and 
based on mature industries until the debt crisis of the 1980s. They 
neither fostered export activities as vigorously as they promoted 
import substitution, nor pursued attracting emerging industries and 
technologies. Those who tried to embark in the new and more 
dynamic industries did so using the same inward-oriented strategies, 
which were effective to mature industries but inappropriate to spark 
the development of industries characterized by different (and shorter) 
cycles of product and technology, and consequently by another logic 
of production, distribution and competition.  
Therefore, it is not the import substitution strategy per se that 
explains the differences in terms of achievement between Latin 
American and Asian countries. Actually, the former exhibited socio-
economic performances less impressive than the latter, not because 
they adopted import substitution policies in the early stages of 
industrialization, but because later on they did not take a step further, 
combining such policies with export oriented measures. Yet they did 
not design effective policies to take advantage of the windows of 






industries, which were already born internationalized. Latin American 
economies just came to promote manufacturing exports in the 1980s, 
when the import substitution model collapsed and the debt crisis 
trapped most of them in balance of payment constraints, rampant 
inflation troubles, fiscal insolvency and other macroeconomic 
problems. In this context, the export promotion was done at the 
expense of real wages and domestic markets, without initially 
enhancing productivity.   
One can ask why Latin American economies neither adopted 
export-oriented policies nor tried to attract more dynamic industries 
with the same tenacity that they pursued import substitution strategies 
to attract mature industries. The answer to these questions may be 
found both in the theoretical basis of the Latin American countries’ 
industrialization and their insertion in the world economy as exporters 
of primary products in the post-war period.    
The main intellectual inspiration and technical support to import 
substitution policies in the Latin American countries came from the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). ECLA’s 
development experts advocated that these countries, because of their 
position in the periphery of the world economy as suppliers of primary 
agricultural products and the asymmetrical diffusion of technical 
progress, should pursue import substitution polices to increase 
productivity and foster economic growth. They believed that 
technological progress would occur automatically through protection 
of infant industries.   
According to Bielschowsky (1998), conversely to what it is said, 
since its early days and mainly from the 60s onwards, the ECLA also 
pointed out the importance of stimulating exports, and played an 
important role at least in two initiatives to this regard. However, 
although the Commission had also stressed the importance of export 
promotion, the Latin American countries only moved in this direction in 
the 1980s, when constrained by the debt crisis and balance of 
payment imbalances. Perhaps the ECLA had not emphasized the 
importance of export promotion with the same vigor conferred to the 
import substitution process per se. In any case, the focus of the 
institution was placed in the export of goods of mature industries. 
 
2.2.2.3 The role of investments in human capital de velopment  
  
Some authors attribute a great part of East Asia miracles to massive 
investments in basic and higher education, especially in the case of Korea, and also 
of Taiwan. The effort made by both economies to expand secondary and tertiary 






However, without an investment policy, the newly educated workforce would not find 
employment, and the result of education expenditures would be the increase of 
unemployment rates and the emigration of skilled workers (Amsden, 1994). In 
Amsden’s view, the supply of educated people does not obey Say’s Law, generating 
“the demand necessary to employ it” (Amsden, 1994).  
Both Korea and Taiwan (two of the most educated latecomer economies) 
experienced brain drain and unemployment before the introduction of industrial 
policies in the 1950s. What really made the difference in East Asia with respect to the 
accumulation of human capital was the creation of employment opportunities, at 
some point, in parallel with the development of human resources. As many authors 
have stressed (Reinert, 2006, and Fageberg and Godinho, 2003, for instance), 
investing in human capital without changing the productive structure to absorb the 
skilled workers is to train people for unemployment and emigration. East Asian 
economies not only invested in schooling, but also managed to expand both higher 
technical education and employment opportunities for engineers and scientists. For 
them, as Fagerberg and Godinho (2003, p. 33) pointed out, “technology and 
educational policies were complements, not substitutes, and the ability to carry these 
policies out in a sustained and coordinated fashion probably explains a good deal of 
their economic success.” In sum, investments in human capital are a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the take-off of technology-intensive industrialization 
(Ras, 2005).  
 The growth of investment rates and the continuing absorption of new skilled 
human resources encouraged further investments in education and training, creating 
a virtuous circle. The increased demand for labor and the human resource 
development contributed to spread the benefits of growth (James, Naya and Meier, 
1989, Abramovitz, 1994).  
Amartya Sen (2000)84 argues that the investment in human capital of East 
Asia economies that succeed in catching up went very much beyond the expansion 
of education. Similarly to Japan, they enhanced the human resources development 
through the creation of social opportunities, investing not only in massive basic 
                                            






education, but also in health care and other spheres that affect the conditions of 
living, even before lifting millions out from general poverty.   
 
2.2.2.4 East Asian Technological Catching up 
 
Approaches rooted in evolutionary theories/Neo-Schumpeterian perspectives 
usually highlight the importance of the technological catching up to the success of 
East Asian economies. There is no question that high investment rates in physical 
and human capital are important to successfully catch up. But the nature of these 
investments matters. High physical capital accumulation per se is not sufficient to 
sustain a development track. In the Nelson and co-authors’ view (Nelson et alii, 
1997), what made the difference in the Asian Miracle, particularly in Korea and 
Taiwan, was that a significant part of capital investments embodied modern 
technologies and were carried out by an effective entrepreneurship.  “Expansion of 
physical and educational capital per worker”, in the words of Nelson and Howard, 
(1998, p. 28)85, “is essential part of the process by which the economy incorporates 
modern technology into its productive structure. But, on the other hand, accumulation 
without assimilation yields no returns”.  
The technological efforts in Taiwan and Korea by firms were critical elements 
that enabled them to start new industries and absorb new technologies. Moreover, 
much of the efforts of absorption involved learning about new opportunities, improve 
organization and management, efforts that are not included as formal R&D 
investments (Nelson and Howard, 1998). In fact, it was the significant and effective 
innovative performance of the firms that entered into new lines of business what 
made saving and investment profitable (Nelson and Howard, 1998). Differently from 
industrialized countries, public R&D and technology were basically more involved 
with technology development than with applied research at the frontier of innovation 
(UNIDO, 2005). In Korea and Taiwan, the institutional framework for competence 
building and technology dissemination were set up in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to 
facilitate the industrial development. In Taiwan, it supported the creation of 
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development centers for metal, chemical, mining, energy, glass, textiles and food; the 
setup of research unities by state companies and the creation of the National 
Science Council (NSC) and other institutions to promote industrial technology 
development - such as the Industrial Technology Research (ITRI) and the Electronic 
Industrial Research Centre - and the export of machinery, whole plants and IT goods. 
The ITRI was a key factor in the development of applied technologies for 
components and capital equipment and technology training in process engineering. 
The Electronic Industrial Research Centre (renamed Electronics Research and 
Services Organization, ERSO) enhanced competence-building in the industry 
through technology transfer and training. 
In Korea, the government decided to enhance the domestic technological 
capability in electronics and information technology in the early 1970s, creating 
industry-oriented research institutes and stimulating technology transfer through 
licensing and consultants. The Korea Institute for Electronic Technology (KIET) was 
set in 1976  “to plan and coordinate semiconductor R&D, provide technical 
assistance to firms, assist technology transfer from abroad and conduct market 
research” (UNIDO, 2005, p. 51). As the chaebols expanded their in-house R&D 
capacity, the KIET changed its mandate and name, giving more attention to 
technological frontier.                                                                                                                                                                                        
As a result, both Korea and Taiwan were exporting products in the 1990s that 
they did not produce in the 1960s, such as electronic goods. This was possible 
because firms did not absorb technology passively, but instead, as Nelson et al 
(1997) state, they built technological capabilities by “first learning rudimentary 
processing, then improving their productivity in small ways, then engaging in 
innovations in process engineering and product design”, through intense efforts by 
firms. Thus, export activities were an important “vehicle for learning” and “a way of 
exploiting evolving comparative advantages” (Nelson and Howard, 1998, 18). 
The magnitude of changes cannot be measured or even perceived by using 
highly aggregated economic data alone, but rather by studying the stories from 
successful firms one can see the process through which they mastered new 
technologies and developed the necessary competencies to operate in new product 






this process and the changing interactions established with OECD contractors, which 
initially provided technical assistance and specifications for the new products 
manufactured by local producers named original equipment manufacturers (OEM). 
Case studies reported by Amsden (1989) and Hobday (1995), for instance, suggest 
that, rather than simply absorbing foreign technologies, usually local contractors 
worked actively to improve productivity and move towards more sophisticated and 
profitable products. At the beginning, the learning process involved reverse 
engineering; progressively many companies engaged in innovative efforts upon 
imported knowledge and some of them were able to do their own designs and later to 
sell products under their own brand names.  
Generally speaking, firm stories show that the East Asian miracle was a 
process more complex than move along the production function due to the capital 
accumulation, involving also shifts in production function, associated with 
entrepreneurship and innovation (Nelson and Howard, 1998). As we saw in the first 
chapter, technological activities go beyond machinery and other physical devices, 
comprising modes of coordination and management activities, which are usually 
more difficult to develop, even though they represent an essential part of catching up 
processes (Nelson et al, 2005). These processes also entail deliberation and 
adaptation of organizational, managerial and institutional aspects of productive 
practices of leading countries to the local context, meaning domestic conditions, 
norms and values (Nelson et al, 2005).  
It was taking into account the history of Korean and Taiwanese firms that Lee 
and Lim (2001)86 and Lee (2005) built a taxonomy to explain the catching up phases 
followed by latecomer firms in Asia.  Lee and Lim (2001) established stages of 
technological development and patterns of catching up, as follow.   
a) Stage I - latecomers learn operational skills by operating imported 
equipment with support of foreign producers. This stage is characterized by 
duplicative imitation and path following catching up;  
b) Stage II - the main feature is the acquisition of technology processes 
through duplicative imitation. In this stage, there is already the possibility of a skip; 
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c) Stage III - latecomers are able to design by imitation products or plants, 
usually with the help of specialized R&D firms from abroad. This phase is 
characterized by creative imitation and for a greater possibility of skipping the 
catching up process;  
d) Stage IV - latecomers become able to conduct real innovation – path 
creating or path leading catching up. 
In advanced countries, leading firms first conceive and design new products, 
and then develop parts and finally assembly them. Firms in late-coming countries, on 
the other hand, started by assembling imported parts to produce final goods, then 
they developed low-tech parts and afterwards they learned to design modified 
versions of existing products and eventually learned to create new products (Lee and 
Lim, 2001). 
To know the level of development of a firm one has to investigate if it is 
assembling, making parts or designing products themselves. In fact, this 
methodology does not fit all sectors. In some high tech sectors, such as the aircraft 
industry, the leader companies are in charge of conception, design and assembly. 
Such was the case for automobile industries in advanced countries. At any rate, his 
classification is useful to understand the catching up processes of the dynamic Asian 
economies.   
Following Lee and Lim´s taxonomy (2001), Lee (2005) identifies three patterns 
of catching up: a) a path-following catch up, in which latecomers take the same path 
of the forerunners; b) a stage-skipping catch up, where latecomers follow the path, 
but skip some stage to save time; and c) a path-creating catch up, in which 
latecomers take their own path of technological development. 
The author focuses on the last two patterns, which he calls leapfrogging catch 
up.  Leapfrogging occurs when firms in backward countries take advantage of 
windows of opportunity opened by new techno-economic paradigms to close their 
technological gap with forerunners, as pointed up by Perez and Soete (1987). 
According to Lee (2005)87, even though the idea of leapfrogging had already been 
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considered by Gerschenkron, most of the studies on catching up have paid attention 
only to catch up in mature technologies.  
In Lees’ view, contrarily to advanced countries that usually attain higher 
capabilities in sectors technologies with longer cycles, leapfrogging in developing 
countries is more likely in sectors with rapid technological change and shorter 
technological cycles (case of Korean and Taiwanese firms) and became more 
plausible with globalization and new information technologies (Lee, 2005)88. Lee and 
Lim (2001) associate the three patterns of catching up to three stages of 
technological capability building by latecomer firms. Accordingly, in the stage I, 
latecomers learn operational skills by operating imported equipment, plants or 
production lines with the support of foreign producers and following blueprint 
instructions. The stage I is characterized by duplicative imitation and path following 
catching up. In the stage II, the main feature is the acquisition of technology 
processes through duplicative imitation. Latecomer firms become able to set up their 
own production unity and take responsibility for the production, learning by 
processing technology. In the stage III, latecomers are able to design products or 
plants by imitation, usually with the assistance of specialized R&D firms from abroad. 
This stage is characterized by creative imitation and by a chance of skipping catching 
up. In the stage IV, latecomers become able to conduct real innovation – path 
creating or path leading catching up.  
Lee (2005) explores the obstacles faced by latecomer firms to acquire design 
capabilities. He notes that these firms do relatively well during the first stage of 
catching up, when they produce only goods designed by forerunner firms in factories 
designed by them (OEM).89 Korea and Taiwan’s domestic companies, for instance, 
learned by operating foreign-made plants or production lines following blueprints and 
guidelines established by contractors. The tacit knowledge was creating during this 
process of learning by processing foreign technologies, and domestic firms became 
able to set up their own production unities and take responsibility for the production 
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(Lee (2005). However, more successful firms faced difficulties when forerunner firms 
refused to sell or license technology and designs to them, or move their production to 
other lower-wage sites. It was the cases of Korean chaebols when foreign forerunner 
firms (especially from Japan) stopped transferring design for them; and of Taiwanese 
firms, when multinational companies started to move their contracts to lower-wage 
countries. Lee (2005) mentions the case of Korean car makers that faced difficulties 
in the US market in the 1980s for lack of a good design and moved to emerging 
markets, such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, in order to get 
time to upgrade the quality of their products (case of Hyundai). This example gives 
an idea of the risks of trying to export brand products without a solid design 
capability, which is not easy to develop.  
Lee (2005) contends that firms can use these moments of design crisis as a 
window of opportunity to leapfrog through a stage-skipping or a path-creating catch 
up. The author analyses two risks or uncertainty connected to this leapfrogging 
strategy – the choice of the right technologies and standards among several 
alternatives or the creation of initial markets. The first risk can be reduced when 
standards are already established (“standards before markets”). The government 
may contribute to reduce uncertainties by identifying a promising R&D target and 
defining standards in advance. With regard the creation of initial markets, this 
endeavor was easier before WTO, when it was possible to protect national markets 
and use public procurement, subsidies and protective measures to promote infant 
industries. These mechanisms were quite important for the development of Korean 
automobile industry, and also in the production of digital automatic telephone switch 
in China, in which the government provided market protection and incentives to the 
adoption of local products. Without incentives or regulations for using local made 
products, firms will continue to buy foreign products recognized quality (Lee, 2005).  
To develop technological capabilities and catching up, in house R&D activities 
are crucial, and it is here the government, public research institutions and 
consortiums may play a key role. Considering patent indicators, public research 
institutions were more important in Taiwan than in Korea.  
Although multinational firms can be helpful in the beginning of learning 






reason or incentives to carry on technological development activities abroad. 
Strategic alliances are possible and can work only when the latecomer firms have 
higher technological capability and bargaining power. The technological capability of 
local firms determines the terms of the technological contracts between local and 
foreign firms. Yet the role of government continues to be important. 
For Lee, it seems that are two or three models for catching up, at least when 
we think about the Asia’s experience – Taiwan, Korea and maybe Singapore or 
China, explained as follows:   
- Korean Model  – process commanded by few large national owned firms 
(chaebols), independent from multinational companies (MNCs) in terms of 
production, financing and marketing (brand). In the 1970s, the government supported 
them to develop their own R&D activities, sometimes taking part in high risk and 
large-scale projects. They used foreign R&D and other MNCs as source of new 
knowledge through embodied technology, import, co-development and horizontal 
collaborations. The Chaebols were independent form each other, maintaining their 
own network.  
- Taiwanese model – process initially commanded by a large number of 
national SMEs associated to MNCs in terms of financing, production and marketing 
(brand).  In the early stage, the national SMEs used to work as subcontractors of 
MNCs and had the support of the government to access new knowledge. There were 
intense collaboration and exchange of knowledge among the firms. The economies 
of agglomeration allowed low transaction costs and high visibility.  
 
2.3 Southeast Asian countries take a different road  
 
Looking at the experiences of Southeast Asian economies is useful to better 
understand the critical factors for the success of the Korean and Taiwanese catching 
up, which will be revealed in this section. In the Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, governments also supported import substitution industries 
and export activities through price mechanisms (such as import tariffs, overvalued 






and import controls. The protection embodied in the industrial policy covered from 
selected heavy industries to consumer goods sectors and services. Generally, 
subsidies were granted in exchange for compliance with certain guidelines and 
performance requirements.  
According to Grabowski (1999), however, the industrialization in those 
countries was not strongly coordinated by a developmental state, but mostly by 
developmental entrepreneurial groups controlled by Chinese immigrants. Grabowski 
(1999) contends that, in the absence of strong developmental states, such business-
oriented ethnic groups resolved important collective development action issues in 
Southeast Asia. These groups gained knowledge in business during the colonial 
period. After the European retreat from Asia, they invested in several productive 
activities and developed an extensive network with other business groups throughout 
Asia and Pacific, based on ethnic identification. Due to their knowledge of local 
markets, linkages with other national markets and ability to foster investments, these 
groups became the favorite partners when Japanese and Korean investors started to 
relocate their production of labor-intensive manufactured goods for export into 
Southeast Asia in 1980s and early 1990s. These investment relocations were 
encouraged by raises in wages in East Asia and currency appreciations and 
government incentives in the receiving countries. They transformed Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia in exporters of labor-intensive manufactured goods, 
drastically changing the composition of their exports, which had been previously 
concentrated in primary products.  
In contrast with Korea and Taiwan, however, the Southeast countries did not 
develop the necessary technological capabilities to make the transition from the 
production of labor-intensive manufactured goods to more sophisticated ones. The 
firms that succeeded in getting involved with the production of medium-term 
technology goods have served in most cases as an assembly base for multinational 
companies. 
These companies have used Southeast Asian countries as a platform for 
export activities, with production dependent on import inputs. In fact, even domestic 
firms have targeted predominantly foreign markets. Thus, the development of export 






consequence, domestic markets remained underdeveloped, there was not a strong 
accumulation of human capital and learning processes similar to those observed in 
East Asia did not occur in the region (Grabowski, 1999). 
Actually the development processes of Southeast Asian countries remained 
concentrated, at least until the end of the 20th century, in the production of low 
technology products and the assembly of medium technology ones. Industrialization 
did not create integrated markets, given the neglect of domestic markets. Their 
advances in schooling, health services and other social indicators (such as sanitation 
and treated water) were also less impressive than in East Asia.  
From the mid-1990s, with the rise of labor costs in Southeast Asian countries, 
East Asian investors started to re-directed their investments from Southeast Asia to 
countries where the labor were relatively cheaper, like China and Vietnam. Beyond 
the increase in wages, other factors contributed to reduce the competitiveness of 
Southeast Asian economies as a platform to export labor-intensive goods, such as 
the devaluation of Chinese currency in 1990 and 1994 and the appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar against the yen. With the drop in competitiveness, large structural current 
account imbalances emerged in most of them, since they had not accumulated 
enough human and technological capabilities to make the transition to the production 
of high-tech goods.   
Grabowski (1999) attributes the imbalances in Southeast Asian countries to 
the strategy of development based on export industries in detriment of the domestic 
economy and the production of intermediate goods. Problems in the current account, 
financed through short-term and speculative capital inflows, resulted in the financial 
crisis of 1997.  
Conversely, advocates of the market friendly approach argue that the poorer 
performance of the Southeast countries is explained by the excessive state 
intervention in the economy.  
The analyses of the trajectory of Southeast Asian countries makes the 
importance to succeed in catching up by combining inward and export-oriented 
strategies; entrepreneurship and state activism; capital accumulation and innovation; 
investments in education and generation of more skilled jobs; and production of labor 






evident. It also highlights the crucial role of targeting more dynamic technologies and 
developing endogenous capacity to innovate, both institutionally and technologically.  
 
2.4 Concluding remarks  
 
Since the post-World War II, many Asian countries, especially in East Asia, 
have succeeded in sustaining fast growth and narrowing (or closing) their economic, 
technological and income per capita gap with rich Western nations. Japan was the 
first Asian economy to catch up economically and technologically with the US and 
advanced European economies. Some East Asian economies followed the Japanese 
example, but pursued their own strategies to get industrialized. In this chapter, the 
Korea and Taiwan experiences were in focus and compared with those of other 
countries.  
A critical element of the Korean and Taiwanese trajectory to success was the 
combination of private entrepreneurship and state intervention: guiding, supporting 
and disciplining the private sector through macro and sectoral policies that enhance 
new institutional arrangements and technological innovations. The Korean catching 
up was commanded by a few large national owned firms, the chaebols, which were 
independent from multinational companies in terms of production, finance and 
marketing (brand). The Taiwanese catching was initially commanded by a large 
number of national small and medium enterprises (SMEs) associated to multinational 
companies in terms of finance, production and marketing. Both in Korea and Taiwan, 
the state provided general and specific guidance and support to domestic firms, 
facilitating the access to financial resources, technology and markets.  
After initially targeting mature industries (such as heavy and chemical 
industries in case of Korea), the economies of Korea and Taiwan directed their 
efforts toward the emerging electronics industries. They began by assembling final 
consumer goods, but embarked in higher stages of production later on, heavily 
investing in a narrow range of products or processes. Korea and Taiwan 
accumulated physical and human capital at high rates, but such accumulation only 
partially explains their performances. In effect, what seems to have made a major 






technologies. These economies also developed an inner capacity to innovate, 
creating new institutions (in accordance with their background and needs) à la 
Gerschenkron, adapting import technologies and innovating technologically. As a 
result, they were able to catch up with advanced economies in key sectors and even 
to forge ahead of the leaders in some technological fields, defining new technological 
frontiers. Korean and Taiwanese firms took advantage of a window of opportunity to 
leapfrog, for which the role of government was crucial. They attained technological 
capabilities mainly in sectors characterized by short cycles, to the contrary of 
advanced countries, which do better in sectors with longer cycles.  
As in the case of Japan's catch-up after their defeat in the World War II, the 
U.S. aid in the context of the Cold War also contributed to strengthen the states of 











In the previous chapters, we emphasized the critical role of technological 
change and innovation for countries behind the socio-economic frontier to catch up 
with the most advanced economies and occasionally forge ahead the previous 
leaders. In this chapter, we analyze how some changing conditions in the 
international environment have placed new frames, imposing constraints, creating 
potential new opportunities and putting new requirements for countries willing to  
absorb new technologies and to build up inner capabilities for innovation.  
In the first part, we analyze how the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, 
which prevent the use of some policies and strategies used in the past by countries 
that succeeded in catching up, may affect developing countries’ ability to catch up 
today. Emphasis is given to the impact of the higher protection granted to the 
intellectual property rights.  
In the second part, we discuss the ongoing catching up of China, whose 
emergence as a major trading player and investor in manufacturing and services has 
considerably impacted the world markets, systems and commons, changing the 
conditions in which other nations make their economic decisions, patterns of 
comparative advantages and competitiveness, and investment opportunities. The 
case of China is discussed in this chapter and not in the Second Chapter for two 
main reasons: first, because China is still in the process of catching up; second, 
because its impressive performance and unique way of doing things have affected 
the global economy and every country in a way that perhaps no other country has 
ever done, changing drastically the environment for catching up.   
 
3.1 WTO  
 
International rules on trade, investment and IPRs have shifted considerably 
with the creation of the WTO in 1995, imposing constraints (as it is broadly claimed) 






frontier. The WTO was an outcome of the Uruguay Round (1986-1993), the seventh 
and last round of negotiations carried out under the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT), the WTO’s predecessor. With the creation of the WTO, the third 
institutional pillar idealized in Bretton Woods to handle the international trade was 
built, although delayed by almost 50 years.90  
Among the agreements with a greater impact on the developing countries are 
those on subsidies and countervailing measures (SCM) and intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS). The SCM defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and 
actionable. Originally, there was a third category: non-actionable subsidies, which 
existed for five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not renewed. 
Prohibited subsidies are those contingent upon export targets (export subsidies) or 
upon the use of domestic instead of imported goods (import substitution subsidies). 
Among the non-actionable subsidies were those to support R&D or pre-competitive 
development research projects, to adapt existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements or to promote regional development. Since January 1, 2000, these 
subsidies can be actionable by other countries in the event of an adverse effect on 
their interests.  
The differential treatment given to subsidies for pre-competitive development 
research was introduced in the agreement by developed countries, especially the 
United States, which have strongly supported R&D activities of private firms.91 
Developing countries, however, that can also benefit from this kind of subsidy, have 
not used it extensively. We will come back to this point.  
 
3.1.1 The current IPR regime and its impacts on inn ovation and catching up  
 
The introduction of protection to IPRs in the world trading system completely 
changed the rules of the game on the subject, extending and harmonizing exclusive 
rights at the global level. Since then, products and processes of all technological 
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fields can be patented, even life-forms and materials found in nature. Moreover, the 
increased protection goes beyond patents, being associated with several other rights, 
some of them new. Before TRIPS entered into force in 1995, the Paris Convention of 
1883 (for industrial property) and the Bern Convention of 1886 (for copyright) were 
the most important international treaties on IPRs (Rego, 2000).  
The Paris and Bern Conventions were of voluntary adhesion, giving freedom 
to their signatories to adopt IPR regimes suitable to their legal system and economic 
situation. With the introduction of IPR rules in the multilateral trading system, the 
situation changed radically. TRIPS incorporated (by reference) most provisions of the 
previous international treaties and established minimum standards of IPR protection 
to products and processes, now mandatory for all technologies (Rego, 2000). In the 
agreement, the rights take a number of different forms, such as copyrights and 
related rights (covering computer programs and data bases), patents, industrial 
designs, layout-designs of integrated circuits, trademarks, undisclosed information, 
trade secrets and geographical indications.  
Before TRIPS, IPR protection differed from one country to another, generating 
since the 1980s permanent tensions between the United States and many countries, 
including other developed nations, such as France, Switzerland, Japan and Spain. 
TRIPS not only universalized the levels and forms of IPR protection of developed 
countries (especially those of the United States), but also defined surveillance 
mechanisms, stipulating procedures and remedies to be adopted in case of non-
compliance with the established rules. Differently from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and other international organizations, the WTO has a dispute 
settlement system and can legitimate trade sanctions in case of violation of rules and 
other commitments.  The enforcement mechanism of WTO is in fact one of biggest 
differences introduced by the incorporation of IPR protection into the world trading 
system (Rego, 2000). 
IPRs were incorporated to trade rules by pressure of science base sectors in 
developed countries, especially in the US, to allegedly to enhance innovation and 
knowledge diffusion. However, the debate on how intellectual property laws 
effectively affect innovative activities and the diffusion of their outcomes is not 






Today, patents are considered crucial by industries whose competitiveness rest on 
massive R&D investments and intangible actives’ accumulation. They allow 
innovators to charge prices above the marginal cost of production and, in doing so, to 
extract extra rents to finance future R&D investments. It is argued that without patent 
protection there are no incentives, even when benefits to society are potentially high, 
to companies to invest in products whose development consumes a large amount of 
resources but can be easily copied and sold at a lower price by imitators (Rego, 
2000).  
The association established between strong IPR protection and investments in 
new technologies and products is questionable, since excessive protection may 
prevent, instead of encouraging, innovative activities and the dissemination of their 
fruits to society. The strict protection of basic-research outcomes and other key-
innovations may preclude the competitors’ ability of doing new innovations at 
reasonable costs. Moreover, there are complaints that the current IPR laws in 
practice divert a growing amount of resources from the generation of new knowledge 
to the protection of existing knowledge and generate a plenty of patents with no real 
value. Yet the extended period of protection does not take into account differences in 
terms of product and technology among industries or the social utility of the object of 
patent protection (Rego, 2000). There are also other mechanisms to appropriate the 
results of R&D investments, such as industrial secrets, and the innovator reputation 
and his ability to move more rapidly in the learning curve.(Chang (2001). 
In effect, the rising in patent registration does not mean necessarily more 
innovation, but also reflect the shifts in IPR laws and strategic reasons to apply for a 
patent (Mazzucato, 2011). The current IPR included among what can patented the 
results of public funding research, research tools and living forms. Moreover, venture 
capital usually takes into account the number of patent to evaluate the strategic value 
of a company. The final result is a plenty of patents for things that rigorously do not 
represent a real innovation, but prevent that others make further exploratory research 
that could imply scientific discoveries and innovations with real value (Mazzucato, 
2011). This side effect of the excessive IPR protection affect both developed and 






TRIPS became one of the most controversial WTO agreements, largely 
because of its far-reaching implications for developing and least-developed countries 
in fields such as technology, public health, traditional knowledge, food security and 
biological resources. Beyond the transitional period, TRIPS agreement did not 
provide any type of special treatment for developing countries.  Provisions in this 
regard were established later, after difficult negotiations, and are related to the 
concession of compulsory license to some countries to produce or import generic 
versions of medicines to selected diseases, such as AIDS (Rego, 2000). Before 
Trips, many countries excluded pharmaceuticals from the patent system as a whole 
or granted patent only for production processes.  
WTO members, on the other hand, have to guarantee full protection for both 
pharmaceutical products and processes, which may affect the access to medicines at 
affordable prices in poorer countries. In the majority of these countries, governments 
are not able to provide subsidized medicines on a large scale and out-of-pocket 
payments are the most common finance mechanism to pharmaceuticals. The 
situation is worst in countries that almost completely depend on imports since they do 
not have the technical capacity to produce generic versions of patented drugs.  
Although the discussions about access to medicines have gained great 
popularity because of the high price of anti-retrovirals (for patients with HIV) and 
other medicines, the impact of patent rules on public health go beyond the access to 
pharmaceutical products. Patenting genes and microorganisms, as in the United 
States and European countries, is still a controversial matter, since more and more 
effective treatments for several diseases have stemmed from genetic engineering. 
The patentability of exams for diagnosis is also contentious. Some studies have 
shown that these kinds of patents may retard scientific advancement and the 
availability to society of techniques and discoveries that may represent the difference 
between life and death (Rego, 2001).  
Over the long run, however, the effects of the new IPR regime may be more 
important in terms of economic development than the increased prices of 
pharmaceuticals and seeds. Although restrictions for catching up go much beyond 
IPR rules, the challenges in this area are huge because they are mandatory and 
cover all technological fields; reduce the room for reverse engineering (largely used 






access to new knowledge and technologies more expensive and restrictive; and 
potentially reduce the room for maneuvering public policies, which increases the 
market power of incumbent players and renders technological transfer more costly, 
ultimately restraining a technological catch-up. These challenges put by the IPR 
regime demand higher efforts and investments in innovative activities by countries 
behind the technological frontiers. 
Therefore, the importance of creating scientific and technological capabilities 
and an inner ability to innovate cannot be stressed enough. And it is not a task that 
can be faced by individual firms in isolation, since competence building is a systemic 
process. Thus, as Nelson and colleagues (Nelson at al 2005) point out, the 
constraints placed by international trade and IPR, as well as the growing importance 
of the scientific underpinnings of technology, reinforce the role of research in 
universities and public laboratories as part of the institutional structure necessary for 
successful catch-up. Local firms need to learn how to do R&D on their own, 
increasing the importance of training and building up capabilities in advanced 
technologies. R&D activities require an appropriate institutional context that is related 
to the formulation and implementation of pro-innovation policies in developing 
countries, which demands an understanding of the function of competition and 
industrial policies in the innovation process. Thus the key role of a well-integrated 
National Innovation System in which strong linkages among universities, research 
institutions, public and private enterprises, coordinating bodies and financial 
institutions to foster the acquisition, production and diffusion knowledge, enhancing 
innovative activities.  
However, as UNIDO points out, one observes a remarkable mismatch 
“between the increasing recognition of the need for domestic knowledge system and 
a quite generalized recent decline in the allocation of resources to capability building 
in most of the developing world” (UNIDO, 2005, p. 17). Developing countries, for 
instance, have not used as they could subsidies to encourage pre-competitive 
development research, as allowed by WTO. Many of these countries still prefer to 
provide incentives to the production and commercialization of goods than financing 
innovation, which is a riskier activity. The financial support to innovation continues 






Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) limits and makes more expensive the access to 
new technologies.  
 
3.1 Box – Trips-plus Agreements 
 
Since WTO entered in force, many developing and least 
developed countries have faced great difficulties to resist to 
international pressures for more IPR protection and some of them 
have already adopted IPR laws more restrictive than Trips. These 
Trips-plus agreements impose additional IPR obligations to 
developing countries, in order to accommodate new technological 
advances and demands from developed countries´ enterprises and 
governments. Several bilateral and regional trade and investment 
agreements between developing and developed countries (especially 
with the United States) also include mutual commitments on 
intellectual property that go beyond WTO minimum standards (TRIPS-
plus clauses), limiting or preventing the use of Trips safeguards (such 
as compulsory license and parallel import) and new flexibilities 
negotiated in and after the WTO Doha Ministerial (2001) mainly for 
least developed countries (Rego, 2001).  
The fact is that many countries lack the capacity to defend 
individually their interests in face of international pressures and set IP 
laws in accordance with their development needs. Even though 
concerns about the adverse impacts of Intellectual property laws are 
also present in developed countries, these countries usually have 
sophisticated systems of competition regulation and other 
mechanisms to avoid that abuses in the use of monopoly rights harm 
the public interest. In most developing countries this is usually not the 
case, what makes such countries more vulnerable to unsuitable IP 
systems (IPR Commission, 2002). 
 
 
3.1.2 Broader Implications of the WTO Rules to Deve loping Countries  
 
Critics of the international trade-related rules contend that advanced countries, 
mainly the US, designed most of rules for the sake of their own interests. It is argued 
that despite of the rhetoric of free trade and globalization, many of these countries 
continue to adopt non-tariff protectionist measures to keep out the goods of the 
developing ones. In Stiglitz’s view, some advanced countries adopt “two standards 






within one´s country, the other for producers outside…” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 4). In fact, 
there is a disparity between what is said and done in “North”.  
The rules on subsidies limit the protection for infant industries and prevent the 
use of the export performance requirements in the context of industrial policies. The 
current IPR regime and the scope of patents that have been granted in advanced 
countries for new technologies may be an obstacle for developing countries to build 
up inner capabilities in science and technology 
However, although international regulations and practices may prevent or limit 
the use of some policies and procedures applied in the past by catching-up countries, 
it cannot be assumed a priori that the new international rules of the game (especially 
on IPR) either render catching up extremely difficult or even impossible. Neither that 
such rules are the most important obstacle that catching up candidates need to 
overcome to succeed. Actually, changes in the institutions and policies only partly 
explain the shifts in the environment for catching up. As Fagerberg and Godinho 
pointed out, “what is a suitable policy nowadays, depends not only on the 
characteristics of the policies that seemed to work well in the past, but also on the 
economic, technological, institutional and social context today (which may be quite 
different from those of previous times)” (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2003, p. 41). 
Moreover, the room for using many old instruments still remains, and they can be 
combined with new ones. It is for the developing countries to identify and take 
advantage of the degrees of freedom in the new rules.  
Even with all the restrictions to knowledge diffusion imposed by IPR and other 
rules, knowledge today can flow through plenty of channels and is probably more 
accessible than ever. Even If a hypothetical international law eliminated all kind of 
intellectual property rights, science and new technologies would continue 
inaccessible to countries without the required skills, capabilities and previous 
knowledge to master new knowledge and technologies. 
It is a fact that certain strategies and mechanisms used by countries that 
succeeded in catching up in the past cannot be used any more. The reason is not 
only because the current developed countries are “kicking away the ladder” that they 
used to catch up (in List’s and, more recently, Chang’s terminology). In fact, changes 






that worked well in the past less effective, if not a complete anachronism. Even 
though international regulations and practices play a very important role in the 
definition of policies to move ahead, the new requirements for technological progress 
are not less important. In any case, when new policy tools can no longer be used, 
whether for legal commitments or because they became dysfunctional, it is time to 
create new institutional arrangements to face the challenges of the time. And these 
challenges today demand specific policies “to build capabilities within the knowledge, 
business and policymaking/governance subsystems largely fall below the radar of 
WTO agreements”, as a 2005 UNIDO Industrial Development Report wisely indicates 
(UNIDO, 2005, p. xiii). In fact, the necessary efforts today go beyond “the market-
based incentives or the supply of generic public goods such as macroeconomic 
stability, the rule of law and functioning financial markets” (UNIDO, 2005, p. xiii), as 
well as the sole adoption of protective measures.  
The effective impacts of the current IPR regime depend upon the institutional 
and socio-economic characteristics of each country and its scientific and 
technological capabilities. They are related to factors such as: a) the country’s efforts 
to build social and technological capabilities, and an endogenous competence to take 
advantage of foreign technologies and innovate; b) the governments’ capacity to 
design development strategies in association with different actors, taking in account 
numerous alternatives and interests; c) the country’s most dynamic economic sectors 
and their ability to identify and take advantage of potential windows of opportunity; d) 
the country´s ability to take advantage of foreign direct investments (FDI) to acquire 
new technologies and enhance innovative activities, bargaining with foreign investors 
their own national boundaries. The impacts in terms of catching up seems to be 
potentially higher than those countries that are “in the middle of the pathway”, such 
as Brazil. The evaluation of specific constraints to emergent countries involves 
identifying the country’s economy-driving sectors and their means of appropriation – 
patents, secrecy, lead-times, learning curves, and complementary assets.  
As we saw in the first chapter and has been emphasized by many studies, 
with the growing importance of science-based technologies and the enforcement of 
the IPR rules, catching up relies more than ever on the ability of developing countries 






places the domestic knowledge systems at the center of industrial development 
strategies (UNIDO, 2005).   
 
3.2 China  
 
Following a development path distinct of those followed previously by other 
successful Asian economies, China has grown fast for more than three decades by 
combining in a unique way central planning with market mechanisms. Known until 
recently as an exporter of cheap and low-tech products, China is no longer simply a 
producer of bad quality goods or assembler of electronics to European and U.S. 
corporations. Now, the country´s exports and imports comprehend a large and 
diversified range of goods, which comprise both cheap and high tech products. China 
has progressively become more competitive in sophisticated goods, having its share 
in the world exports of high-tech products increased from 6.5 per cent in 2000 to 36.5 
per cent in 2013.92 This upgrade is explained by the acquisition of sophisticated 
equipment, parts and components, as well as by outsourcing, local improvements 
associated to in-house investments in R&D, technological alliances, acquisition of 
companies abroad and by government determination in turning China a major 
knowledge-driven economy.  
Today, China is the world´s largest exporter and second largest economy, the 
major destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and Chinese companies are 
going global through growing outward direct investment, with special interest in 
natural resource investments and acquisition of foreign firms with advanced 
technologies or brand names. Income per capita has increased steadily while poverty 
declined. China’s exports and imports have grown faster than its GDP and trade 
plays an important role in its economic performance. China is not only a major 
exporter, but also a huge importer of a broad basket of goods. As a great consumer 
of commodities, the country imports from agricultural products to fuels and minerals, 
providing markets to many countries. The Chinese dynamism has contributed both to 
the increase of the relative prices of commodities and the fall of prices of 
                                            








manufactured goods. The first effect benefits developing countries in the short and 
medium run, but also raises the price of energy and produces environment concerns 
in the case of non-renewable natural resources. The second effect (which is 
associated to the first) produces also two contradictory results. On the one hand, it 
expands the access to manufactured goods over the world, benefiting the poorer with 
cheap products and contributing to control inflationary pressures elsewhere. On the 
other hand, and at the same time, it displaces manufacturing activities even in low-
wage countries, what makes deeper the process of deindustrialization initiated with 
the liberal reforms of the 1990s.  
As Winters and Yusuf (2007) show, although most of the increase in China´s 
imports of natural raw-materials reflects a net increment in the world demand, part of 
the Chinese additional demand is offset by the equivalent reduction in the 
consumption in countries that China has displaced manufacturing. In the same way, 
the boost of the U.S. and European countries trade deficit with China is to some 
extent balanced by reductions in their deficits with other Asian countries, due to the 
ongoing transfer of assembly and production from other countries to China.  
While a few years ago figures about foreign investment in China used to cause 
some fears about the scarcity of funds elsewhere, today many concerns are related 
to the growing investments of Chinese companies abroad, especially through 
acquisitions. Yet, the country is moving steadily to become an important innovator in 
many technological fields, including clean technologies and renewable energies.  
The present economic dynamism of China can be regarded as a regaining of 
the economic prominence that it enjoyed for centuries and lost with the European 
colonialism (Mandelson, 2007). For a long time, the country produced and provided a 
wide range of commodities to almost all corners of the world, enjoying a trade surplus 
with most of their partners. According to Swamy (2005), in the late 18th century, 
China was considered a developed nation by the criteria of the time, accounting 
together with India for about 50 per cent of the world product. Joel Campbell (2012)93 
notes (supported by Joseph Needham researches) that centuries ago Chinese 
scientists and technicians provided mankind with some of the most important pre-
modern inventions, such as gunpowder, ceramics, crossbows, pulp paper, magnet 
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compass, seed drills and iron plows, seismographs, and sternpost ship rudders. 
Many of these inventions would have become the foundation of the Western 
industrial progress from the 17th century onward (Campbell, 2012).  
The country lagged behind in technology and economic development during 
the 18th and 19th centuries due to internal and external turbulences, at the time that 
the first and second industrial revolutions took place in the West. The economic 
decline of China started coincidently with the Imperialism of Britain and other 
Western powers, which subjugated nations and occupied vast territories in Asia, 
Africa and Oceania.  
After being defeated by Britain in the Opium Wars (1842 and 1860), China 
was subdued by five different empires and began the 20th century as one of the 
poorest nations in the world. In 1949, already liberated from foreign occupation (from 
Western powers and Japan) and with an economy based on traditional agriculture, 
the country started to pursue a rapid industrialization to catch up with the West under 
the so-called proletarian dictatorship, commanded by Mao Zedong. Mao adopted an 
economic system inspired by the Soviet Union, which was based on central planning, 
agrarian collectivization, investments in heavy industries and state-owned 
companies. The forced economic modernization, so-called “the great leap forward”, 
carried out by the Communist regime implanted heavy industries with the support of 
the Soviet Union; however, this modernization produced inefficiencies, 
unemployment and scarcity.  
The economy grew about 5-6 per cent a year between 1950 and 1980, a 
performance unable to change the country’s economic status and improve living 
conditions for the majority of its population. Actually, the modernization was 
responsible for perhaps the worst famine in world history, under which millions of 
people perished between 1958 and 1961. After unsuccessful intents to deal with the 
economic problems and losing political power, Mao started the Cultural Revolution to 
reaffirm socialist values, defeat enemies and regain influence. The priority given to 
the military industry and ideological issues – with persecutions and executions of 
internal “enemies”, dismantlement of universities and research institutes etc. - 
increased the poverty, caused a demographic explosion, and depleted natural 






By the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the country was a poor, 
over-populated and centrally planned economy, with deficiencies in physical and 
human capital, infrastructure and natural resources. China’s economic trajectory 
started to change in the late 1970s with the first chapter of economic reforms towards 
a more market-oriented economy under the leadership of Deng Xiao Ping, following 
the death of Mao Zedong. In the beginning of the 1980s, after a subsequent retreat 
due to internal resistances, the Communist Party elected economic modernization as 
a priority. Since then, China has experienced sustained growth without precedent in 
the modern economic history, with a remarkable reduction in poverty and 
improvements in living conditions, although inequality is increasing.94 Two decades 
after the first round of reforms, the country had become the most dynamic and 
fastest-growing economy in the world, with a per capita income more than three 
times higher than in the late 1970s. A decade later China had overtaken Germany as 
the world’s top exporting nation (2009) and Japan as the second largest economy in 
the world (2010). 
The engines of growth of the Chinese economy have changed over the last 
decades. Initially it was driven by capital-intensive investments in manufacture and 
infrastructure (including housing). The large domestic market and the abundant 
supply of labor facilitated the expansion of large-scale industries, FDI, and labor-
intensive sectors, such as consumer goods, electronics, automobiles, domestic 
appliances, pharmaceuticals and engineering. High investments in manufacture 
progressively transformed the country into the largest world production platform of 
cheap goods, and then, within a short period of time, into a major assembly platform 
for imported high-tech components.  
Instead of getting stuck in low-end markets, however, the country has 
searched to upgrade technologically and to develop innovative capabilities through 
global alliances, acquisitions and growing investments in R&D.  According to Jin, Lee 
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and Kim95, if foreign investments and exports had a major impact on economic 
growth between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, from the late 1990s knowledge 
or innovation elements became more influential on growth, indicating that China has 
moved toward knowledge-based growth. In fact, the Chinese government made a 
strategic decision to develop high-tech industries in the late 1980s when the China's 
national high and new technology industrial development plan, called the Torch 
Program, was put into force.   
 
3.2.1 The transitional institutions in China 
 
The originality of the Chinese catching up refers to the creation of original 
institutional arrangements and enterprise strategies (Zonenschain, 2006). The state 
has played a crucial role regarding both elements, providing the macroeconomic 
conditions and all kinds of incentives for investment and innovation, as well as 
promoting the necessary institutional adjustments as the catching up proceeds 
(Zonenschain, 2006).  
China has made its transition towards a market economy without following the 
policies prescribed by mainstream economics for planned economies or adopting 
many of the best practice prescribed by multilateral organizations. According to Qian 
(2003)96, for most of the 1980s and 1990s, China’s economic reforms worked 
effectively “without complete liberalization, without privatization, and without 
democratization”. 
One of the key elements of the Chinese transition to a market economy was 
the building of transitional institutions according to its peculiarities, needs and goals. 
In Qian’s view, the Chinese transitional institutions of market, firms and government 
worked very well because they matched China’s initial conditions and were 
consistent with the interest of the ruling groups (Qian, 2003). Indeed, those 
institutions were a way of the country to address the existing economic distortions 
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without affecting the income and status quo of several social segments. Therefore, 
according to Qian, transitional institutions reached two objectives at the same time: 
improving economic efficiency, making the reforms a win-win game; and pacifying 
political concerns on how the interests of those in power would be served.  
Qian (2003) discusses the general principle and specific mechanisms of 
China’s fundamental transitional institutions by analyzing four successful reforms and 
one that he considered a failure when he wrote his paper. The first example refers to 
the market liberalization through the so-called “dual-track” approach, or dual-price 
system, adopted initially in agriculture, through which commodities were sold at both 
planned and market prices. Under the system, economic agents had the obligation of 
selling fixed quantities of goods at fixed planned prices, according to the plan track. 
Once they fulfilled their obligations (quotas), they could participate in the market 
track, selling their products at free market prices. The introduction of the market track 
provided an opportunity of extra gains for farmers and state companies, while the 
continuation of the plan track compensated potential losers with the market 
liberalization by preserving their status quo rents, since they also had the right to 
fixed quantities at fixed prices. Thus the dual-track mechanism simultaneously 
protected existing rents and improved efficiency, illustrating how market-oriented 
reform can use successfully existing institutions, designed for central planning.  
The second example was the creation of an innovative ownership type of firms 
– the local government ownership, especially the rural Township-Village Enterprises 
(TVEs). In the first fifteen years of economic reform, between 1979 and 1993, private 
firms were under-developed in China because, among other reasons, the lack of 
legal protection for private property rights. Contrary to what happened in the 
transitional economies of Eastern Europe and other developing countries, most of the 
new Chinese firms were neither private firms nor national government firms, but 
rather local government firms in rural areas. Despite their non-standard ownership, 
the TVEs were one important engine of the Chinese growth until the mid of the 
1990s, when 1.5 million of them contributed with 42 percent of the national industrial 
output and employed 52 million workers. Only in late 1990s, with the privatization of 
TVEs, private companies also started to drive China’s growth. Qian (2003) states that 
TVEs improved efficiency in an environment without guaranteed protection of private 






governments by providing them with a higher share of revenue, when compared to 
the standard private companies. The ownership of TVEs is also an example of how 
existing institutions can be used and adapted to reach development goals and can be 
regarded as functional substitutes of private companies, in the Gerschenkron 
perspective.97 
The third example was the fiscal reform that granted more autonomy and 
revenues to local governments, stimulating them to pursue economic prosperity. The 
fiscal decentralization started as an experiment in 1977. In 1980, the central 
government sanctioned a revenue-sharing agreement dividing revenues and 
expenditures with each level of government, through which the revenues were 
classified in central fixed, local fixed and shared. The criteria of sharing changed over 
time, but the local government autonomy and revenues were preserved.  Before the 
decentralization, the fiscal system in China was highly centralized and sub-national 
government did not have a separate budget. The central government collected all 
revenues and set a consolidated budget for governments at all levels (Lin, 2001)98  
The fourth example refers to the grant of incentives to private activities, in the 
absence of rules of law, through the creation of anonymous banking accounts. This 
mechanism limited the charge of discretionary taxes on individuals and allowed the 
government to collect revenues that in other circumstances would be kept out of the 
banking system. With the anonymous banking accounts, the state was not able to 
target particular individuals, but could levy a flat tax on the growing savings deposits. 
These accounts also facilitated the control of interest rates and capital flows. 
The four arrangements mentioned by Qian contributed to increase economic 
efficiency without creating big resistance to change.  With the dual-track market 
liberalization, market prices played a role in resource allocation whereas the plan 
track protected the existing rents. When compared to private enterprise, TVEs 
provided more revenues to both national and local governments. The fiscal 
decentralization stimulated the latter to develop local non-state enterprises and the 
reform of state-owned enterprises. In the absence of rules of law, anonymous 
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financial transactions restrained the state’s discretionary behavior, but, at the same 
time, enabled the government to extract quasi-fiscal revenues from the banking 
system.  
As the growth proceeded, the transitional institutions were progressively 
substituted by other institutional arrangements. In the mid of 1990s, the dual track 
started to be eliminated and the TVEs privatized. Today, many private Chinese 
companies had originally been TVEs. In 2000, the identification of all baking 
accounts became mandatory, but only for new deposits. In the Qian’s view, 
conversely to the common understanding of the relationship between state power 
and reform, state enforcement power is necessary not to carry out an unpopular 
reform, but, instead, to execute one that creates only winners, not losers. O course, 
this has not always been the case and there certainly have been losers. In Qian’s 
words:  
“China’s experience has shown that there will be a time period in 
which impressive growth does not require perfect institutions, and 
imperfect but sensible institutions can perform. On the other hand, 
China’s success in unconventional institutions does not constitute an 
argument against fostering best practice institutions such as rule of 
law, private ownership of firms, and transparent government. It is an 
argument against simplistic and naive views on institutional reform. 
(Qian, 2003, p. 330)  
 
The example mentioned by Qian as a failure was the reform of state-owned 
enterprises SOEs, which has taken longer than expected to reduce their number and 
weight in the Chinese economy. The reform of SOEs and the role of these 
companies are examined in the next section.  
 
3.2.2 State owned enterprises - SOEs 
 
Until 2013, four rounds of SOE reforms took place in China. The first round 
(1978-1992) basically aimed to increase the operational autonomy of managers and 
introduce a commercial orientation for these companies, with the incorporation of 
governance mechanisms and decentralization of decision making (Ho and Young, 






transformation of selected enterprises from wholly state-owned entities into 
shareholding companies in which the state remained the main shareholder (Ho and 
Young, 2013). There were some strategic sectors excluded from this arrangement, 
such as: security-related industries, natural monopolies and natural resources 
(power, oil and petrochemicals, and telecommunication), sectors supplying 
infrastructure and important public goods and services, and high-tech industries. 
According to Ho and Young (2013), these modernization reforms did not intend to 
reduce the state’s control over SOEs, but essentially to shift the way how SOEs were 
financed and to introduce a modern management structure. 
The third round of SOE reforms (1997-2003), known by the motto “grasping 
the big and letting go the small”, included a large-scale privatization program for the 
less strategically important (poorly performing) businesses and a plan to strengthen 
large SEOs through mergers, restructuring and public offering of equities (IPO). The 
Government decided to keep the ownership of the majority of large SOEs in order not 
to lose its overall control over the economy. At the same time, however, the 
government encouraged the rapid expansion of the non-state sector, with the aim of 
preserving the job of millions of workers employed in the privatized small and 
medium SOEs.  
The fourth round of reforms (present round) has focused on the regulation 
and management of state assets, as well as on a higher supervision of SOEs. These 
reforms assigned local government with the responsibility for supervising small- and 
medium-sized SOEs and left to the central government the supervision of large 
SOEs. Additionally, this round of reforms has searched to enhance horizontal and 
vertical integration, increase economies of scale and scope, and foster competition in 
accordance with the enactment of China´s anti-monopoly law in 2008. Moreover, 






the Hong Kong and New York stock exchange99 (Ho and Young, 2013).   
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), an agency established in 2003 by the State Council to oversee China’s 
biggest SOEs, has taken measures to strengthen the supervision of the SOEs and 
pushed for corporate governance reforms and diversification of SOEs ownership 
structure. Apparently, however, the agency has given more attention to its mandate 
of growing and supervising state assets than to reforming and restructuring SOEs 
(Zhang and Freestone, 2013)100. The large SOEs under the SASAC supervision are 
known as the national champions and its portfolio includes telecommunication, 
automotive, shipbuilding, steel, petroleum and aviation, among others industries. 
Most of these companies have subsidiaries that hold assets of other companies, 
although the control remains with the state, which is the owner of all the shares, 
which are not tradable (Zonenschain, 2006).  
In the last two decades, a large number of small and medium SOEs were 
sold and non-profitable large ones (often listed on the stock market) were 
restructured, but in 2014 they account for more than 150,000 companies (most of 
them controlled by local governments), of which 117 (2014) large ones and under 
SASAC supervision. Zonenschain (2006) notes that the gradual privatization of the 
SOEs meets the strategic objectives of the government, although the process 
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apparently carries a high degree of economic inefficiency.101 According to the author, 
the permanent and gradual character of the SOE reforms has produced better results 
when compared to other international experiences of privatization, with privatized 
companies absorbing an expressive part of workers and thereby mitigated the social 
costs.  Concerning social and political costs of privatization might explain why central 
and local governments still keep thousands of state companies, many of them not 
performing well, in non-strategic sectors, running from hotels to shopping centers.   
Zonenschain (2006) also calls attention to the diversity of firms in terms of 
ownership structure and decision-making, which is one of peculiarities of the Chinese 
economy. There are different degrees of participation of the State, national private 
capital and foreign capital. Although giving power to government in strategic 
decisions, state participation also benefits private capital for granting privileged 
access to special conditions, such as cheaper financing from state-owned banks and 
other kinds of favoritism.  
Although SOEs are still used as an instrument of the governmental 
technology policy, and of the industrial and commercial integration of the country, the 
private sector has increasingly driven the innovative activities, with the State´s 
support.  
  
3.2.3 From cheap to high-tech goods, from imitation  to innovation  
 
The economic openness allowed China to take advantage of the IT revolution 
and the increasing modularization of production in many industrial sectors. With the 
economic reforms, multinational companies started to set production units in the 
country to reduce costs and take advantage of the huge Chinese market. Since the 
very beginning of economic reforms, the Chinese government has taken measures to 
discipline foreign investments according to the country’s interests. In effect, the 
attraction of foreign capital has been embedded in a strategy to leverage local firms 
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and develop internal technological capabilities. In this sense, many policies have 
been used to ensure technology transfer and local capability building, including 
requirement local content and alliances with domestic companies. Foreign investors 
had to accept the demands of joint-ventures with Chinese companies, to transfer 
technology to local partners, and to purchase inputs from local firms (Zonenschain, 
2006).  
The associations with foreign companies gave to the local companies the 
opportunity to access new technologies and foreign markets. According to Campbell 
(2013), the nature of technology transfer has changed from equipment contracts to 
technology licenses, technological consultation fees and joint production of design. In 
the beginning, most of the Chinese counterparts in the joint-ventures were SOEs. 
The immense domestic market provided leverage for Chinese companies to compete 
with multinational corporations. To narrow their technological gap with these 
companies, Chinese firms adopted a market-oriented innovation strategy, focusing 
initially in the domestic rural market and low-end market (low technology markets), 
and then moving to larger cities. Chinese firms opted for incremental innovation to 
reduce cost and to combine imported technologies with Chinese designs, developed 
in-house according to the needs and preferences of the local markets. The market-
oriented innovation strategy provided competitive advantages for Chinese firms and 
their lower costs of production also allowed them to surpass their competitors in 
industries such as consumer electronics.  
Many Chinese firms in the telecommunications industries and also 
automobiles took advantage of component modularization to develop their products 
with the support of several component suppliers, combining them with their own 
development efforts and commercializing the final products with their own brand logo. 
In the case of cell phones, for instance, local producers initially concentrated their 
efforts in peripheral R&D to meet local-specific demands, introducing functions and 
designs based on their knowledge of the local markets. However, as Jin, Lee and 
Kim (2008) note, the strategy of relying on lower modularity in the long does not allow 
producers to keep up with the frequent technological changes or to meet the demand 






For many years, Chinese mobile phone producers remained trapped in the 
production of peripheral technologies due to their limited in-house technological 
capabilities. As a result, by 2000, the mobile phone markets showed a dual structure, 
with foreign MNC dominating the high-end markets and local producers, the lower-
end markets. Soon, the MNC also started to produce lower-end mobile phones, while 
keeping their advantage in the more sophisticated markets. Many local brands, 
however, remained at least until the late 2000s in the middle- and lower-end markets. 
The local companies that succeeded in accessing more sophisticated markets were 
those that gave a step further to upgrade their innovative capabilities. These 
strategies allowed local brands to access big markets and became known in short 
period of time.  
Huwaei, Lenovo, TCL and ZTE are examples of successful Chinese firms that 
became giant players in the IT industry, in both domestic and international markets. 
This first generation of innovative Chinese firms are building up global brands and 
increasing their operations abroad, taking advantage of mergers and acquisitions and 
the set of overseas R&D to access foreign knowledge. As they initially were not able 
to spend as big companies in Europe and the USA in R&D, the Chinese companies 
pursued open innovation strategies. As defined by Henry Chesbrough, the creator of 
the concept, open innovation is:   
“the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to 
accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external 
use of innovation, respectively. [This paradigm] assumes that firms 
can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and 
internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance their 
technology.” (Chesbrough, 2006, p.1)102   
 
These companies, among other successful ones, also targeted the 
unexploited rural markets first, but moved progressively to large cities, always taking 
into account the market needs. Due to their limited capabilities in in-house 
technology development, they recurred to international outsourcing and alliances with 
foreign companies to follow through their market-oriented innovation strategy. 
According to Xielin Liu (2005), this option was the way that Chinese firms caught up, 
which is quite different from that of Japan, Korea and other latecomers. 
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The technology outsourcing strategy allowed some Chinese firms to follow the 
leaders and reduce the risk of falling into a no promising or a unique technology. As 
they gained muscle, the Chinese companies directed part of their investment to 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which became another important mechanism 
for technological catching up. Chinese firms also adopted the strategy that in the 
early 1990s Wu Xiaobo named ‘secondary innovation’, which is a process through 
which developing countries combine technologies acquired from developed countries 
with existing technologies and local developments.  
Wu, Ma and Xu (2006)103 state that secondary innovation is an incremental 
accumulative evolutionary process, which goes beyond learning and assimilation. It 
is far from being a linear process from imitation to assimilation and innovation. The 
concept emphasizes the linkage between imported technologies and local 
specificities, involving both qualitative development and qualitative change. Wu, Ma 
Xu (20006) state that the process may follow two patterns: the standard secondary 
innovation and post-secondary innovation. In the first pattern, the secondary 
innovations rely on the acquisition of mature technologies. The post-secondary 
innovations are based on emergent technologies or technologies that are still in their 
first stages. The second pattern demands higher capabilities in R&D and production 
than that based on mature technologies, but still relies on acquired technologies. 
 
3.2.4 The Chinese strategy to become a knowledge-dr iven economy 
 
In order to promote Chinese technological development, the state has acted in 
many dimensions (macroeconomic, regional, sectoral and social), and through 
horizontal and vertical interventions. The objectives are to provide favorable 
macroeconomic conditions, adequate physical infrastructure and other incentives to 
attract investments; to enhance competitive advantages of certain sectors and 
regions; and to provide technological change and innovative capabilities. The 
Chinese Government knows that it is crucial to enhance the capability building in 
science and technology, and has heavily invested in higher education. Most of the 
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basic research is carried out by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Research 
Institutes attached to the Ministries (each Ministry has its own research institute), 
large universities and SOEs (Zonenschain, 2006). The CAS was created in 1949 in 
line with the Soviet research model and restructured in the 1990s. Now it comprises 
more than 100 research institutes, a university and a graduate school, with unites 
across China. 
China has strengthened its S&T as the economic reforms proceed, 
allocating more funds both to basic and applied researches, connecting research 
units with local companies and attracting foreign partners (both companies and 
experts). Since 2000, government has heavily invested in building science and 
technological capabilities, creating a huge infrastructure to enhance R&D, providing 
incentives to high-tech firms and developing a legal framework (such as IPR rules 
and industrial standards) (Campbell, 2013).  
According to Campbell (2012), the Chinese strategy to develop science and 
technology has four distinct phases. In the first period, 1949-1960, technological 
efforts were associated to the development of heavy industries, according to 156 
large industrial projects designed by the Soviet Union (USSR). Huge volumes of 
equipment were imported from the Soviet bloc, which sent 3,000 technicians to 
China, mostly for training Chinese workers. About 20,000 Chinese were trained in the 
USSR and their satellites, many of which later led the Chinese scientific and 
technological initiatives. Mao Zedong supported technological development for 
military and industrial purposes to catch up with advanced economies, but the 
country experienced only punctual outcomes in heavy and military industries.  
The second period, between 1960 and 1978, marked by the Sino-Soviet Split 
and the Cultural Revolution’s political turbulences and economic stagnation. China 
concentrated its efforts in defense and still on heavy industries. The country became 
a nuclear power (testing an atomic bomb in 1964), developed intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and launched a satellite in 1970.  
With the country’s economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaping in late 1970s 
and carried forward by Jiang Zemin up to 2001, the third phase of the Chinese 
science and technological development took place. Deng Xiaoping endorsed the so-






abandoned) to reinvigorate China’s economy. Science and technology was 
appointed as one of the most important goals for the country, along with agriculture, 
industry and national defense. Universities and research institutions were 
rehabilitated and called upon to develop and transfer technology to SOEs. Actually, 
the Chinese government made a strategic decision to develop high-tech industries in 
the late 1980s when the China's national high and new technology industrial 
development plan, called the Torch Program, was put into force.   
Since the Torch Plan the government has reinforced the priority conferred to 
science & technology and to the construction of a high-performing national innovation 
system.104 According to the 2006 Medium to Long-Term Strategic Plan for 
Development of Science and Technology, the objective is to make China an 
“innovation-oriented” economy by the year 2020 and overtime one of the world´s 
leading “innovation economy”. China determination and steady efforts to develop 
inner capabilities to innovate indicate that the Chinese authorities are conscious of 
the challenges put by the country´s remarkable socioeconomic performance. As the 
OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: China (2008) points out, without high 
investments in innovation, the high rates of economic growth, industrialization and 
urbanization may jeopardize the sustainability of economic growth and social 
development due to environmental degradation and ecological challenges, uneven 
distribution of the economic development across regions and high demand for energy 
and raw materials. 
These constraints make imperative to China, the OECD report adds, to move 
from sustained to sustainable and comprehensive growth, which requires turning 
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innovation its engine of growth through continued efforts to develop scientific and 
technological capabilities. China has, indeed, succeeded at mobilizing resources for 
S&T rapidly on an unparalleled scale, becoming a big global player in science and 
technology. The outcomes are impressive in terms of publications, patent 
applications, high tech content of exports and economic performance, but “it has not 
yet translated into a proportionate increase in innovation performance”: the output of 
its investment is still below that of the OECD countries with equivalent levels of R&D 
and China continues relying on imported technologies (OECD, 2008). The OECD 
report attributes this shortcoming to inefficiency of the NIS, such as the weak 
integration between actors and subsystems (e.g. regional and national; public and 
private sector), the limited innovation capability and low propensity of the private 
sector to innovate, slower development of human resources vis-à-vis the 
development of related infrastructure in R&D, particularly in the private sector, even 
with the growing contribution from foreign companies. The insufficient supply of 
specialized human resources may affect the Chinese future performance, even if with 
the growth of human resources for S&T (OECD, 2008).  
The improvement of some framework conditions, particularly of those 
concerning to corporate governance, financing of R&D and enforcement IPR rules, 
may provide the appropriate conditions to the development of “an open system of 
innovation in which indigenous innovation capabilities and R&D-intensive foreign 
investment could be mutually reinforcing” (OECD, 2008). 
Although China had jointed the WTO in the December 2001, the poor 
enforcement of IPR rules is still a contentious issue with foreign companies. Actually, 
since China reopened its economy to foreign trade in the late 1970s, lax IPR 
protection has been the object of tough disputes between China and the United 
States.. Even today, it continues to be one of the main litigious matters in the US–
China relationship, along with the implementation of other WTO obligations, the 
policies to maintain currency undervalued, the privileges granted to local companies 
in terms of financial support, trade and investment barriers and pressures for 
technology transfer (Morrison, 2014105, Yu, 2010106).  
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When China was not engaged in building innovative capabilities, the posture 
of Chinese government regarding IPR protection aimed to facilitate for local firms to 
acquire foreign technologies and innovations through copy and reverse engineering 
without paying for it. Now that the country has conferred a strategic role to S&T, the 
lack of an effective IPR protection may become detrimental to Chinese interests. The 
infringement of rights not only affect the willingness of foreign companies to transfer 
technology to China, but also may affect the propensity of Chinese actors to invest in 
R&D and/or commercialize the outcome of their efforts in the country and the 
reputation of Chinese firms internally and abroad (OECD, 2008).  
Probably China’s attitudes concerning the enforcement of IPR rules will 
change in the same pace in which the local companies increase their technological 
capabilities and proprietary innovations. Indeed, some Chinese enterprises are 
already following this path. The emergence of China as a major international player 
in the S&T and innovation will change the dynamics of the global system of 
knowledge creation, diffusion and use. However, this process also carries the risk of 
additional tensions with other nations for the competitive pressures that it may 
generate (OECD, 2008).  
 
3.2.5 China’s investment in clean energies and gree n industries 
 
China is the world’s largest energy producer (since 2007) and consumer 
(since 2010), which makes the country a very influential player in the world energy 
markets. The country’s fast growth has enormously increased its energy demand, 
especially for oil: China is already the world´s second largest oil consumer, below the 
US. Until the early 1990s, China was a net oil exporter, but became the second 
largest net importer in 2009, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
estimates that it will surpass the U.S. in 2014.107 China is the world’s largest 
producer, consumer and importer of coal, and heavily contributes to the CO2 
emissions. In 2011, the country also became the world´s largest power generator.   
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Due to its growing pollution problems, since 2001, China has increased its 
investments in projects associated to energy technologies, especially projects related 
to renewable energies. In 2006, the Medium to Long-Term Science and Technology 
National Plan included energy and environment among its research priorities, while 
the Twelfth Five-Year Technology Plan (2012-2016) committed to invest USD 300 
billion in renewable energies, and the Ministry of Science and technology (MOST) 
and the National Development and Reform Commission started an international 
cooperation for new or renewable energies with many countries and organizations, 
signing more than 100 cooperation agreements with 97 countries. (Campbell, 2013).  
According to the Global Status Report, released by the Renewable Energy 
Policy Network for the 21st, China led the global investments in renewable energies in 
2013, spending a total of USD 56.3 billion on wind, solar and other renewable 
projects, well above the U.S. total (of USD 36.7 billion) and Europe investments, and 
61 percent of the total investment in renewable energies by developing countries. 
China has increased its investment in renewable energies for more than a decade 
and it now accounts for about 24 percent of the world’s renewable power capacity. Its 
renewable energy investments are included in the 12th Five-Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development, which established expenditures of USD 473.1 billion on 
clean energy investments from 2011 to 2015. China’s objective is to have 20 percent 
of its total energy consumption from renewable energy by 2020. 
The new Government since March 2013, headed since last year by Xi Jinping 
(President) and Li Keqiang (Prime-Minister), has reaffirmed the country’s 
commitment to sustainable growth. Besides announcing policies and economic 
reforms to promote more balanced economic growth and changing emphasis from 
exports and investments to domestic consumption, the government outlined the 
policies to the energy sector. These policies include the adoption of a more market-
based pricing system, energy efficiency measures, actions to enhance competition 
among firms, more investments in renewable energy projects and studies on how to 
attract more private investments in energy by speeding the project approval 
processes, enhancing the energy transmission infrastructure and loosening some 






China has made steady efforts to diversify and clean up its energetic matrix 
that strongly relies on coal (69 per cent in 2011) and makes the country the biggest 
CO2 emitter. The government intends to reduce the relative weight of coal 
consumption to below 65 per cent by 2017, and the EIA calculates that this share 
may fall to 55 per cent in 2040, but even in this case the EIA predicts that coal 
consumption will increase over 50 per cent during this time. For this reason, China 
has also invested to develop economical technologies that allow burning coal without 
releasing greenhouse gas into the atmosphere. Another initiative is the creation of 
low carbon centers, which similarly to the special economic zones, provide 
infrastructure and incentives to low carbon manufacturing and exports. Meanwhile, 
China has pressed the U.S. and other developed countries to accept stricter limits to 
their CO2 emissions and to continue to support the adoption by poor countries of 
clean energy technologies.  
The huge China´s market and economies of scale are reducing the cost of 
renewable energies (such as solar and wind) and other environmentally friendly 
technologies (such as electric car batteries), which help to turn green investments 
economical – nowadays many green investments still need subsidies to pay 
themselves. Chinese companies are becoming an important player in international 
markets, with cheaper equipment than their competitors in Europe, Japan and the 
United States.   
China investments in the development of green technologies might contribute 
to mitigate global problems associated to the overuse of natural resources and 
environmental depletion, which the country has, with its impressive performance, 
contributed to aggravate. China initiatives towards a low carbon economy probably 
will contribute to reshape the usage and the sources of energy worldwide, dropping 
prices and encouraging more investment in R&D and innovations in green industries. 
The country may define a new frontier to economical clean technologies and open 
new windows of opportunity for developing countries to catch up, at least for those 
making efforts to build science and technological capabilities, to master emerging 








3.3. Concluding remarks 
 
The environment for catching up has changed drastically in the last few 
decades and in this chapter the changing conditions associated with the emergence 
of the WTO and the resurgence of China as a major international player are 
analyzed. On one hand, the current international trade rules reduce the degrees of 
freedom to developing countries pursuing economic catching up through the same 
policies adopted by countries that successfully caught up in the past. However, it is 
also true that the requirements for catching up have changed immensely in a world 
increasingly driven by innovation, which demands specific policies to build up inner 
capabilities to innovate. Yet the new rules on intellectual property rights may restrain 
or make more expensive the access to new knowledge and its results, but probably 
now knowledge is more accessible than ever. The fact is that increasingly catching-
up relies on the ability of countries behind the technological frontiers to adopt and 
adapt imported technologies, and develop inner capabilities to become an innovator.  
On the other hand, China has challenged many established ideas and policy 
recommendations about growth, development and catching up, indicating new 
possibilities to other developing countries to move ahead. The country´s weight is 
growing in so many domains and what happens in China today matters more than 
ever to the world. The Chinese growth is disruptive and generates adjustment 
pressures elsewhere in the world, which demands accommodations and new 
strategies. It has changed and will continue to change patterns of comparative 
advantages and competitiveness, and therefore investment opportunities and the 
environment for catching up. China has put up great world challenges, but has also 
opened windows of opportunities for those that are at the technological frontier as 










Development was the main concern of classical economists, who investigated 
the critical factors to attain prosperity, but the subject lost popularity with the 
emergence of Marginalism and its emphasis on the allocation of resources in late 
19th century. Neoclassical growth models arose at the beginning of the 20th century, 
proposing single equations to explain the growth performance of all countries and 
predicting that growth rates and income per capita would converge among countries 
over time.  
After World War II, the centrality of development issues and the recognition of 
broad differences among lagging countries gave room to the advent of development 
economics as a separate field of research. At that time, there was a lack of 
confidence in the efficiency of markets to allocate the investments needed, due to the 
traumatic experience of the Great Depression.. Hence, the state was believed to play 
a crucial role both in modernized and modernizing economies, through planning, 
coordination and direct participation in economic activities. Generally speaking, at 
least until the late 1960s, state activism and development policies (based on  
Keynesianism, Welfarism and interpretations of backwardness) were considered not 
only desirable but essential, according to a myriad of theories that emerged in the 
core and the periphery of capitalism.  
Classical development economics started to lose prestige in the academic 
arena and on the political front by the end of “golden age” of capitalism (early 1970s) 
when a new generation of development or growth economists,  emerged, postulating 
new methodologies, interpretations and policies that were rooted in neoclassical 
economics. Rather than broad theories and visionary models, they preferred to 
investigate the microeconomic aspects of growth processes and target specific 
policies. According to their view, strengthened by the reinvigoration of neoliberalism 
and the advent of the Washington Consensus, growth would be a natural 
consequence of getting macroeconomic fundamentals right through privatization, 
deregulation and trade liberalization. 
Development economics began to re-gain its lost status in the mid-1990s, with 






development economics. The renewed interest in development issues was largely 
motivated by the poor economic performance of many countries that had followed the 
Washington Consensus guidelines. In the new context, the tradition of thinking of 
development as a catching up matter, inaugurated in the 1960s, was also reinforced. 
This tradition, which approaches development as a catching-up issue associated with 
technological change and innovation, provided the theoretical foundation to this 
dissertation, the objective of which is to examine the critical elements for developing 
economies to narrow their gap with the more advanced economies. The study 
focused on the role of technological change and innovation, and pursued its objective 
by addressing the following three questions: 
1) How can we revisit the catching-up approach in light of the knowledge 
economy and the experiences of countries that have succeeded in narrowing 
their gap with the more advanced economies in the last decades?  
2)  What seem to be the critical factors for catching-up today and what is the role 
of knowledge and technological catching-up in attaining a higher level of 
development? 
3)  What can countries behind the economic and technological frontier still learn 
from the experience of economies that succeeded in forging ahead (especially 
Asian economies) or are on their way to do so (case of China), through the 
lens of the catching up approach? 
In order to answer the first question we examined contributions associated to 
the catching up tradition, focusing on the elements that seem to matter most to catch 
up in the knowledge economy and by analyzing the catching up experience of Japan 
and other Asian economies. In the first chapter, one of the main points made is that 
today developing countries need to develop inner capabilities to innovate (both 
technologically and institutionally) in order to narrow their technological and 
economic gap with the more advanced economies (catching up), which may, 
occasionally, allow such countries to forge ahead and define new technological 
frontiers. The examination of theoretical and empirical studies of concrete experience 
in catching up shows that innovation has played a growing role in economic progress 
and that today an innovation-driven catch-up seems to be a pre-condition to attain 






Although technological change and innovation are more important to a 
country’s economic performance than ever before, empirical studies have shown that 
mastering knowledge, skills and new technologies has been crucial to a country’s 
ability to catch up since the late 19th century, when science-based industries 
emerged (such as the chemical industries), and the United States and Continental 
European countries caught up with England. Technological change has proven to be 
a critical factor in most successful catching up experiences, involving technological 
innovations and dissemination of existing technologies through learning by copying 
and learning by doing.  
The need for countries that are behind the technological and economic frontier 
to build up capabilities to absorb imported technologies and eventually become 
innovators has increased, especially in the last few decades, due to the new science-
based technologies (such as biotechnologies), the dissemination of the all-pervasive 
IT technologies and the adoption of stricter international IPR rules. Developing 
scientific, technological, managerial and other social capabilities has turned into one 
of the most strategic issues for countries to improve their economic performance and 
compete in the global economy. In other words, technological change and innovative 
capability have become not only a prerequisite of catching up, but the very essence 
of catching up today. Catching up increasingly relies on the ability of countries behind 
the technological frontiers to adopt and adapt imported technologies, as well as 
develop new technologies, which depends on the building of technological 
capabilities, technological infrastructure and efficient innovation systems, at the 
national, regional and sectoral levels.  
For this reason, such elements for development have received the attention by 
many new-Schumpeterian researchers, and they  were the object of this study. The 
option of focusing on technological change as a critical factor to catch up neither 
implies adherence to any kind of technological determinism nor any disregard for 
other elements also considered essential, such as state activism, financing, and 
institutions, which were critical elements that have also been taken into account in 
this study. In the present paper, knowledge has been recognized as a critical element 
to catch up today, but knowledge per se cannot enhance development if not 
supported by other elements such as a well-functioning financial system, good 






the state still matters and has key roles to play in supporting emergent technological 
fields, investing in infrastructure and mobilizing financial resources for key 
investments.    
Although this dissertation has emphasized the critical role of technology for 
development in an endeavor to answer the second question formulated in the 
introduction, it has become clear that innovation goes far beyond the production of 
high-tech and sophisticated industrial goods. Indeed, innovation should be 
understood in a broader sense and encompass organizational, managerial and 
business model aspects not only in manufacturing but also in agribusiness and in 
services. It is important to point out this aspect because countries have different 
possibilities in terms of economic development and can become innovators in 
manufacturing sectors. Social, technological and scientific capabilities, history, 
geography, geopolitical issues and other aspects in the international scenario matter 
to development. Specialization in the production of a few sophisticated goods or the 
provision of certain services can be the best development alternative for some 
economies, especially small ones. It has been the path followed by economies like 
Costa Rica, for instance, which has acquired competitive advantages in IT and 
services segments. Countries with big markets and more complex economic 
infrastructure have more options, but they also may fall behind without a clear vision 
about the future they want to build. They may also lack the steady efforts and lasting 
institutional arrangements to carry on a consistent development strategy to make 
their vision come true.   
Moving to the third question, it has become apparent from the experiences of 
the Asian countries that succeeded in sustaining fast growth and narrowing (or 
closing) their economic, technological and income per capita gap with rich Western 
countries, how important is to invest in capability building and create new institutions 
(in accordance with their background and needs), adapting imported technologies 
and innovating in a broader sense.  
Japan was the first Asian economy to catch up economically and 
technologically with the US and the advanced European economies after World War 
II. One of the peculiarities of the Japanese catch-up was the very rapid and orderly 






industries, as well as the continuous improvements associated with learning. Japan 
set the goal of establishing a broad-ranging industrial structure and developing a 
diversified manufacturing system; it updated technologically, and knew how to take 
advantage of the favorable economic and geo-political circumstances after World 
War II, as well as of the technological trends of the time. Japanese firms started by 
copying Western models through reverse engineering, but very soon went beyond 
imitation, improving and developing technologies and products created abroad. 
Some East Asian economies followed the Japanese example, but pursued 
their own strategies to catch up. In this study, the experiences of Korea and Taiwan 
have been highlighted and compared with other development experiences, such as 
that of Latin America and South Asian countries. After initially targeting mature 
industries (heavy and chemical industries in case of Korea), both Taiwan and Korea 
directed their efforts towards the emerging electronics industries, beginning with the 
final assembly of consumer goods and then embarking on higher stages of 
production, heavily investing in a narrow range of products or processes. The East 
Asian countries accumulated physical and human capital at high rates, but such 
accumulation only partially explains their performances. What effectively made a 
huge difference in the success of East Asian countries was the fact that investments 
in physical capital embodied modern technologies and, thanks to the investment in 
human capital, those countries were able to learn, master and adapt the new 
technologies, as well as innovate in a broader sense.  
The Asian industrialization/catching-up processes were comprised of a broad 
range of organizational and managerial innovations, as well as the construction of 
original institutional frameworks, according to the level of backwardness of each 
economy, their goals, and the international circumstances under which the 
modernization took place. One of the greatest merits of the East Asian economies 
was to perceive the windows of opportunity opened by the global production 
networks associated with the emergence of information technologies and 
globalization. As shown in Chapter 1, during the emergence of new techno-economic 
paradigms, windows of opportunity appear for latecomers because such paradigms 
diffuse new types of knowledge, skills and experiences, as well as create a favorable 
environment for easy entry. Throughout techno-economic paradigm shifts, 






because they do not carry the onus of capital stocks and institutions of the previous 
paradigm. Such was the case of Korea and Taiwan at the beginning of information 
technology: when everybody was learning, investment costs were lower in absolute 
terms and international intellectual property right regulations were less strict.  
The more successful Asian experiences of catching up seem to contradict 
orthodox laissez-faire interpretations, which essentially attribute the remarkable 
achievements of East Asia economies to their stability-oriented and market-friendly 
macroeconomic policies. In fact, contrary to what is believed by orthodoxy, Asian 
governments had adopted sound macroeconomic policies to get prices “wrong” 
according to strategic goals. Moreover, governments in East Asian countries, 
particularly in Korea and Taiwan, did more than pave the way for the private sector 
by providing a suitable macroeconomic environment. Actually, the state directly 
influenced firms’ decisions through a complex system of incentives. Government 
agencies set up a closer relationship with private entrepreneurs, guiding and 
supporting them through planning and coordination of a number of financial, technical 
and managerial instruments. Thus, a critical element of Asia’s trajectory to success 
was the combination of private entrepreneurship and state intervention, which 
guided, supported and disciplined the private sector through macro and sectoral 
policies. In the process, the role of new institutional arrangements and technological 
innovations were crucial, as has been proposed by the catching up approach. It is 
also worth mentioning the complementarity and synergy among Asian economies, 
which initially gravitated around the Japanese economy.   
The Asian economies that succeeded in catching up occupied a subaltern 
position as subcontractors in global value chains at the beginning of their efforts to 
catch up but invested to develop inner capabilities and were able to change their 
status overtime. Some of them like Japan, Korea and Taiwan were able to assume a 
dominant position in some chains. Today China is doing the same.      
China has been growing fast for more than three decades without following 
most of the conventional policies recommended for developing countries and 
transitional economies on their way to become market-oriented. From a large 
platform for the production of cheap goods, the country is moving steadily to become 






and enhancing capability building in science and technology.  China has also made 
efforts to move from sustained to sustainable growth through high investments in 
green technologies and is already an important player in this regard. 
China is not only a major exporter, but also a huge importer of a broad basket 
of goods. As a great consumer of commodities, the country imports  agricultural 
products as well as fuels and minerals, providing markets for many countries. The 
Chinese dynamism has contributed both to the increase the relative prices of 
commodities and the fall of prices of manufactured goods. The first effect (the 
increase of the prices of commodities) benefits developing countries in the short and 
medium run, but also raises the price of energy and produces environmental 
concerns in the case of non-renewable natural resources. The second effect (which 
is associated with the first) also produces also two contradictory results. On one 
hand, it expands the access to manufactured goods over the world, benefiting the 
poorer with cheap products and contributing to control inflationary pressures 
elsewhere. On the other hand, and at the same time, it displaces manufacturing 
activities even in low-wage countries, which makes deindustrialization processes 
initiated by radical liberal reforms in the 1990s even deeper.  
In fact, although most of the increase in China’s imports of raw-materials 
reflects a net increment in the world demand, part of the Chinese additional demand 
is offset by the equivalent reduction of consumption in countries where China has 
displaced manufactures. In the same way, the boost in the US and European 
countries trade deficit with China is to some extent balanced by reductions in their 
deficits with other Asian countries, due to the transfer of assembly and production 
from other countries to Chinese territory. 
China has re-designed value chains in Asia and worldwide, creating 
challenges and also new opportunities for other developing countries willing to catch 
up.  
On one hand, by providing cheap industrial goods to the whole world and by 
draining natural resources and food, China potentially inhibits the development of 
local industries in many developing countries, as well as maintains the exportation of 
primary goods more attractive for many countries  than investing in the production of 






materials, energy and food in poor countries in order to ensure that their needs may 
also be detrimental to their interests in the long run. In general, Chinese direct 
investments in the primary sector and infrastructure do not generate expressive 
dynamic effects in the recipient countries because the final beneficiaries are located 
in China – the country usually provides equipment and workers, paid in China with 
the funds lent to the recipient countries. 
On the other hand, China makes catching up a feasible endeavour by showing 
that it is possible to catch up by following strategies that take into account local 
needs and interests, as well as by showing the importance of moving from imitation 
and extensive capital accumulation to innovation and knowledge accumulation. The 
country also provides markets for other emergent economies and supplies them with 
equipment and intermediate goods at more affordable prices. 
Just as impact of China’s impressive performance, the rules on trade and 
intellectual property rights also change the international environment for catching up, 
affecting the ability of developing countries to catch up and reinforcing the need to 
build up inner capabilities to absorb new technologies and innovate. Although 
restrictions for catching up go much beyond IPR rules, the challenges in this arena 
are huge because they potentially reduce the room for maneuvering public policies 
and  increase the market power of incumbent players, rendering technological 
transfer more costly and ultimately restraining technological catching-up.  
If it is true that current international trade and IPR rules either put constraints 
on the use or completely prohibit recipes that worked well in the past for many of 
today’s advanced economies, it is equally true that some old policies are now a 
complete anachronism in light of the knowledge-intensive technologies, and the 
production and competition in the world economy. Some practices are still effective 
and can be used despite the restrictions placed by the new rules. Thus, industrial and 
trade policies are still possible, but they need to take into account that the 
requirements for catching up have changed immensely in a world that is increasingly 
driven by innovation, which demands specific policies to build up inner capabilities to 
innovate. 
  Since the US and continental European countries caught up with England in 






countries in terms of technology and institutions, and even finance. However, most or 
perhaps all the countries that succeeded in narrowing and surpassing their gap with 
the most advanced economies did so by finding an original way of doing what the 
leaders had already done to create their space and markets, and then they also 
developed something new. Moreover, backward countries that succeed in catching 
up knew how to take advantage of the international scenario instead of simply 
blaming leading nations or the circumstances for their underdeveloped conditions.   
Historically, innovations have relied on elements such as a country’s level of 
backwardness, its particularities (size, geography, natural resources, history, 
education and social capabilities), the techno-economic paradigm, the historical 
context and conditions in the international arena (finance, rules, and geopolitical 
elements). In some of the catching up experiences mentioned, the required 
innovations were associated with the creation of new financial mechanisms, such as 
the investment banks in Germany and other European countries, stock markets and 
public financial mechanisms. In others, the novelty was the design of planning and 
coordinating bodies or agencies to articulate public and market mechanisms. Yet, 
innovation has created new products, processes and also incremental or secondary 
innovations, which in some cases have implied the use of new raw materials and 
sources of energy. In sum, countries that succeeded in catching up have prioritized 
the knowledge aspects of development and those that want to keep going forward 
have to invest incessantly in creating knowledge capabilities. 
Despite all kinds of innovations since the second industrial revolution in the 
19th century, most countries have reproduced the production and consumption 
patterns of the leaders, based on the usage of fossil fuels (including oil, natural gas 
and coal) as a primary energy source and on the wastefulness of other natural 
resources. The continuity and the reproduction of non-friendly production and lifestyle 
patterns have depleted the environment, changed the planetary climate, polluted 
rivers and oceans, and increased the disparities within and among countries. The 
concern surrounding global warming has mobilized international civil society, states, 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as some 
firms and experts. This concern has produced local and global initiatives and actions 
that promote energy efficiency, clean energy sources, forest conservation, and eco-






global economy as a whole. As Celso Furtado commented almost four decades ago, 
the idea that the opulence and consumption patterns of developed countries could be 
universalized to the masses of peripheral countries is unfeasible.  
China, whose impressive performance has contributed to aggravate the 
problem of consumption, may, however, contribute to change this situation in the 
years to come, if its strategy to move towards a greener economy is successful. 
China’s movement may help to disseminate cleaner technologies more broadly, as 
well as create more economic, low-carbon supply chains in terms of waste 
management and consumption of energy, water and raw materials. It is an 
indispensable and challenging step in face of the costly environmental consequences 
of China’s huge growth rates in the last few decades, which transformed the country 
into the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases, due to its heavy dependence 
on coal and oil.  
The success of China towards a more sustainable development path will 
probably have a big influence on production and consumption at the global level, 
thereby encouraging more investment in R&D and innovations in green industries. In 
this case, the country would not only reach the technological frontier (catching up), 
but would possibly define a new technological frontier (forging ahead). It may open 
new windows of opportunity to developing countries to catch up, at least for those 
making efforts to build scientific and technological capabilities to master emerging 
technologies and innovate. In doing so, China is going beyond other Asian 
economies that took advantage of windows of opportunity to catch up. More than just 
demonstrating new ways of doing old things, it may be that China will show new 
ways of doing new things.  
To conclude this dissertation, the following points should be made:   
• Leaders are important references for backward countries in terms of 
technology and institutions, or even finance. However, each country must find 
its own way to succeed in catching catch up. Most or perhaps all countries that 
succeeded found an original way of doing the same thing that the more 
advanced countries were already doing in order to create its space and 
markets.  They also knew how to take advantage of the international 






prosperity for their underdeveloped conditions. The additional challenge now it 
is to find original ways of doing different things.  
• Technological catching up is necessary, and maybe the pre-requisite for 
catching up today. However, although much attention has been given to the 
key role of technological change for development today, it is clear that a socio-
economic catching up also relies on other elements. Whereas capital 
accumulation and technological change may increase the GDP, they may not 
improve other development indicators. In fact, a country may move towards 
the technical frontier in some sector while remaining underdeveloped, with 
very poor socio-economic indicators. 
• Since the 1990s, the conditions of international competition, the rules of the 
game on trade and intellectual property rights (IPR), the nature of new 
technologies, and the resurgence of China as major player not only impose 
constraints (as it is broadly claimed) but also offer opportunities for countries 
that are economically and technologically behind to catch up.   
• For countries that are behind the economic frontier, the mediation role of the 
state continues to be crucial in order to take advantage of potential windows of 
opportunity opened by the new conditions in the international arena. The 
challenges put forth by globalization, international competition and the path of 
technological progress are so immense that even some advanced countries 
have also faced huge difficulties in adapting themselves and not falling behind. 
• Even though some preconditions can be appointed as crucial to catching up, 
many elements, such as the appropriate institutional arrangements, are built in 
the course of the process itself. The requirements to keep going are context-
dependent. They are determined by the specific characteristics of the 
backward country (such as degree of backwardness, geography, endowments 
of natural resources, initial level of social capabilities, technology gap, and the 
size of potential domestic market), international conditions (legal framework, 
international support, finance mechanisms etc.), technology trends, the 
country’s target industries and technologies, the country’s target markets and 






• The new growth theories that emerged in the late 1980s have emphasized the 
increasing returns associated with education. Neo-Schumpeterians have 
showed the spill overs of high investments in education in East Korea, 
particularly in Korea. However, without productive investments, the newly 
educated people will not find employment, and the result of the education 
expenditures will be increased unemployment rates and brain drain. In the 
case of Korea’s catching up, associated with high investments in education by 
many analysts, what was really impressive was the country’s ability to invest in 
education and  create opportunities to absorb the trained human resources at 
the same time. The capital accumulation and continuing absorption of new 
skilled human resources encouraged further investments in education and 
training, creating a virtuous circle. In fact, in East Asia economies that succeed 
in catching up, investments in human capital went far beyond the expansion of 
education. Similar to Japan, they enhance the human resources development 
through the creation of social opportunities, investing not only in massive basic 
education, but also in health care and other spheres that affect the living 
conditions, even before lifting millions out of poverty. Therefore, generally 
speaking, investments in human capital are a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to succeed in catching up. 
• Certain strategies and mechanisms applied in the past by countries that 
succeeded in catching up cannot be used any more. The reason is not only 
because the current developed countries are “kicking away the ladder” that 
they used to catch up (in List’s and, more recently, Chang’s terminology). In 
fact, changes in so many levels in the environment for catching up have made 
certain remedies that worked well in the past less effective, if not a complete 
anachronism. Although international regulations and practices play a very 
important role in the definition of policies to move ahead, the new 
requirements of technological progress are not less important. In any case, 
when new policy tools can no longer be used, whether for legal commitments 
or because they became dysfunctional, it is time to create new institutional 
arrangements to face the challenges of the time.  
• Technological borrowing by followers is a necessary step in the path for 






are the essence of the catch-up hypothesis. However, imported technology 
may also be very detrimental to the lagging countries’ interests. For these 
reasons, most countries that succeed in catching up adopted polices to take 
advantage of the methods and techniques already in use in the advanced 
countries in a way that enhanced the development of industrial activities and 
the improvement of the standard of living. In fact, the negative impact of 
leading countries can go beyond the importation of final products and 
technologies that may prevent, instead of enhance, the growth progress.  
• Even more critical to development may be the borrowing of institutional 
arrangements that are totally alien to the local reality. Even though backward 
countries can take advantage of the successful institutional experiences of 
leader countries, institutions should be to some extent embedded in the 
country’s socio-economic structure in order to function effectively. Institutional 
learning may reduce the time of institution building, but learning does not 
mean simply copy institutions created in more advanced nations.  In other 
words, taking  advantage of leaders’ experience means to build institutions 
that perform similar functions in the backward country.  
• The latecomers need to set priorities in terms of investments, but the catching 
up process itself can produce scarcities and bottlenecks, that often cannot be 
anticipated.  
• Countries have uneven abilities to follow different technological paths, 
according to their capabilities, deficiencies, geography, endowments of factors 
and historical circumstances. There is no path that fits all. Some deficiencies 
can be surpassed over time, but not all of them.  
• Knowledge is the critical factor to catch up today, but empirical evidence 
shows it needs to be supported by proper financial conditions, good 
governance and proper infrastructure.  
• In the successful catching up experiences of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the 
presence of strong business groups was crucial. Today’s China is no different.  
• Development policies are contingent upon the country’s level of 






diverse groups of developing countries differ a lot, the international programs 
to help them build the roads to progress and escape from poverty should be 
tailored to their particular conditions. Indeed,  international policies toward the 
backward countries should take into account their peculiarities and external 
circumstances. 
• The higher the social capability of followers, the higher is their ability to 
compete in new markets and displace the old established industries of the 
leader countries. Competitive pressures may be an incentive to research and 
innovate as well as an excuse for protection. Countries that succeed in their 
catching up processes quite often also challenge the older leaders in the 
technological frontier. In fact, as Abramovitz pointed out, as the technological 
gap falls, the direction of knowledge transfer may change in some domains, 
and the old lagging countries may become leaders in particular branches, 
thereby becoming sources of new knowledge for the countries that they had 
previously followed. 
• Catching up more than ever relies on a country’s´ ability to adapt and adopt 
new technologies as well as to innovate. It demands high effort to build social, 
scientific and technological capabilities; to develop physical infrastructure; and 
to create an environment that enhances the R&D activities by firms. 
Finally, in the current international environment, some roads to catch up have 
been closed, but new ones have been opened. Countries that are now near to or on 
the socio-economic frontier have also faced challenges on their way to 
industrialization – perhaps challenges  as big as those which many developing and 
least developed countries are facing now. The “old good times” were not so good and 
the “bad present times” are not so bad. There are no ideal conditions; often there are 
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